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CONCEPTUALISING, REALISING AND ENFORCING A HUMAN 
RIGHT TO WATER FOR UGANDA: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 
ABSTRACT 
International law is increasingly recognising a right to water. As with other socio-economic 
rights in international law, enjoyment of this right depends on its translation within domestic 
constitutional and legal systems.  This dissertation concerns itself with the enjoyment of the 
right to water in Uganda, where it is not currently explicitly ensconced in the Constitution. 
The dissertation supports the findings of previous research showing that, where the 
understanding of a right to water as conceptualised within international law has been 
ensconced within the domestic legal framework; there is better translation of the right in 
domestic legislation and executive policy.  This, it is advanced, is even more so when the 
right is made justiciable and is deliberated upon and enforced by the courts.  This is 
illustrated through a desk study of the right to water in different legal systems.  After 
unpacking the content and implications of the right in international law, the dissertation looks 
at the implicit manner in which the right is recognised in the Ugandan Constitution, links this 
to the extent to which it has been translated in legislation and executive policy and 
contemplates the possibilities of enhancing such translation through adjudication.  By way of 
comparison, the dissertation then conducts similar analyses of the protection of the right in 
India (where, like in Uganda, it is also only indirectly ensconced in the Constitution but 
where, unlike in Uganda, it has been elaborated indirectly through adjudication) and in South 
Africa (where the Constitution guarantees a fully justiciable right to water and where the 
courts have adjudicated upon this right).  The dissertation finds that constitutional protection 
of a justiciable right to water appears to provide the most appropriate springboard for its 
elaboration, translation and ultimate enjoyment.  Constitutional protection legitimizes 
citizens’ claims to enjoy the right, facilitates dialogue with the institutions of state over 
access to water, shapes water struggles and provides the most effective counterweight to the 
forces of neo-liberalism engrained within legislation, policy and water service delivery 
models. In the context of current constitutional reforms, the dissertation thus proposes that 
Uganda adopts a model in terms of which a justiciable right to water is explicitly entrenched 
in the Constitution and both directly and indirectly enforced by the courts. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: WATER NEEDS AND WATER RIGHTS 
1.1 WATER AS A BASIC NEED 
The need for fresh water is one of the most basic human needs. Water sustains life. Human 
beings need water for drinking and producing food. Water is essential for basic hygiene. It 
also plays a vital part in the social functioning of communities because in many parts of the 
world, water has strong cultural and religious connotations. The various uses to which we 
apply water create an important means of social mobilization as well as a means of enhancing 
social cohesion between communities.  
 Considering that water has several uses, there is increasing competition for utilising the 
resource. To illustrate the increasing competition for water use among sectors, the United 
Nations estimates that 70 percent of the world’s total water usage is attributed to irrigation 
and agriculture. An additional 20 percent is used on industry, leaving a paltry 10 percent for 
everyday human consumption.
1
 Commentators have even argued that, given the nature of 
these increasing demands on water resources at national level, there is likely to be increased 
tension between states over trans-boundary water resources. These commentators go as far as 
to argue that the next world war may be triggered by disagreement over the distribution of 
water resources.
2
 The competition for water resources has thus added a new dynamic to its 
importance. Water is increasingly being regarded as one of the scarcest resources for current 
and future generations.
3
 
Even though the importance of water as a prerequisite to human existence is not 
disputed, the problem of water scarcity has persisted. Scarcity is described as a situation 
where the demand for water is greater than the water which is readily available for use. From 
this perspective, there is no threat of absolute water scarcity globally, because the total 
amount of global fresh water is more than enough to meet the basic water needs of human 
beings. Rather, water scarcity appears to be due to distance to water sources, poor service 
                                                          
1
 World Water Assessment Program sourced from http://www.unwater.org/statistics_use.html. Also see Linda 
Stewart & Debra Horsten ‘The role of sustainability in the adjudication of the right to access to adequate water’ 
(2009) 24 SAPL 486, 503. 
2
Harriet Bigas et al (eds) The Global Water Crisis: Addressing an Urgent Security Issue 
 http://inweh.unu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/WaterSecurity_The-Global-Water-Crisis.pdf. 
3
 See Stephen C McCaffrey ‘A human right to water: Domestic and international implications’ (1992-1993) 5 
Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 1, 4; and Bob Sandford ‘Water and global security’ in 
The Global Water Crisis: Addressing an urgent security issue 12 
http://www.inweh.unu.edu/WaterSecurity/documents/WaterSecurity_FINAL_Aug2012.pdf . 
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delivery, inability to pay for water services and outright exclusion from water sources.
4
 These 
factors are not all caused by naturally occurring circumstances. The UN has argued that ‘the 
roots of the crisis in water can be traced to poverty, inequality and unequal power 
relationships, as well as flawed water management policies that exacerbate scarcity.’5 
Water scarcity affects millions of people around the world. The UN estimates that there 
are nearly 780 million people worldwide who cannot access clean and safe water.
6
 More still, 
the majority of the 780 million people in the world who lack access to clean and safe water, 
are located in Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and South America.
7
 Many of these people live in 
urban areas.  
The impact of water scarcity has been vicious. Water-related illnesses, caused by the 
lack of clean and safe drinking water, account for the deaths of approximately 1.5 million 
children under the age of 5 years.
8
 Drawing a link between water scarcity and life, the UN 
reports that infant mortality rates are twice as high for households without access to safe 
water than for those households with adequate access to safe water.
9
 More importantly, the 
scarcity of water has perpetuated the exclusion of many of the world’s poor and vulnerable, 
who find themselves systematically disadvantaged and barred from enjoying access to water. 
While much of this exclusion is not legally ordained, it appears that, to some extent, it may be 
implicitly facilitated by law or omissions of law. It is these consequences of water scarcity, 
which require that the question of how water is delivered is reformulated, to examine the 
possibility and potential of enhancing enjoyment of water within a human rights paradigm.  
1.2 WATER DELIVERY CHALLENGES IN UGANDA   
This thesis mainly focuses on the enjoyment of a right to water as it pertains to Uganda which 
is endowed with significant freshwater resources. The country’s rivers and lakes, including 
wetlands, cover about 18% of the total surface area of the country.
10
 Uganda receives an 
ample amount of rainfall, which also enhances available water sources. The most significant 
                                                          
4
 Jenny Gronwall Access to Water: Rights, Obligations and the Bangalore Situation (2008) PhD dissertation 
Linköping University downloaded from http://liu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:18111/FULLTEXT01  1, 29. 
5
 United Nations Human Development Report (2006) v. 
6
 WHO UN- Water Global Analysis & Assessment of Sanitation & Drinking Water: The Challenge of Extending 
& Sustaining Services (2012). In addition, about 2.5 billion people still lack access to basic sanitation. 
7
 Ibid. These numbers have reduced over time.  For instance by 2005, it was estimated that the population 
without water was 1.2 billion. 
8
 See UN General Assembly, Human Rights Council Session A/HRC/15/L.14, 24
th
 September 2010. 
9
 UN 2
nd
 World Water Development Report, National Water Development Report: Uganda (2005) 1, 69. 
10
 Uganda comprises a total area of 241,550 square kilometres (sq kms), of which about 15% or 36,902 sq kms 
are covered by fresh water bodies and 3% or 7,325 sq kms are covered by permanent and seasonal swamps. See 
Government of Uganda Water Supply Atlas (2010) 
http://mwe.go.ug/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=59&Itemid=55.  
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hydrological features in the country are Lake Victoria and the River Nile. Lake Victoria is the 
second largest freshwater lake in the world and the largest in Africa. Much of the water used 
in Kampala, the country’s capital city, and surrounding towns is sourced from Lake Victoria. 
In addition, nearly all of Uganda lies within the River Nile basin which charts its course 
through eleven African countries, many of which are water scarce.
11
  
Uganda’s water bodies buttress several uses for water and are at the heart of the 
country’s socio-economic development. Besides supporting the country’s domestic water 
supply, fresh water is necessary for livestock, industrial use, hydropower generation, 
agriculture, marine transport, fishing, waste discharge, tourism, environmental conservation 
mechanisms and, more recently, oil exploration and production. This indicates that there is an 
increasing demand for water resources to support tangible economic growth in the country. 
But Uganda’s fresh water resources are likely to diminish in the decades ahead. For 
example, over the past decade, it has been reported that changing weather patterns have been 
adversely affecting water resources. In addition, the water from Lake Victoria has receded 
significantly. Key amongst concerns over the extent to which water is being exploited and 
utilised for Uganda is agreement over the use of the Nile’s water. In 2013 an attempt to revise 
the 1929 colonial Nile River treaty, which would have increased the extent to which Uganda 
and other countries could utilise the Nile’s waters, was rejected by Egypt.12 This is only one 
way of illustrating the need to focus on the manner in which water is conceptualised by 
institutions of State as the bedrock for planning and implementing measures geared at 
enhancing equity in water delivery for citizens in the long term. 
Conceptualising water supply and delivery requires a contextual understanding of how 
water was historically distributed and delivered within Uganda. Apart from the colonial era 
infrastructure, that supported a few towns which were the hubs of colonial activity, there was 
little effort towards extending water infrastructure to all parts of the country. In many areas, 
water was accessed communally according to customary rules of land ownership. Reports 
indicate that, from about 1966 to 1990, no new water infrastructure was developed in the 
                                                          
11
 The river Nile basin area is shared by Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, DRC, Uganda, South Sudan, Sudan, 
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Egypt.  
12
 An accord, the Nile River Co-operative Framework Agreement, was signed by Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Kenya and Burundi in 2013. But the 1929 treaty gave Egypt the power to veto any projects involving waters of 
the Nile by upstream countries such as Uganda. Also see “East Africa seeks more Nile water” BBC (14 May 
2010) “Ethiopia ratifies River Nile treaty amid Egypt” tension BBC (13 June 2013) 
http://m.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22894294. There have also been reports of disputes relating to territorial 
claims over Lake George and Lake Albert which border the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as Uganda’s 
water boundaries with Kenya within Lake Victoria. See http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/dispute-over-
migingo-escalates.  
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country. By 1990, the UN estimated that only 10 percent of the country’s population was 
being served by the State controlled National Water and Sewerage Corporation (NWSC), yet 
this was the primary institution mandated to provide water delivery services to citizens.
13
 
This shows that, even when water delivery was a state managed effort, it did not benefit the 
majority of citizens.  
For the most part, water delivery in Uganda has been by self help mechanisms both 
within urban and rural areas in the sense that individuals take responsibility to ensure that 
water is available for their households. Citizens will depend on their own geographic 
knowledge of the city or rural area to determine where and how to reach water sources and 
for what the water will be used for. Rain water may be harvested during the rainy seasons, 
mobile water trucks may sell water to locals, or a local entrepreneur may collect water from a 
spring and traverse the neighbourhood selling jerry cans from a bicycle; a borehole may be 
used or an individual with a stand tap may sell at a small premium. For others the state water 
supply system may reach their homes to supply water.
14
 What this explains is that most water 
delivery arrangements appear to be unregulated by the State. 
When water delivery became the subject of the fierce ‘privatisation versus public 
service’ debate which affected many countries, Uganda was no exception. After the World 
Bank and IMF-driven economic liberalisation reforms of the 1980s, which sought to 
withdraw government from business and service delivery by emphasising privatisation, 
divestiture and cost sharing, water delivery was organised in a manner which promoted the 
interests of those who could afford to pay in order to consume water.
15
 While the NWSC was 
able to expand its service to many more parts of Uganda, its business model emphasised 
payment for new water connections; efficiency in billing and collecting payments; payment 
of penal charges for re-connections where original connections had been removed for non-
payment; and a lack of tolerance for failure to settle arrears. Most of the harsh effects 
                                                          
13
 UN 2
nd
 World Water Development Report op cit note 9 at 178. In 1972, the NWSC supplied water in three 
towns: Kampala, Entebbe and Jinja. See also William T Muhairwe Making Public Enterprises Work: From 
Despair to Promise- A Turn Around Account (2009) 5-10; 95-98. 
14
 This information was gleaned from informal interviews with residents of an informal settlement of Kampala 
conducted in September 2013.  
15
 See J Oloka Onyango ‘Poverty, human rights and the quest for sustainable human development in structurally 
adjusted Uganda’ (2000) 18 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 23, 30-33 for an overview of the negative 
effect of IMF and World Bank reform policies on the struggle for human rights. For a more detailed discussion 
of privatisation, human rights and water delivery see Karen Bakker Privatizing Water: Governance Failure and 
the World’s Urban Water Crisis (2010) Chapter 1 and 5. 
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resulting from such water service delivery reforms were felt within overcrowded settlements 
in urban areas.
16
 
Even then, there are still challenges emerging from the social context in which water is 
delivered, which affects how and to whom it is distributed. First, Uganda’s population has 
continued to grow rapidly. Population growth is estimated at 3.2 percent per annum and it is 
projected that the national population will rise to 37.9 million people by 2015.
17
 National 
reports also indicate that population growth is especially rapid in the urban parts of Uganda. 
Kampala, the country’s capital city, has a high population density in relation to other urban 
areas, which presents a unique challenge for water management.
18
 The majority of these 
urban residents reside within informal settlements. NWSC reports that the city already has 24 
areas zoned as informal settlements or slum areas. Many of these informal settlement areas 
are situated in low-lying areas which are prone to flooding, without adequate access to tap 
water.
19
  
Poverty is another enduring problem which affects the context in which water is 
delivered in Uganda. By 2006, 31 percent of Uganda’s population lived below the poverty 
line.
20
 As in other developing countries, women and children in Uganda are burdened by 
water collection. A large percentage of the population still spends significant amounts of their 
productive time walking long distances to collect water. To compound this, owing to the long 
distances travelled, even the water collected may end up contaminated due to unhygienic 
water handling and storage practices.
21
 This implies that there are still many citizens who 
need support in enhancing their enjoyment of water and whose social context ought to be 
taken into account while planning and implementing programs for water delivery. 
The approaches used by the State to address the problems of water delivery also 
deserve interrogation. For instance within the rural and peri-urban areas, government policy 
                                                          
16
 If water borne illnesses provide a measure of understanding the effect of water scarcity, in 1998 the highest 
incidence, consisting 49,514 cases of cholera was reported in Uganda. http://www.africhol.org/country/uganda. 
See also William T Muhairwe Making Public Enterprises Work: From Despair to Promise- A Turn Around 
Account (2009) 175-178. 
17
 In 2002, the Population and Housing Census reported that the national population was at 24.2 million.  
18
 UN 2
nd
 World Water Development Report op cit note 9 at 77. 
19
 This information was gathered from an interview with Pro-poor Manager for National Water and Sewerage 
Corporation in September 2013. See also WHO UN Water Global Analysis and Assessment of Sanitation & 
Drinking Water op cit note 6 at 44. Government of Uganda Joint Water & Environment Sector Support 
Programme 2013-2018 (2013) 1, 109.  
20
Government of Uganda The National Development Plan 2010/11-2014/15 (2010) 1, 276. According to the 
2011 Human Development Indicators profile for Uganda, the country ranked below the trends in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. The indicators provide a composite measure of 3 dimensions: health, education and income. Uganda’s 
HDI was 0.446 ranking 161 out of 187 countries with comparable data. In comparison the HDI of Sub-Saharan 
Africa was 0.463. Sourced from http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/l.   
21
UN 2
nd
 World Water Development Report op cit note 9 at 61. 
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has emphasized a community approach to water delivery.
22
 This community approach locates 
the responsibility for determining when and how water sources are managed with the various 
community leaders. While this may facilitate sustainable use of water resources, 
commentators caution that a community approach to water delivery does not prioritise the 
basic needs of the individual to exist in dignity and good health. Additionally, it does not 
appear to emphasize the responsibility of the state in actualising water delivery.
23
  
As such, while the state has made progress in enhancing access to water supply from an 
economic perspective, the underlying problems surrounding substantive enjoyment of the 
human right to water remain.
24
 Given that the poorest and most vulnerable may be unable to 
compete for water in circumstances of scarcity, it seems that the State’s initiatives may 
themselves perpetuate the inequity existing in water delivery models. It would seem that 
while physical scarcity of water is not Uganda’s problem, enjoyment of access to water may 
have been impeded by the weak water governance regime. This raises the question whether 
approaching water delivery issues from within a human rights paradigm would lead to better 
enjoyment of water services. 
1.3 A RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH TO WATER  
The notion that rights are a tool for social transformation has met with much scepticism. It 
has for instance been argued that law, by design, protects and entrenches the interests of the 
few who have or control resources. Some have argued that the conceptualisation of human 
needs within the human rights framework only serves to legitimize the interests of the 
wealthy and effectively to maintain the status quo, given that there are often laws, through 
which the poor are excluded from enjoying access to basic needs. Moreover, it has been 
argued that, through the liberties which come along with rights recognition, a rights 
framework prevents the redistribution of resources in any manner which would likely 
                                                          
22
 Phiona Muhwezi Mpanga ‘Plenty of water but scarcity persists: Surveying the status of the right to water in 
Uganda’ (2007) Working Paper No 10 HURIPEC 1, 22. In addition, the World Bank has piloted and promoted 
reliance on a demand driven approach to water delivery where those communities which have been able to 
organise themselves to manage water sources appear to get water facilities availed much quicker than areas 
where organisation appears to be absent or lacking. 
23
 Malcolm Langford ‘The United Nations concept of water as a human right: A new paradigm for old 
problems?’ (2005) 21 (2) International Journal of Water Resources Development 273, 275. 
24
 Over the last 10 years, Uganda developed a Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP I and PEAP II) which 
was intended to provide a framework for national planning. The PEAP approach is described as a strategy which 
aims to forge a framework for economic growth; promote good governance and security; directly improve the 
ability of poor people to generate income; and directly improve the poor’s quality of life. See UN 2nd World 
Water Development Report op cit note 9 at 6. 
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improve the social status of the poor and vulnerable.
25
 In short, the argument has been that 
law serves the interests of those with power and therefore that the human rights model cannot 
improve the lived realities of the poor and vulnerable. 
But these arguments have been countered and have mostly been found to be erroneous. 
Scholars arguing for the application of a rights-based approach within the domestic context 
advance the view that a rights based approach empowers those who are poor and vulnerable 
to secure their freedom and entitlement to enjoy certain rights through direct claims made 
against the State.
26
 Considering that the broader human rights discourse has constructed 
values which underpin human rights, the universal acceptance of the dignity and equality of 
human beings as values can be given broad interpretation in order to add weight and 
legitimacy to claims for basic needs. 
Other scholars have countered the argument that rights perpetuate class interests by 
illustrating that the process of adjudicating socio-economic rights has transformative 
tendencies which aid the actualisation of these rights. These transformative tendencies 
manifest themselves by legitimizing basic needs as socio-economic rights. When the nature 
and content of a specific right is articulated within domestic legislation, it facilitates the 
possibility of legitimate rights claims. In addition, the courts are more willing to engage with 
elaborating on and enforcing such claims. In turn, citizens subsequently have a basis upon 
which their needs are recognised and are ultimately awarded a legitimate basis upon which to 
claim for the right.
27
 Through rights-based adjudication, the interests of the poor and 
vulnerable are thus mainstreamed. 
Much of this debate has been settled. Indeed, within the framework of international 
human rights law, claims for water as a basic need are increasingly perceived as human 
rights, particularly within a broader context in which it is accepted that all human rights are 
indivisible, interdependent and inter-related. Rights are thus perceived as a means to address 
concerns of protecting and distributing water within societies. 
Accordingly, the interpretation of the normative content of many of these human rights 
has gravitated towards a universal understanding of these rights, and scholars have in turn 
                                                          
25
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developed a human rights based approach which ought to enhance the realisation of socio-
economic rights.
28
 The human rights based approach has been adopted by the United Nations 
(UN) and reinforces the argument that basic needs such as water are better accessed and 
enjoyed by citizens in circumstances where the State conceptualises these needs as rights and 
thus applies a human rights framework to actualize its obligations to addressing the socio-
economic needs of its citizens.   
 The UN has accordingly agreed on principles which aim to guide States when they are 
conceiving and implementing basic service delivery programs. These principles include 
participation, non-discrimination, equality, accountability, interdependence and indivisibility 
of rights.
29
 The principles ought to work by infusing rights consciousness within national 
programs at domestic level. Even though these principles appear to be self standing, 
commentators have affirmed that they are in fact informed by law. The law is thus envisaged 
as capable of having a tangible effect in social processes because it mainstreams rights and 
ensures adherence to legal obligations.
30
 
If these approaches have been articulated, why do challenges with water delivery 
persist? It has been argued that the application of a rights based approach is at most symbolic.  
As a result, water delivery concerns tend to focus on questions of water scarcity, tokenistic 
participation, top-down expensive solutions, insistence on universal payment of user fees and 
an allocation of most budgetary resources to the provision of water and sanitation 
infrastructure for wealthier neighbourhoods.
31
 While all these factors may not hold equally 
true within Uganda’s water delivery mechanisms, such concerns highlight the importance of 
critically analysing the manner in which constitutional, legislative and policy mechanisms 
operate to enhance or impede enjoyment of a right to water.  
1.3.1 The Justiciability Debate As It Pertains To A Human Right To Water 
A rights-based approach to realising socio-economic rights encompasses more than 
adjudication. The rights-based approach envisages a legal framework through which 
                                                          
28
 Philip Alston ‘A framework for the comparative analysis of bills of rights’ in Philip Alston (ed) Promoting 
Human Rights Through Bills of Rights: Comparative Perspectives (1999). 
29
 Emilie Filmer-Wilson ‘The human rights-based approach to development: The right to water’ (2005) 23 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 213, 217 ; United Nations The Human Rights Based Approach To 
Development Cooperation: Towards A Common Understanding Among UN Agencies(2003) downloaded from 
http://www.undg.org/content/programming_reference_guide_(undaf)/un_country_programming_principles/hum
an_rights-based_approach_to_development_programming_(hrba)  
30Paul Gready ‘Rights-based approaches to development: what is the value added?’ (2008) in Olivier de Schutter 
(ed) Economic, Social & Cultural Rights as Human Rights (2013) 877, 878.  
31
 Malcolm Langford ‘Ambition that overleaps itself? A response to Stephen Tully's critique of the general 
comment on the right to water’ (2006) 24 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 433, 449; Emilie Filmer-
Wilson op cit note 29 at 217-9. 
9 
 
conceptualisations of rights guide the legislative and executive processes and ultimately 
provide a rallying point for activism within civil society. But the more controversial subject 
remains the appropriate avenue for their enforcement through law and especially courts, 
where for socio-economic rights, there is a major controversy regarding the appropriateness 
of their justiciability. 
Those opposed to the notion that socio-economic rights ought to be vindicated by 
courts argue that the idea is fraught with ideological shortcomings and institutional 
illegitimacy. Firstly socio-economic rights are regarded as significantly different from their 
counter-part civil and political rights. Within the International Covenant of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) these rights are expressed in a manner that describes 
aspirations in the context of societal needs and the pursuit of better social services.
32
 Such 
aspirations cannot reasonably be immediately realised and, thus, it is argued, they cannot 
become the subject of adjudication.  
Reluctance to accept justiciable socio-economic rights was premised on the argument 
that the adversarial form which adjudication takes does not allow courts to effectively 
deliberate matters concerning the allocation of resources because of the strong polycentric 
issues involved.
33
 Claims for socio-economic rights to a great extent involve resource 
allocation. The concern is that such claims cannot be adequately resolved before courts, 
because any determination of one of these issues consequently affects matters of finance and 
the ordering of government priorities, which according to conventional wisdom, only the 
executive branch is well informed to determine. In a court setting, it is argued, the judge is 
only limited to the information presented by the adversarial parties and cannot have a 
complete understanding of the consequences which are likely to emerge from a decision the 
court is required to make.
34
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Opponents of adjudicating socio-economic rights therefore caution that an adjudicative 
process relating to these rights conflicts with a separation of powers doctrine present in most 
jurisdictions. Within a pure doctrine of the separation of powers, the Constitution allocates 
the three arms of government (executive, legislature and judiciary) specific constitutional 
roles which avoid any overlap.
35
 As such, matters concerning socio-economic claims which 
address citizens’ needs and the allocation of resources are considered to be more 
efficaciously resolved by the executive who have the technical expertise to make such 
decisions. An attempt to draw the courts into the determination of socio-economic rights 
issues through adjudication would thereby, conceivingly serve to introduce an inappropriate 
role for courts and to second guess executive decisions.
36
  
  Reluctance to adjudicate socio-economic rights and the right to water is further 
enhanced by concerns about the democratic deficiency of the judiciary. It is argued that 
courts lack the democratic legitimacy to pronounce themselves on matters on which 
democratically elected members of the executive and in some cases the legislature have 
pronounced themselves.
37
 It is thus argued that the courts have no basis upon which to second 
guess those organs which directly represent the citizens of the State whose decisions serve the 
best interests of those they represent. 
On the other hand, proponents of justiciable socio-economic rights have long exposed 
the flaws inherent in these arguments. More so, the adjudication of several socio-economic 
rights in contextually different domestic settings has provided evidence that the concerns 
against adjudication may be overstated. The proponents of justiciability have demonstrated 
that civil and political rights and socio-economic rights are indivisible. A broad human rights 
framework simply enhances the ‘needs’ framework in articulating and realising socio-
economic rights.
38
 In addition, proponents have demonstrated that civil and political rights, 
the justiciability of which is more readily accepted, actually have financial and other resource 
implications and when courts have adjudicated upon these rights they have not exceeded their 
constitutional mandate. On this basis, it is difficult to argue against justiciability of their 
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socio-economic counterparts. Moreover, it has been shown that, while it is to be expected that 
socio-economic rights issues present polycentric challenges, this should not exclude the 
judiciary from their determination. From their point of view the courts have an innately 
different function in relation to socio-economic rights claims which merely infuses rights into 
the debate regarding the actualization of basic human needs.
39
 
Consequently, it appears that the justiciability of socio-economic rights has slowly 
come to be accepted as plausible without causing the much feared shift in the balance of 
power between the various arms of government. Adjudication adds value to the infusion of a 
rights based approach to actualising socio-economic rights, particularly where it facilitates 
executive accountability and citizen participation. Drawing from Etienne Mureinik’s 
conceptualisation of the ideal exercise of executive power within a constitutional democracy, 
scholars have argued that the judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights would offer 
courts an opportunity to enhance such accountability from the executive. More importantly, 
institutional concerns about the limits of judicial power would be allayed by allowing for a 
careful demarcation of the judicial function in reaching the broader goal of socio-economic 
transformation.
40
 Considering that the typical form of accountability and citizens’ 
participation in relation to matters relating to water services appears to be political 
accountability, the argument can be appropriated to make the case for a justiciable right to 
water. 
Finally, theorists appear to agree that for socio-economic needs to be realised, they 
ought to be translated within the domestic legislative framework in a manner which 
accommodates judicial review. The translation within the domestic framework appears to 
envisage two main steps. First, a substantive entitlement needs to be legally articulated and 
defined. Secondly, legal or administrative mechanisms must be established through which 
substantive entitlements can be claimed or their violations challenged.
41
 Ultimately, where a 
right has been adequately translated, it may be more amenable to judicial review.  
1.4 THE CENTRAL QUESTIONS AND OUTLINE OF THIS THESIS 
This thesis explores and evaluates possible ways to enhance enjoyment of a right to water in 
Uganda. Its central aim is to investigate whether and if so, what legal mechanisms can 
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enhance the enjoyment of a human right to water in Uganda. Two secondary questions arise 
from this central question. I consider whether and to what extent the constitutional 
articulation of a right to water would have a meaningful effect on how the right is elaborated 
within legislation, policy and ultimately on a judicial understanding thereof. Secondly, I 
consider whether the adjudication of a human right to water may impede or enhance the 
enjoyment of the right by citizens.   
The central question of the thesis is premised on the assumption that the enjoyment of a 
right to water in Uganda is presently curtailed because of the manner in which the right is 
currently conceived within the constitutional and legislative framework. I presume that two 
challenges flow from the manner in which the right to water is conceived within the 
constitutional and legislative framework. First, the right to water is not independently 
enumerated within the Constitution. I claim that this creates a challenge because there is no 
firm basis upon which an individual or community can assert a claim to access water against 
the State as a matter of right.  
The second challenge is that the right is not independently justiciable.
42
 I argue that this 
presents a challenge because Ugandan courts already appear reluctant to indirectly vindicate 
rights claims when the rights claimed are not explicitly spelt out within the constitutional 
text. Given the weak manner in which the right is encapsulated within the Constitution, 
claims for a human right to water are unlikely to be entertained by courts, at least, in a 
manner that brings any positive consequences to claimants. Exploring possible solutions to 
these problems may go a long way to remove impediments to enjoyment of a right to water. 
Commentators have expressed concerns about the utility of legislation as a means to 
recognise and protect socio-economic rights in comparison to constitutional protection. 
Legislation is perceived as discretionary. The state may or may not prioritise the elaboration 
of individual claims within legislation for various reasons, such as a preference to rely on 
executive policy. Secondly, legislation is easily the subject of review or even repeal. 
Commentators thus raise concerns that fundamental rights issues contained in such legislation 
would be left to the benevolence of the state through its ever changing policies.
43
 While these 
propositions hold true, this study commences from establishing a constitutional recognition of 
a right to water and pre-supposes that within a constitutional democracy, legislation and 
policy is subject to the dictates of the constitutional text, as far as these are clear. Thus, 
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legislative and executive policy must align itself to the spirit and content of the Constitution. 
In so doing, the scope and limits of legislation and executive policy are restrained by the 
Constitution.  
The answers to the questions raised in this thesis are reached by way of a review of the 
international human rights regime which embodies the right to water and two country case 
studies of India and South Africa. Even though the case studies which are the focus of this  
thesis do not purport to be exhaustive of how constitutionalising, legislating and adjudicating 
a right to water has impacted and enhanced enjoyment of the right, they substantially benefit 
the thesis by allowing a reflection on the benefits and shortcomings of, respectively, explicit 
and implied constitutional recognition as well as direct and indirect adjudication of the right 
to water, in an attempt to reflect on the opportunities and shortcomings arising within 
Uganda’s context. The selection of the two countries was further influenced by the fact that 
like Uganda, they both come from a common law tradition.  
India is a developing country with a Constitution which appears to be similarly 
structured to Uganda’s, in the sense that the constitutional text includes non-justiciable 
directive principles of state policy separate from a bill of rights. In addition, the Indian 
Constitution does not explicitly make reference to a right to water and explicitly determines 
that directive principles shall not be justiciable. Even then, the countries’ constitutional law 
contexts are fundamentally distinct. India’s Constitution has been tested for nearly 60 years 
as compared to Uganda’s relatively new Constitution. At the same time India’s constitutional 
rights have benefited from adjudication since the 1970s. A case study of India may therefore 
particularly illuminate the possibilities and challenges of indirect adjudication of a right to 
water and make it possible to draw lessons from a long history of constitutional adjudication. 
On the other hand, the South African case study provides a more recent example of the 
utility of constitutional rights and how their direct adjudication can potentially transform the 
manner in which socio-economic rights are enjoyed. Although the entrenchment of socio-
economic rights must be explained within the South African social context, the right to water 
is explicitly enumerated within the constitutional text and has been adjudicated alongside 
other socio-economic rights. The comparison with South Africa is additionally significant 
given that the country is a Sub-Saharan African country which deliberated over constitutional 
reforms and enacted a new Constitution at about the same time as Uganda. Yet, soon after the 
enactment of the new Constitution, and beyond, the South African courts engaged with the 
elaboration and interpretation of several socio-economic rights, including the right of access 
to water. The case study will facilitate a reflection on what could have been possible if 
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Uganda had taken a different view of constitutionalising socio-economic rights. Given that 
the idea of another constitutional review is being mooted within Uganda, this comparison 
may add weight to the question whether entrenchment and justiciability of a right to water 
holds promise.
44
 
In each of the countries studied, the thesis devotes itself to addressing several 
secondary questions. It investigates whether there is an explicitly articulated right to water in 
the particular Constitution. In the alternative, it investigates whether there is a non-justiciable 
right to water as a directive principle in the Constitution. I then examine which other rights 
are enumerated and justiciable in the Constitution, into which aspects or elements of the right 
to water could be read. I examine the extent to which the right to water finds elaboration 
within the particular national legislation and policy. Finally, I examine the extent to which the 
right to water has been adjudicated upon and the outcomes of such adjudication.
45
  
The focus of the thesis is the human right to water as it is used within the domestic 
context. In addition, I further narrow down my focus to how the right to water is implicated 
within urban centers which have been the testing ground for many of the reformed 
government policies on water delivery. Ultimately, I focus on how the enforcement 
mechanisms provided by courts empower communities, facilitate participation and enhance 
state accountability as enduring substantive benefits that can potentially flow from 
elaborating a right to water. 
Two limitations flow from my own focus of the study. While I discern an intricate 
connection between the manner in which water is conceptualised and delivered and the 
evidence for and against the privatisation of water services, this work does not expand its 
scope to participating in debates over the appropriateness of the privatisation of water service 
delivery. At the same time, it does not explore water within the context of a right to sanitation 
even though the UN has declared a right to water and sanitation. 
In addition, many countries (including Uganda, India and South Africa) now have 
institutions devoted to the protection of human rights whose mandate would seem to 
incorporate enhancing the enjoyment of human rights for citizens.
46
 While I acknowledge 
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that the work of these agencies may stimulate debate on the manner in which the right to 
water is actualised for citizens, this thesis does not attempt to explore the work of such 
agencies. 
My investigation thus commences in chapter two of the thesis by surveying the manner 
and extent to which the human right to water is embodied within international and regional 
human rights treaties as well as within soft law and the resolutions of the United Nations 
General Assembly. It then explores the exact components of a human right to water as well as 
the internal parameters and external reach of a human right to water. It shows that the right to 
water has come to be accepted as a right within international human rights law, although 
uncertainty relating to its scope and reach remain. I argue that although the right to water 
finds its most explicit and elaborate acknowledgement within non-enforceable soft law, it has 
been articulated in a manner which makes it possible to begin to extrapolate implications of 
an internationally recognised human right to water which engenders positive State obligations 
as well as enforceable individual claims within the domestic setting. 
 In chapter three I explore the right to water in Uganda. This chapter begins with a 
historical exploration of how, if at all, socio-economic rights have been conceptualised in 
previous constitutional documents since the country achieved independence in 1962. It then 
delves into the constitutional assembly debates which shaped the manner in which socio-
economic rights and the right to water were enumerated within the 1995 Constitution. The 
chapter proceeds to examine the manner and extent of constitutional recognition of the right 
to water in the text of the 1995 Constitution. It then explores the extent to which the 
Constitution measures up to the international law standards envisaged for a human right to 
water. The chapter shows that, even though the right to water is not explicitly articulated 
within Uganda’s Constitution, it can still be inferred from the constitutional text on three 
grounds. First, the Constitution envisages that international law ought to be taken into 
account when interpreting the Constitution. Secondly, there are a number of rights, notably 
the rights to life, equality and dignity, into which elements of a right to water can be read. 
Thirdly, the Constitution includes directive principles of state policy into which a right to 
water, albeit only indirectly justiciable, can be read. The chapter then investigates the ways in 
which the legislative and policy framework elaborate and give content to the right to water. I 
argue that the right to water elaborated within Uganda’s legislation and policy essentially 
underscores a neo-liberal paradigm with not much of a rights-based approach visible.  Finally 
the chapter explores the possibility of adjudicating a right to water. Given that the Ugandan 
courts have never deliberated on a right to water, I mostly speculate from the manner in 
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which they have dealt with other socio-economic rights claims and the way in which the 
courts seem to conceive of their powers within the separation of powers debate. I argue that 
the courts appear unwilling to read rights into the constitutional text and as such in its current 
form, the right to water is unlikely to receive the much desired judicial elaboration. The 
chapter however shows that there are some decisions by the Ugandan courts which, if 
followed, may pave way for judicial elaboration of a right to water in future.   
Chapter four offers a survey of the potential of indirect adjudication of the human right 
to water, emerging from India. Within the Indian setting, the right to water appears to be read 
into the constitution from the right to life and other entrenched rights at the instigation of the 
country’s Supreme Court. Given that India is a federal state, there is little national legislation 
and policy which directly impacts water delivery. The thesis thus offers a sketch of the 
overarching legislative and policy framework as well as a proposed national bill 
encompassing water as a human right. The Chapter shows that Indian national legislative and 
policy framework does not entirely adopt a rights based approach although this appears to be 
changing particularly with proposals to enact laws espousing a human right to water and the 
adoption of a new policy framework in 2012. By examining several socio-economic rights 
decisions of the country’s Supreme Court and federal High Courts to determine the extent to 
which these courts have elaborated on the internal contents and external reach of the right to 
water, the chapter argues that a willing court may go a long way to enhancing enjoyment of a 
right to water where the constitutional framework does not explicitly include a justiciable 
right to water. Even then, the main impediments to enjoyment of the right appear to be the 
neo-liberal underpinnings of the legislative and policy framework and the limitations arising 
from a focus on the negative aspects of the right emphasised by the Indian courts’ 
jurisprudence.  
Chapter five provides an illumination of the constitutional right to water in South 
Africa. As with the other country studies, this chapter examines the extent to which the right 
is elaborated within legislation and executive policy and whether if at all it dovetails with the 
international law contemplation of a human right to water. It argues that the right to water 
elaborated within national legislation tends towards a rights conscious model although it also 
appears to be affected by the neo-liberal underpinnings of state policy. More significant is the 
claim that the legislation and policy also appears to have been shaped by the outcomes of 
adjudication. However, the explicit presence of a right to water in the 1996 South African 
Constitution has meant that courts have been unwilling to read a right to water into other 
rights such as the right to life, which neglects some dimensions of the right.  Also, the right as 
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adjudicated does not, in and of itself, vest immediately claimable entitlements, nor does it 
provide a complete buffer against neo-liberalism. However, in the end there is clearly more 
enjoyment of a right to water than in India and Uganda. 
In Chapter six, I draw conclusions for the study. I find that, to a large extent, the 
implicit manner in which the international human rights framework contemplates a human 
right to water appears to have been mirrored within the domestic legal system in Uganda. 
However, what is explicitly recognised within international law appears to be explicitly 
emphasised within the 3 countries studied. Particularly, the 3 countries envisage a right to 
water as a universal entitlement which guarantees physical access to clean and safe water. To 
a marginal extent the domestic legal systems recognise that the water which is made available 
to citizens ought to be acceptable to them for their domestic use. On the other hand the study 
of Uganda and India shows that the adequacy of water availed by the State being an essential 
element of the right to water is absent. However, what appears to be contested in all three 
countries is the affordability of the water provided by the State’s infrastructure.  Given that 
Uganda and India’s coverage of the components of a right to water is significantly partial, I 
thus conclude that the South African contemplation of the right appears to have come closest 
to ensuring that the legislative and policy framework cover the full scope of the right to 
water. The thesis thus concludes that the manner in which a right to water is articulated 
constitutionally may determine the extent to which the right can be vindicated in the domestic 
setting and the extent to which it finds expression in domestic legislative and policy 
frameworks.  
In the end, the constitutional entrenchment of a right to water ought not be perceived as 
an end in itself. A rights based approach envisions that rights consciousness will enhance 
citizens’ participation and state accountability. These principles are manifested in the 
dialogical potential of rights adjudication. The study shows that where there has been no 
constitutional entrenchment of the right as in Uganda there has been no dialogue facilitated 
and guided by the courts to construct a rights conscious legislative and policy framework 
pertaining to water. In India the study shows that even though there is no constitutionally 
recognised right to water, its enjoyment and protection have been facilitated by a creative and 
bold judiciary. At the same time, the study shows that the judiciary’s role has slowly 
enhanced enjoyment possibly on account of the absence of an explicit right to water. For 
South Africa, the study showed that the courts have actively engaged with the executive and 
provincial legislatures in order to ensure that a rights conscious framework for enjoyment of 
the right to water is guaranteed. I thus conclude that a more enduring approach for Uganda 
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must aim to maximise the dialogical benefits of direct adjudication. So, in addition to 
articulation, justiciability appears to be a main enhancer of dialogic potential. 
 In sum, the thesis aims to show that better articulation of the right to water at the 
international and domestic level remains essential to the ultimate goal of enjoying entitlement 
to water for all. Given that there is increasing acceptance of the justiciability of socio-
economic rights, it is plausible to argue that adjudication can provide an appropriate means 
through which enjoyment of the right to water in Uganda can be enhanced. It is therefore 
hoped that the thesis will provide insight into the formulation of a more explicit human right 
to water in Uganda. Ultimately it is hoped that the thesis will contribute to the debate on the 
extent to which judicial interaction with socio-economic rights could facilitate the deliberate 
elaboration of the rights in a manner which enhances citizen empowerment and democratic 
accountability. At the same time it is hoped that such judicial interaction may enhance 
dialogue with the executive and legislative institutions in a manner which fashions the 
legislative and policy framework pertinent to delivery of water in Uganda. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CONSTRUCTING A HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER FROM 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
2.1 BACKGROUND 
None of the documents constituting the International Bill of Rights, that is, the UN’s 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), makes explicit reference to a right to water. Consequently there has been a 
long debate over the legal foundations of a human right to water, particularly as to whether 
international law in fact recognised a human right to water and, if so, whether such 
recognition was legitimately founded.
1
 Part of this debate has been brought to an end with the 
increasing acceptance that rights are interdependent and indivisible, and therefore that rights 
which are not expressly articulated may nevertheless be legitimately read into the text of the 
international bill of rights. 
Commentators remained cautious of defining the exact content of and obligations 
engendered by the right to water within the existing international law paradigm. Much of the 
concern pertained to whether, given the vagueness of the documents from which it was 
inferred, a human right to water could be unpacked in a manner which made it possible to 
enumerate specific benefits accruing to an individual and, flowing from these benefits, to 
distil tangible obligations accruing to States. 
In this chapter, I demonstrate that the right to water has come to be accepted as being 
implied within international human rights law. Consequently, it is possible to explore its 
internal parameters and external reach. As a starting point I explore the extent to which the 
right to water finds embodiment within international human rights treaties, the customary 
norms of international law and the African regional human rights conventions. Having found 
that there is a basis upon which a human right to water may be elaborated within international 
law, I then contemplate the exact content and scope of the right. Having shown that the 
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contours of the international law right to water are fairly clear, I end with a discussion of its 
implications for States within the domestic constitutional and legal setting.  
2.2 LOCATING THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER WITHIN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW TREATIES AND CUSTOMS 
The UN’s jurisprudence appears to affirm that it is appropriate to adopt a teleological 
interpretation of its human rights covenants, to the extent that the text of such covenants 
allows.
2
 As such, most commentators locate the right to water by aggregating provisions of 
several human rights instruments and declarations which may be understood to imply or 
include an entitlement to water. Many of these instruments trace their roots to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Although the UDHR is not an enforceable treaty, it 
has received universal acceptance as a basis for the recognition of rights and as an instrument 
that espouses the ‘common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations’.3 Its 
statements on basic rights have increasingly become recognised as human rights in later 
treaties or as norms of customary international law.  
Previously, the embodiment of a right to water within the text of the UDHR was 
contested. Proponents of an existing right to water  argued that, even though the word ‘water’ 
was not explicitly stated in the UDHR, the intention of the framers of the Declaration was to 
allow for future inclusion of any other necessities that enable health and well being, one of 
which is obviously water.
4
 Others argued that it was not deemed necessary to specifically 
include water in the text since water is much the same as air: it is not possible to exist without 
it.
5
 On the other hand, those opposed to the notion that international law recognised a right to 
water argued that the absence of an express reference to water, going as far back as the 
UDHR, provides evidence that it has never been recognised as a human right.
6
  
The UDHR provides the earliest embodiment of rights which can be read to implicate 
enjoyment of a right to water. For instance, affirmations of the rights to equality, well being 
and life may contain aspects of a right to water. More importantly, the UDHR’s preamble 
also introduced into international law the underlying principles of inherent dignity, equal and 
inalienable rights of all persons. In Article 1, the UDHR affirms that all people are born free 
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and equal in dignity and rights. In Article 2, it states that, ‘Everyone is entitled to all the 
rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Declaration, without distinction of any kind….’ The 
UDHR further affirms that everyone has the right to life and that everyone has the right to a 
standard of living that is adequate for health and well being.
7
  
Considered together, it is arguable that the affirmation of a right to life and enjoyment 
of a dignified existence is predicated upon the enjoyment of a right to water. Commentators 
roundly agree that the manner in which the UDHR set out the broader dimensions of the right 
to life was particularly aimed at encompassing rights to the fulfilment of socio-economic 
needs such as food, health, well being and social security.
8
 The enjoyment of life necessitates 
that these socio-economic good and services are at a minimum regularly available. Such an 
interpretation may obviously be expanded to include the right to water.  
2.2.1 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
The human right to water is not explicitly recognised within the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the main international law instrument that espouses civil 
and political rights.
9
 However, it is possible to infer the right to water from the context within 
which the text of the ICCPR is framed. For instance, implicit recognition of a right to water is 
strengthened by the ICCPR’s preamble, which emphasizes the inter-related nature of civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural rights. The preamble proclaims that the ideal of free 
human beings enjoying civil and political freedom can only be achieved if conditions are 
created whereby everyone enjoys civil and political rights, as well as economic, social and 
cultural rights. This affirmation that rights are inter-related may allow for a right to water to 
be read into the text of the ICCPR, because water is an essential determinant of human 
existence. 
The human right to water may also be read into some of the explicitly enumerated 
rights in the ICCPR. For example, the right to water can be inferred from the right to life. The 
ICCPR recognises that, ‘Every human being has the inherent right to life. The right shall be 
protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.’10 The States Parties to the 
Covenant are required to respect and ensure the Covenant rights to all individuals within their 
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jurisdiction and to take legislative or any other measures necessary to give effect to the 
Covenant rights.
11
  
A traditional interpretation of the right to life holds that it emerges from the 
inviolability of life and must be interpreted strictly, as being related to an individual’s liberty 
and protection from the arbitrary deprivation of life by the State. It has accordingly been 
argued that the right to life does not provide safeguards against for instance, death from 
famine or the elements and does not encompass an entitlement to an appropriate standard of 
living. On this view, a compliant State would essentially need to refrain from acts that would 
cause arbitrary deprivation of life or prevent third persons from causing such arbitrary 
deprivation.
12
  
However, this narrow approach to the meaning of a human right to life has not gained 
traction in recent years given the exposition of the right to life advanced by the Human Rights 
Committee (‘the Committee’) which provides authoritative, though ultimately non-binding,  
interpretations of the provisions of the ICCPR. The Committee understands the right to life 
primarily as ‘the supreme right from which no derogation is permitted.’13 As such, the right 
to life is a pre-condition for effectively recognising all other human rights and without which 
other human rights would be meaningless.  
In addition, the Committee’s General Comment affirms a more expansive interpretation 
of the right to life. It recommended that: 
The expression “inherent right to life” cannot properly be understood in a restrictive 
manner, and the protection of this right requires that States adopt positive measures. 
In this connection, the Committee considers that it would be desirable for States 
Parties to take all possible measures to reduce infant mortality and to increase life 
expectancy, especially in adopting measures to eliminate malnutrition and 
epidemics.
14
 
Commentators have accordingly conceptualised the right to life in a manner which 
allows a right to water to be read into the meaning of life. As a starting point, the term ‘life’ is 
defined as the fundamental conditions necessary to support life.
15
  Consequently, if a right to 
life is understood as innate, then life can only exist in conditions and circumstances that 
foster rather than inhibit it. This understanding of life goes beyond the protection of a 
biological existence and embraces the notion that life requires fulfilment through accessing 
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food, water and other basic needs which are essential to make life meaningful.
16
 These 
conditions necessitate that goods and services to satisfy all the above socio-economic needs 
are at a minimum regularly available. Consequently, such an interpretation infers a right to 
enjoy water for daily consumption.  
In light of the generous approach to the interpretation of the ICCPR preferred by the 
Human Rights Committee, the right to water may also be inferred from affirmations of the 
rights to equality, dignity and guarantees of non-discrimination. The preamble to the ICCPR 
recognises that the rights expressed in the Covenant derive from the ‘inherent dignity of the 
human person’. The main text of the ICCPR then affirms the equal rights of men and women 
to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the Covenant,
17
 ‘without 
distinction as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status’.18 When read together, these affirmations may be 
read as implying that the rights and freedoms guaranteed within the ICCPR are predicated on 
the existence of and an ability to enjoy a right to water. 
2.2.2 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights  
The human right to water is not explicitly recognised within the International Covenant on 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Nonetheless, it is possible to implicate the 
right within the text of some provisions of the ICESCR. Particularly, Articles 11 and 12 of 
the ICESCR espouse rights into which a right to water may be read.
19
 The ICESCR provides 
in Article 11 that: 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an 
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, 
clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The 
States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realisation of this right, 
recognising to this effect the essential importance of international co-operation based 
on free consent.
20
   
Article 12(1) determines that, ‘The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right 
of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health.’ 
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Reading a human right to water into the text of the ICESCR is supported by the albeit 
non binding interpretations of the Covenant’s provisions found in several General Comments 
adopted by the United Nations Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
(UNCESCR).
21
 Two of these General Comments appear to be particularly amenable to 
reading a right to water into the ICESCR and will be elaborated upon in the penultimate 
section of this chapter. These are, first, the General Comment 14 addressing the right to 
health, in which the Committee began to expound on components of the right to enjoy the 
highest standard of physical and mental well being
22
 and secondly General Comment 15, 
which explicitly recognises water as a fundamental human right and specifically infers the 
human right to water as implicated within Article 11 and 12 of the ICESCR.
23
  
Finally, Article 2(2) of the ICESCR, guaranteeing freedom from discrimination, may 
also be read to implicate some components of a human right to water. Considering that 
commentators have formed the view that enjoying an adequate standard of living pre-
supposes a guarantee of freedom from discrimination, it is possible to argue that this 
guarantee pertains also to an implicit right to water.
24
  
2.2.3 Other Conventions 
A number of Conventions that came into force after the ICCPR and ICESCR make explicit 
reference to the right to water. Article 14(2) of the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) states that: 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women in rural areas in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, 
that they participate in and benefit from rural development and, in particular, shall 
ensure to such women the right: ... 
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 (h) To enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in relation to housing, 
sanitation, electricity and water supply, transport and communications
25
  
In this context the entitlement to a right to water is explicitly implicated as a 
determinant of the right to enjoy adequate living conditions. In line with the reading of the 
right to health in international law as including an entitlement to water, it is arguable that the 
right to access adequate health care facilities in CEDAW also embodies the human right to 
water.
26
  
The Convention on the Rights of the Child, (CRC), explicitly refers to a human right to 
water when it determines that: 
States Parties shall pursue full implementation of this right and, in particular, shall 
take appropriate measures…to combat disease and malnutrition…through the 
provision of adequate nutritious foods and clean drinking water, taking into 
consideration the dangers and risks of environmental pollution;
27
 
The CRC further enjoins States Parties to recognise the right of a child to the enjoyment of 
the highest attainable standard of health.
28
 The CRC’s recognition of the right to drinking 
water is important because the CRC is one of a few Conventions that have attained near 
universal ratification by all members of the United Nations, thus providing strong evidence of 
universal recognition of a human right to water.
29
  
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) embodies a human 
right to water insofar as it enjoins States Parties to recognise the right of persons with 
disabilities to social protection. The CRPD’s elaborate measures to promote the right to social 
protection include a determination that States shall ensure equal access to clean water 
services, and access to appropriate and affordable services.
30
  
International humanitarian law also appears to give impetus to claims of a long existing 
right to water. For example, the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War enjoins States Parties to ensure the provision of drinking water to prisoners 
of war and internees.
31
 States are further enjoined to provide such prisoners and internees 
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with water, shower and bath facilities for their daily personal toilet and washing 
requirements.
32
 The additional protocols of 1977 prohibit the destruction of objects 
indispensable to the survival of a civilian population such as foodstuffs, areas for the 
production of foodstuffs and drinking water installations.
33
 On this basis, it is plausible to 
argue that the right to water is recognised within the broader international law framework.
34
  
2.2.4 Customary International law 
It is arguable that the human right to water is also embodied within the customary norms of 
international law.
35
 The widely accepted factors in determining customary norms are long 
term use (duration), uniformity, general practice and the opinion of jurists. It is also possible 
to infer from these norms the normative content of a human right to water.
36
 In fact, the 
International Court of Justice has indicated that it is enough to establish a norm where only 
two of these factors are proved to exist: patterns of uniform or universal practice and patterns 
of legal acceptance.
37
 Therefore in order to establish the existence of a recognised norm of 
international law, from which a human right to water can be constructed, the proper place to 
begin is to investigate whether ‘universal practice’ exists and whether the right can be 
logically implied from such practice.  
There appear to be several demonstrations of a universal practice relating to water. 
Several international declarations made subsequent to United Nations conferences allow for 
inferences to be made regarding the recognition of a human right to water. For instance 
Principle one of the Stockholm Declaration emanating from the 1972 United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment, proclaimed that ‘Man has the fundamental right to 
freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits 
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a life of dignity and well-being...’.38 Even though structured within the context of a healthy 
environment, it is arguable that the participating States recognised that rights to the 
environment and could be understood as encompassing water.   
Later, the Mar del Plata Action Plan was developed as an outcome of the United 
Nations Water Conference. The Action Plan recognised water as a right and declared that all 
people have the right to drinking water in quantities and of a quality equal to their basic 
needs.
39
 Subsequently, the period between 1981 and 1990 was declared as the International 
Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade. The decade enhanced recognition of a right to 
water within member states, in so far as it was agreed that during this time, governments 
would commit to bringing about substantial improvements in drinking water supply and 
sanitation services within their jurisdictions.   
The declarations that followed made even more explicit references to the human right 
to water. Following on from the Mar del Plata Action Plan, the International Conference on 
Water and Environment held in Dublin led to a further declaration relating to water. The 
Dublin Statement established several principles related to water and sustainable 
development.
40
 In Principle four, the Statement reaffirmed that ‘it is vital to recognize first 
the basic right of all human beings to have access to clean water and sanitation at an 
affordable price’. Later that year, the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development concluded with the adoption of Agenda 21,
41
 the general objective of which 
was to affirm people’s right to have access to drinking water in quantities and of a quality 
equal to their basic human needs regardless of their stage of development and their social and 
economic conditions. In sum, many of the international declarations relating to water had 
began to conceive the concept of water as a human right, essential to the satisfaction of 
human beings’ most basic needs and to the enjoyment of all other rights. 
The patterns of legal acceptance of a human right to water within international law are 
further mirrored by the declarations of the UN General Assembly. For example, in 1986, the 
UN General Assembly declared the right to development in which it was required that 
development be carried out in a manner in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms 
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can be fully realised.
42
 Subsequently, at the start of the millennium, the General Assembly 
endorsed a Resolution on the right to development. The Resolution affirmed that in 
realization of the right to development, ‘the rights to food and clean water are fundamental 
human rights and their promotion constitutes a moral imperative both for national 
governments and for the international community’.43  
The General Assembly had also adopted the United Nations Millennium Declaration, 
which is lauded for its visionary re-statement of fundamental and shared values which need to 
be achieved within this century.
44
 It was resolved that these shared values would be achieved 
through action in specific areas, some of which implicate an understanding that the 
enjoyment of water may be perceived as a human right. It was among others resolved to take 
action: 
To halve, by the year 2015, the proportion of the world’s people whose income is less 
than one dollar a day and the proportion of people who suffer from hunger and by the 
same date, to halve the proportion of people who are unable to reach or to afford safe 
drinking water. 
In 2010, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution recognizing the human right to 
water and sanitation.
45
 The resolution provided that the General Assembly ‘Recognizes the 
right to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation as a human right that is essential for the 
full enjoyment of life and all human rights.’ 
The resolution was widely supported by member States and received 122 votes in favor.
46
 
Introducing the draft resolution, the Bolivian representative stated that: 
The right to drinking water and sanitation is a human right essential to the full 
enjoyment of life. Safe drinking water and sanitation are not only principal elements or 
components of other rights, such as the right to an adequate standard of living. The 
rights to safe drinking water and sanitation are independent rights, which must be 
recognized as such. It is not enough to urge States to fulfil their human rights 
obligations relating to access to drinking water and sanitation. It is necessary to call on 
States to promote and protect the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation.
47
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Whereas there were no objections, there were abstentions from some countries.
48
 Alluding to 
the reasons for their abstention, the delegate from Canada stated that: 
It is premature to recognize such a right without allowing States the benefit of full 
deliberations based on the independent expert’s findings, their own internal processes 
and the agreement of States.
49
 
These deliberations provide evidence of widespread legal acceptance as is required to 
establish a customary norm relating to a human right to water within international law. While 
there were objections to the proposition at the General Assembly, at least it appears that the 
abstentions did not go so far as to deny the right; rather they focused on its scope, something 
which is admittedly still debatable. These General Assembly resolutions serve to demonstrate 
that the international community is increasingly inclined to perceive water as a human right. 
In what may be considered further affirmation of a customary norm of international law 
relating to access to water, the Berlin Rules on International Water Resources, compiled by a 
section of leading experts in water resources, determine that the right to water is recognised 
in customary international law. The Rules draw evidence from the fact that national 
Constitutions in more than 60 States include a right to a safe and healthy environment which 
can implicitly be linked to a human right to clean and safe water. The Berlin Rules further 
expressly state that ‘Every individual has a right of access to sufficient, safe, acceptable, 
physically accessible and affordable water to meet that individual’s vital human needs.’50  
Together, these General Assembly debates and the Assembly’s subsequent resolutions 
coupled with the findings of experts who compiled the Berlin Rules, provide evidence of the 
international consensus surrounding the universal acceptance of a customary right to water.
51
 
It is further arguable that the above resolutions indicate acceptance of a threshold normative 
content of the human right to water and its accompanying State obligations. 
2.2.5 The African Regional Human Rights System   
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (The ACHPR) serves as the single most 
authoritative statement of human rights recognised and enforceable on the African 
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continent.
52
 It has been ratified by nearly all member states of the African Union signifying 
that the rights expressed therein are recognised and can be claimed by citizens within African 
states. In its preamble, the Charter proclaims that:  
…civil and political rights cannot be dissociated from economic, social and cultural 
rights in their conception as well as universality and that the satisfaction of economic, 
social and cultural rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political rights; 
There is no explicit right to water in the ACHPR. As in international human rights law, 
the right to water is however implied within a number of ACHPR rights. For instance, the 
human right to water can be inferred from the right to health, as was affirmed by the African 
Commission in Free Legal Assistance Group, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Union 
Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme, Les Temoins de Jehovah v Zaire, where it adopted a 
generous approach to interpreting the right to health in the ACHPR as encompassing the right 
to water.
53
 The right to water may arguably also be read into the right to economic, social and 
cultural development,
54
 the right to a satisfactory and favourable environment
55
, the right to 
life
56
, and the right to dignity.
57
 Finally, as in international law, the right to water can be 
inferred from the notion of well-being. The ACHPR enjoins States to protect the family unit 
as a basis of society by taking care of its physical health.
58
 It is arguable, then, that the 
ACHPR contemplates the right to water in much the same manner as the international law 
framework: within the paradigm of a decent standard of living; good health, protection of life, 
and a clean and healthy environment.
59
 
Explicit recognition of a human right to water is found within the text of the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC), article 14(2) of which provides 
that States shall endeavor to provide adequate nutrition and safe drinking water for children. 
Similar provision is made in the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s 
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (2003) also referred to as the ‘Maputo Protocol’, 
article 15 of which provides for the right to food security, including an obligation to provide 
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women with access to clean drinking water, land and the means of producing nutritious 
food.
60
  
Within the East African region, the East African Community legislative assembly 
recently enacted an East African Community Human & Peoples’ Rights Act (EACHPRA)61 
which aims to domesticate international human rights standards at a sub-regional level and 
establish an East African human rights regime. The right to water can be read into the East 
African Bill of Rights to the extent that it recognises a right to enjoy the best attainable state 
of health, the right to food and nutrition, children’s entitlement to nutrition and health and the 
right to life.
62
 Furthermore, the EACHPRA recognises the obligation of member states to 
provide protection and humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons and refugees 
within their territorial jurisdiction.
63
 Given that the EACHPRA determines that the minimum 
obligation to these vulnerable groups is to ensure safe access to, among others, ‘essential food 
and clean water’, it is possible to infer a right to water from such a guarantee.64  
Finally, the declarations of African States, which may be construed as regional soft 
law, may be read as inferring a human right to water. For instance, the Pretoria Statement on 
socio-economic rights in the African Charter provides that the right to health in the African 
Charter entails access to basic sanitation and an adequate supply of safe and potable water. 
Since it is readily acceptable to read water into essential entitlements towards the fulfilment 
of the right to health, it is arguable that the Pretoria Statement particularly provides evidence 
of an accepted norm relating to water and affirms that African States recognise obligations 
flowing from the recognition of the human right to water.  
2.3 THE AMBIT AND SCOPE OF THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER 
It is accepted that rights recognised within the international human rights regime must 
additionally endow identifiable benefits, upon which citizens may base claims against the 
State. Not surprisingly, concerns about the recognition of the human right to water inevitably 
interrogate the normative content of the right within international law. It is these concerns 
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that I briefly re-visit, prior to mapping out the ambit and scope of the right to water in this 
section.  
Commentators who remain cautious of readily acknowledging the existence of a human 
right to water have argued that the implicit nature of the international law right to water has 
several limitations which all relate in one way or another to its ambiguity. They argue that it 
is difficult to pinpoint the exact legal interest that a right to water protects, because the right 
is drawn from several loosely related rights, each with a distinct scope.
65
 The legal 
foundations of the right to water therefore remain weak and loosely constructed. Accordingly, 
it is argued that claims for water cannot be effectively pursued by citizens, because they 
remain unable to articulate specific and independent entitlements flowing from the right.
66
 
This section remains to establish whether these concerns are borne out, with a survey of the 
internal and external dimensions of the international right to water.  
In 2002, the UNCESCR issued General Comment 15 which explicitly recognised water 
as a fundamental human right and set out the standards inherent to the right.
67
 General 
Comment 15 constitutes six elaborate parts which articulate the normative content of the 
right, the obligations for States Parties, the minimum core obligations inherent to the right, 
violations of the right, its implementation at national level and the obligations that it imposes 
upon non-state actors. My focus here is limited to elaborating upon the definition given to the 
right to water and the obligations that attach to States Parties, as conceptualised by the 
UNCESCR. 
2.3.1 Defining the right to water 
The UNCESCR underscores that the right to water is of universal application. In the 
preamble to General Comment 15, it describes water as a ‘public good fundamental for life 
and health.’68  The UNCESCR further emphasises the principle of non-discrimination, stating 
that the right to water must be enjoyed equally by women and men without discrimination. 
As such, the right to water applies to everyone and engenders a universal entitlement to the 
benefits that accrue from its recognition.  
The UNCESCR constructs a right to water as a right of ‘everyone to sufficient, safe, 
physically accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic uses.’69 Personal and 
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domestic use is described as including ‘drinking, personal sanitation, washing of clothes, 
food preparation, personal and household hygiene.’70 Obviously, this is not a conclusive list, 
rather it represents the most basic of human needs forming the threshold for enjoyment of the 
right to water. The right thus implies interrelated freedoms and entitlements – freedom to 
maintain access; and entitlement to a water supply and management that provides equal 
opportunity for people to enjoy the right to water.
71
 It is these freedoms and entitlements 
which will be elaborated forthwith. 
(a) Water related freedoms  
The UNCESCR envisages that the human right to water guarantees autonomy of access to 
water and water facilities, as well as freedom from interference when accessing water. In this 
way, the right to water, although not limited to, is broadly a guarantee of access to services. 
In engaging with the intricacies of the term access, the UNCESCR explains that the human 
right to water provides a guarantee to a sufficient or adequate supply of water for social and 
cultural utility.
72
 A sufficient or adequate supply is further defined as that amount of water 
which is necessary to ‘prevent death arising from dehydration, able to reduce the risk of 
water-related disease and to provide for consumption, cooking, personal and domestic 
hygiene.’73 The World Health Organisation (WHO) has set out specific guidelines which 
elaborate on what accessing an adequate amount of water entails. The WHO guidelines 
indicate that a minimum volume of 7.5 litres per person per day is to be considered as 
sufficient water for hydration and incorporation into food, for most people under most 
conditions. However, when personal and domestic hygiene are included, the basic amount is 
estimated at 20 litres per person per day.
74
  
Given that what may be adequate in one situation may turn out to be inadequate in 
another, General Comment 15 further unpacks the term adequacy as embodying various 
dimensions of meaningful autonomy of access. To meaningfully enjoy autonomous access to 
water, four main inter-related factors must be present: physical access, economic access, non-
discriminatory access and information access. Physical access connotes personal security 
within the precincts of the water source. The UNCESCR accordingly recommends that 
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autonomy of access to water sources can be achieved where water sources are within safe 
physical reach for all sections of the population.
75
 The UNCESCR elaborates that this 
requires services being within or in the immediate vicinity of each household,
76
 education 
institution
77
 and the workplace.
78
 Although the UNCESCR does not specifically elaborate on 
the term ‘immediate vicinity’, the context in which it is applied appears similar to the World 
Bank’s proposition that the notion of physical access entails the individual being within 
reasonable distance of the water source.
79
  
‘Economic accessibility’ is in turn defined as an entitlement to affordable water 
facilities and services. For water to be economically accessible, the ‘direct and indirect costs 
and charges associated with securing water must not compromise or threaten realization of 
other Covenant rights.’80 Therefore, in determining what amounts to an adequate price for 
water, States should ensure that the price of water does not prohibit citizens from being able 
to consume other necessities or prohibit them from consuming water at all.
81
 
Accessibility of water and water facilities also implicates the avoidance of 
discriminatory practices and policies. The Limburg Principles expound on the scope of the 
duty of non-discrimination by emphasizing that it should be checked at two levels: 
discrimination which may result because of existing laws, and actual discriminatory practices 
which may occur as a result of unequal enjoyment of rights on account of a lack of 
resources.
82
 The UNCESCR emphasizes both of these aspects and proposes that to avoid 
discriminatory practices, water facilities must be accessible to all including the vulnerable 
members of society both in law and in fact. The UNCESCR shows that the autonomy over 
access to water and water facilities envisages that citizens will be guaranteed access to water 
sources which allow them to exercise some choice as to how water is actually enjoyed. For 
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instance, citizens may have a choice as to whether water may be accessed in the form of in- 
house connections, stand taps, bore holes or natural springs. At the same time, autonomy 
envisages that the State will not interfere with such enjoyment of access to water facilities. 
Finally, the UNCESCR elaborates on the importance of ensuring sustainable access to 
water resources for agriculture.
83
 Given that in its General Comment expounding on the right 
to food, the UNCESCR defines sustainability as a notion that incorporates long term 
availability and accessibility, it appears that the enjoyment of a right to water also implicates 
availability of water for food production.
84
 
(b) Water related entitlements   
Over and above an entitlement to access adequate water inherent to the freedom of autonomy 
to access water, the UNCESCR envisages that the right to water engenders an entitlement to 
‘a system of water supply and management that provides equality of opportunity for people to 
enjoy the right to water.’85 It would appear that the UNCESCR envisages that, in order to 
actualise the freedom to enjoy the right to water, States Parties need to set up supportive 
institutions which link the individual beneficiary to the water resources. Such a framework 
must however be understood within the broader goals of guaranteeing equality and non-
discrimination in access to water. It can take the form of a structured national legal and policy 
regime, which ought to comprise of laws, regulations, policies as well as enforcement 
mechanisms. To actualise enjoyment of the right to water, such a framework ought also to 
encompass a physical infrastructural framework which practically makes concrete 
improvements to water availability. As such, the State’s institutional framework should be 
able to make the freedoms relating to access real. 
The right to water also implicates that the individual is entitled to water which is safe 
for human consumption, thereby encompassing a standard of water quality. In paragraph 
12(b) of General Comment 15, the UNCESCR notes that water must be free from micro-
organisms, chemical substances and radiological hazards that are harmful to health. The 
WHO also elaborates on the content of this standard by, for instance, determining that water 
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for human consumption should be derived from ‘improved water sources’.86 This is because, 
where an individual is able to collect water from an improved water source, the quality of 
such water is more likely to be free from micro-organisms and adulteration.
87
 The notion of 
quality also embraces a standard of acceptability in terms of odour, taste and colour for 
personal and domestic use.
88
 The importance of the quality of water which furthers 
enjoyment of the right to water is also underscored by the UNCESCR’s position on the right 
to health as expressed in General Comment 14. There, the UNCESCR recognises that water 
is a determinant of the right to health and necessitates the availability of safe and potable 
water.
89
  
To conclude, the freedoms and entitlements flowing from the recognition of a human 
right to water can be discerned from the UNCESCR’s exposition on the right to water in 
General Comment 15. Concerns over the lack of discernible content of the right to water as 
expressed by some commentators are thus not borne out. 
2.3.2 The Resulting State Obligations  
An important feature of the ICESCR is its explicit pronunciation of States’ Parties obligations 
towards the fulfilment of covenant rights regardless of the level of development attained 
within the domestic setting. In this section I particularly focus on the obligations arising out 
of the ICESCR and the UNCESCR general comment 15 and revisit scholarly elaborations of 
the specific obligations attaching to States Parties.
90
  
Article 2 (1) of the ICESCR sets out the obligation of States Parties determining that: 
Each State Party to the present covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, 
to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the 
full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate 
means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures. 
                                                          
86
 WHO Guidelines for Drinking- water Quality op cit note 75 at 83 - 85. An improved drinking-water source is 
one that by the nature of its construction and design adequately protects the source from outside contamination, 
in particular by faecal matter. Examples are a public tap, piped water into dwelling, borehole, protected dug 
well, protected spring and rain water collection. 
87
WHO Guidelines for Drinking- water Quality op cit note 75. States are expected to use the guidelines as a 
benchmark to developing national standards based on the State’s peculiar circumstances. 
88
In addition, in the context of the health of individuals acceptability is defined as being respectful of culture, 
gender sensitive and life cycle requirements in General Comment 14, The right to the highest attainable 
standard of health UN Doc E/C12/2000/4 (2000) para 12 (c). 
89
 Ibid para 4, para 9 and para 12 (a). 
90
The ICCPR and other international and regional treaties envisage state obligations attaching to States Parties 
which are for the most part similar to those stipulated in the ICESCR. Even then, a more detailed analysis of 
States Obligations is provided by Matthew CR Craven op cit note 23 at 106-152; Philip Alston & Gerard Quinn 
op cit note 2. Also see General Comment 3, The nature of States Parties obligations, 1990; General Comment 9 
The domestic application of the Covenant E/C12/1998/24. 
37 
 
From the phrasing of Article 2(1), there appear to be four main requirements against which 
States compliance with the ICESCR ought to be measured. The first requirement is to take 
steps to achieve the Covenant rights.
91
 The second requirement is that of progressive 
realisation, which implies that States Parties are not necessarily expected to realise the rights 
immediately, but are nevertheless obliged to act expeditiously and effectively in order to 
ultimately reach the goal of realizing the rights within each particular socio-economic 
context.
92
 The third requirement is that the State is required to use all appropriate means to 
achieve the covenant rights. Over and above legislation and policy, the availability of judicial 
remedies is increasingly accepted as a good indication that a State has put in place an 
appropriate mechanism for ameliorating violations of covenant rights.
93
  Finally, the State is 
required to deploy the maximum of available resources towards the progressive realisation of 
covenant rights. It demands that States must, without exceeding the possibilities available to 
them, do their utmost in implementing the rights enshrined in the Covenant.
94
 Consequently, 
the measure of availability of resources is determined by aggregating all international and 
national resources available to each particular State. 
The resources stipulated in Article 2 (1) ICESCR refer to the specific tools which make 
it possible for the steps taken by the State to become meaningful, and typically include 
financial, natural, human, technological and informational resources.
95
 In relation to the 
human right to water, this is even more intricate, because the water itself constitutes a natural 
resource. At the same time, substantial financial resources are required to improve water 
infrastructure while human resources are required to innovate and implement technological 
advances in water supply, which would enhance the enjoyment of the right within the 
resource envelope of the State.   
Commentators have raised concerns about the manner of articulation of the state 
obligations under the ICESCR. The state obligations are considered to be imprecise, 
incapable of justiciability and not readily capable of enforcement. Nonetheless, in order to 
understand international law conceptualisations of a right to water, it is still necessary to 
explore the manner in which the obligations are spelt out in the tripartite typological 
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paradigm, as well as how the minimum core approach elaborates an understanding of the 
states obligations engendered by a right to water. 
(a) State obligations to respect, protect and fulfil  
The UNCESCR articulated the exact obligations attaching to a right to water, using the 
tripartite typology of interdependent duties adopted by the UN and traced back to the writings 
of Henry Shue according to which all rights impose at least three interrelated obligations, 
namely to respect, protect and fulfil upon States .
96
 According to General Comment 15, the 
obligation to respect the right to water requires that States parties refrain from interfering 
with the enjoyment of the right to water for those for whom it has already been realised. It 
demands that States refrain from acts that would cause unlawful pollution or contamination 
of water.
97
 It appears that interfering with enjoyment of the right to water includes intentional 
actions on the part of the State to impede enjoyment of the right to water such as arbitrary 
disconnections. For instance, the UNCESCR proposes that no disconnections should be 
effected in circumstances where an individual is deprived of the minimum essential level of 
water. As such, the State is obliged to establish a transparent and legal process of 
disconnection which takes into account the availability of a basic minimum amount of water 
for basic needs.
98
  
The UNCESCR further envisages that the human right to water implicates several 
positive obligations for the State. First, it elaborates an obligation to protect the human right 
to water which enjoins States parties to prevent third parties from interfering with the 
enjoyment of water by existing beneficiaries. The UNCESCR envisages that the obligation to 
protect implores States to adopt necessary and effective legislative measures that would 
restrain third parties, including individuals, groups, corporations and their agents from 
inequitably dealing with water resources.
99
  
The UNCESCR accordingly recommends that the obligation to protect requires that, 
where water services are operated or controlled by third parties, the States parties provide 
effective regulation. States must therefore prevent third party water operators from 
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compromising equality, affordability and physical accessibility of sufficient safe and 
acceptable water, by establishing an effective national regulatory system. Such a system 
would ideally include institutions that provide independent monitoring, a framework for 
genuine public participation and potential penalties for non-compliance on the part of water 
suppliers.
100
  
The UNCESCR also elaborated on the obligation to fulfil the right to water. This 
obligation entails facilitating, promoting and providing water. The obligation to facilitate 
requires States to take positive steps to assist individuals and communities to enjoy the right 
to water. It appears that, at one level, the State has an obligation to remove any impediments 
to the enjoyment of the right to water such that those citizens who can afford to pay for water 
may not be denied their entitlement to a water supply. On the other hand, the obligation to 
provide enjoins States to provide water when communities or individuals are unable to 
provide it for themselves, for reasons beyond their control.
101
  
An equally important aspect of the obligation to fulfil the right to water pertains to 
access to information. To satisfy the requirement of accessibility of water resources, the State 
ought to enhance access to information.
102
 This entails ensuring that citizens are able to seek 
and receive information which would be useful to enabling them to make informed choices 
about water services. Conversely, the State ought to take steps to impart information 
concerning water issues to citizens.  
(b) Minimum core obligations 
The UNCESCR had earlier adopted the minimum core concept as a means to providing 
States Parties with a minimum threshold for States’ obligations flowing from socio-economic 
rights. Following this, the UNCESCR elaborated on the minimum core of the right to water 
in General Comment 15. The minimum core is thus distinguishable from the full scope of the 
right because it only sets the floor for a State’s obligations.103 A minimum core of the right to 
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water is useful to clarify the content of the right for purposes of prioritising plans and their 
implementation by the State. It also protects the vulnerable citizens within the State by 
outlining the very minimum basic services they are entitled from the State.  
While the minimum core appears to be a significant feature of the UNCESCR’s 
approach to socio-economic rights, scholarly reactions to the concept have been mixed. First, 
some have expressed concern that developing states will most probably find difficulty in 
fulfilling immediate core obligations due to scarcity of resources.
104
 Others have cautioned 
that the obligations promote a ranking of claims while ignoring the underlying factors which 
affect a State’s efforts to actualize socio-economic rights. It has further been suggested that, 
as a result of the minimum core obligations being vague, they fail to provide valuable 
guidance to a court faced with concrete cases to determine whether specific claimants’ needs 
ought to be prioritized over others.
105
 
This notwithstanding, the UNCESCR determined that there are nine minimum core 
obligations in relation to the right to water, which are of immediate effect.
106
 These are: 
a) A minimum essential amount of water, sufficient and safe for personal and domestic 
uses to prevent disease; 
b) A right of access to water and water facilities without discrimination especially for 
disadvantaged or marginalised groups; 
c)  Physical access to water facilities or services which provide sufficient, safe and 
regular water through a sufficient number of water outlets to avoid prohibitive 
waiting time within a reasonable distance of the household; 
d) Personal security is not threatened when physically accessing water; 
e) Equitable distribution of all available water facilities and services; 
f) Adopt and implement a national water strategy and plan of action addressing the 
whole population which is subjected to periodic review through transparent and 
participatory processes. The strategy should include indicators and bench marks by 
which progress can be closely monitored; 
g) Monitor the extent of realization or non-realisation of the right to water; 
h) Adopt relatively low cost targeted programmes to protect vulnerable and 
marginalised groups; 
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i) Take measures to prevent, treat and control diseases linked to water, in particular 
ensuring access to adequate sanitation.
107
 
 
In summary, the minimum core obligations provide clarity on the content of the right to 
water, and additionally, they indicate what policies ought to be given priority within the 
domestic context. It also demonstrates that there is sufficient evidence from which to infer 
specific entitlements for citizens and specific obligations attaching to States which flow 
directly from recognition of the right to water even though there remains some uncertainty 
about its full scope.   
2.3.3 Conclusion 
In its current form the international human rights law regime provides ample guidance with 
which national legal systems can work in order to give content to a right to water within their 
national legal systems. In addition, the guidance provided by the UNCESCR in general 
comment 15 although not binding appears to elaborate a fully justiciable right to water. 
Finally, the UNCESCR’s guidance appears to be elaborate enough to guide courts exercising 
their interpretive and enforcement of rights mandate within domestic courts such that 
citizens’ claims for enjoyment of a right to water can be effectively adjudicated upon. 
Therefore claims that the right to water is too vague to recognise and consequently to make 
the subject of adjudication are no longer sound. 
2.4 CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS 
Returning to the main purpose of this chapter, it has shown that the human right to water is 
inferred within most international law Conventions and that there is increasing acceptance of 
the right to water derived from the practice of States Parties to these Conventions. We can 
therefore conclude that the right to water exists within international law, its content is clearly 
articulated within international law, and the obligations it engenders are increasingly clear. In 
conclusion, I therefore consider its implications for domestic legal systems. 
While the duty of incorporation of international covenants is not absolute, States are 
obliged to ensure that the spirit of their international law obligations is translated into their 
domestic legislative and policy frameworks. There are two main implications which arise 
from the recognition of a right to water in international human rights law. First, at national 
level, the conceptualisation and articulation of water and water issues ought to take 
international law into account. Secondly, States must then translate the entitlements 
                                                          
107
 Para 37, General Comment 15. 
42 
 
envisaged and the obligations attaching to the State in terms of the international law right to 
water within the national legal regime. Put differently, States must adopt a rights based 
approach to the manner in which water is managed, delivered and regulated.  
Applying a rights based approach boils down to using rights as scaffolding for 
conceptualising and implementing policies, in the sense that rights permeate all of the 
policies that relate to water services delivery.
108
 A rights-based approach brings three main 
advantages within the domestic setting. First, it recognises the existence of claims and their 
corresponding obligations. In so doing, a rights-based approach translates mere needs to 
rightful enforceable claims. In this instance, a rights-based approach to realizing a right to 
water would serve to expand thinking about water delivery in terms of the international law 
human rights standards elaborated in General Comment 15.  
Secondly, a rights-based approach ensures that the rights holders and duty bearers are 
distinctly recognised. For rights holders this recognition has immense benefits. For instance, 
it emboldens them to claim against duty bearers and exercise their rights effectively.
109
 This 
recognition can enhance genuine public participation in the implementation of strategies for 
water delivery, through collaborating with communities but also through the use of rights 
based adjudication. 
Finally, a rights based approach enhances accountability by establishing a paradigm 
whereby duty bearers are held accountable to rights bearers.
110
 In human rights terms, 
accountability is useful at different levels. Since there are presumably competing needs that a 
State ought to address, it has been argued that accountability would ultimately enhance self-
scrutiny by the executive. In this sense, accountability is not envisaged only as a routine 
electoral outcome but also extends to the kind of responsiveness demanded by a robust 
adjudicative system. Within a rights based paradigm, the executive exercises its functions 
aware that its policies must be ultimately explained within an objective standard. As a result, 
the state becomes more accountable by justifying to its citizens its policies and priorities 
towards enhancing enjoyment of a right to water.  
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CHAPTER 3 
RECOGNISING AND ENFORCING THE RIGHT TO WATER IN 
UGANDA 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
A starting point for understanding the struggle for recognition and enforcement of socio-
economic rights in Uganda is in the history of the Constitution making process prior to 1995. 
Accordingly, this chapter begins with a chronological account of Uganda’s previous 
Constitutions and a background to the debates surrounding the promulgation of the 1995 
Constitution.
1
 It then explores the unique features of the 1995 Constitution which facilitate 
executive, legislative and judicial interaction with human rights (including, presumably a 
human right to water). In the third section, I explore the manner in which the human right to 
water may be inferred from the constitutional text. In section four, I explore the ways in 
which Uganda’s legislative and policy framework elaborate and give content to the right to 
water. Section five interrogates whether it is possible to enforce the human right to water 
within the Ugandan courts. Considering that the right to water has not yet been adjudicated 
upon by the courts, I examine the approach of the courts in adjudicating other socio-
economic rights. As a result, much of this section speculates on the extent to which the 
jurisprudence of the courts in Uganda would allow an elaboration and enforcement of the 
right to water. Finally, I draw conclusions on the potential and impediments to constitutional 
adjudication as a means to enhancing enjoyment of the human right to water in Uganda. 
3.2 A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIO-
ECONOMIC RIGHTS RECOGNITION IN UGANDA 
Prior to 1995, Uganda had enacted three Constitutions. The first Constitution was enacted in 
1962, at independence. Thereafter, consequent to politically tumultuous events in 1966, 
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another Constitution was enacted. Only a year later, the third Constitution was promulgated.
2
 
In terms of human rights, these three constitutions recognised the fundamental human rights 
of the individual within a consolidated chapter, enumerating the Bill of Rights. These 
constitutional texts did not include additional directive principles of state policy. The Bills of 
Rights in these Constitutions appeared to give a limited scope to fundamental human rights as 
being limited to including the protection of life, liberty, security of the person and property.
3
 
The closest that the texts came to recognising socio-economic rights appears to have been the 
protection from forced labor and the protection of the right to a pension for public servants. 
The period between 1966 and 1986 was also dominated by political instability.
4
 
Although terms such as fundamental human rights were routinely used by State agencies, 
they were conceived as relating to civil and political rights. To illustrate, in 1986 the Attorney 
General of Uganda issued a legal notice conferring powers upon a special Commission of 
Inquiry into violations of human rights covering the period 1962-1986. While, according to 
its terms of reference, the Commission was to inquire into ‘human rights violations’, these 
were defined as including acts of mass murder, arbitrary arrests, disappearances and denial of 
fair trials.
5
 Subsequently, even though the Commission of Inquiry noted that the political 
turmoil experienced nationwide had led to social and economic deterioration (with the 
majority living below the poverty line without access to basic rights such as food, shelter and 
education) it never pursued an inquiry into the nature and form of socio-economic rights 
violations, nor did it provide any recommendations as to their amelioration.      
After decades of political instability, the political transition, which began in 1986, was 
followed closely by a debate about constitutional reform. In 1988, a Constitutional 
Commission was constituted and tasked with gathering the views of the majority of 
Ugandans in order to incorporate these views and aspirations within the new Constitution. 
Particularly, the Constitutional Commission was required to make proposals for a national 
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Constitution which would guarantee the fundamental rights and freedoms of Ugandans.
6
 The 
report compiled subsequent to the Constitutional Commission’s review paid some attention to 
the recognition of socio-economic rights. The Commission noted:  
The rights to food, health, clean water…human shelter have been enjoyed only by 
some. Without these basic necessities of life, other human rights become virtually 
meaningless. Post-independence governments have squandered the country’s wealth 
without doing justice to either the rural farmers or the urban and rural poor and 
without developing and implementing policies for fighting backwardness and abject 
poverty.
7
  
The Constitutional Commission additionally wrote: 
There is widespread support for the view that priority should be accorded to the basic 
necessities of life such as food, water, shelter, health services, education…for the 
needy when deciding on priorities for socio-economic development and provision of 
services.
8
 
Nonetheless, the Constitutional Commission recommended that these socio-economic 
rights could not be immediately enforced and were better suited for inclusion as national 
objectives and directive principles of State policy.
9
 Only a selection of women’s rights, 
labour rights and the right to a clean environment were recommended for inclusion as 
fundamental rights. In reference to enforcement of socio-economic rights, the Commission 
wrote: 
We believe Uganda needs to recognize the entire International Bill of Rights as 
developed up to now. The new Constitution should enshrine all its principles while 
ordinary laws should spell out necessary details of the Bill. But this should be done in 
accordance with the mentality and aspirations of the people bearing in mind the 
present as well as the likely future conditions of the country. Such rights which cannot 
be immediately enforced should nevertheless be contained in the Directive Principles 
of State Policy to serve as goals to be achieved.
10
  
Following directly from this Constitutional Commission report, the Constituent 
Assembly delegates debated the content of the constitutional text. These debates also reflect a 
perception that the socio-economic rights enumerated within the draft Constitution were to be 
understood as mere aspirations. It is plausible that the extensive civil rights violations of 
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previous years made it difficult to envisage extending equal protection to socio-economic 
rights. For instance, one delegate commented that: 
…these objectives are very good, the point I am seeking clarification on is about the 
possibility or practicability of this objective, because at any given time, I do not see how 
any Government will provide all these things, will ensure free education for all, food, 
accommodation, good health and so forth.
11
 
In fact, the report of the Assembly’s debates reflects that these objectives should by all means 
remain non-justiciable. For instance, delegates arguing against justiciability of socio-
economic rights stated: 
…suppose tomorrow I go to Ibanda and I find I have no clean water within my vicinity, 
am I supposed to sue the government on the basis of this clause of Article 66?
12
 
Another view stated: 
…I wonder how many cases [litigation] we are going to have of people with no decent 
accommodation, people with no medical facilities, with no clean water and so forth. I do 
not know how practicable this is going to be;….13 
The Constituent Assembly ultimately agreed to remove the chapter detailing the socio-
economic objectives from the main body of the Constitution. In the end, 1995 saw the 
passing of the country’s fourth Constitution which aspired to ‘building a better future by 
establishing a socioeconomic and political order through a popular and durable national 
Constitution based on the principles of unity, peace, equality, democracy, freedom, social 
justice and progress....’14 In addition to a justiciable Bill of Rights, the Constitution of the 
Republic of Uganda (1995 Constitution) contained a non-justiciable section, which 
enumerates socio-economic rights as national directive principles of State policy (NODPSP). 
In this way, the NODPSP recognise, among others, non-justiciable rights to education, health, 
decent shelter and food security.
15
 
The NODPSP also enumerate several social and economic objectives aimed at 
delivering social justice and economic development. For instance, the NODPSP recognise the 
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rights to development, culture, the environment, protection of the aged, protection of natural 
resources and ensuring gender equality.
16
  
Commentators critical of the Constituent Assembly’s approach to enumerating 
constitutional rights urge that the textual location of the rights became a crucial determinant 
of their effectiveness in influencing both law and policy.
17
 Particularly, their relegation to the 
NODPSP meant that socio-economic rights were understood to be secondary and unequal to 
other fundamental human rights. Secondly, the classification of rights was determined by the 
Constituent Assembly delegates’ conceptualisation of the justiciability of rights, meaning that 
socio-economic rights were classified as non-justiciable aspirations within the new 
constitutional dispensation.  
But the promulgation of a 2005 amendment to the main body of the 1995 Constitution 
may have some effects on the conceptualisation of socio-economic rights. The newly inserted 
Article 8A stipulates that, ‘Uganda shall be governed based on principles of national interest 
and common good enshrined in the national objectives and directive principles of state 
policy.’ It has been argued that Article 8A may allow for a reading of the NODPSP as 
justiciable, given that the 1995 Constitution now makes it mandatory for the organs of State 
to take into account the NODPSP. Even then, this argument is yet to be tested before the 
courts.
18
  
What is certain is that the NODPSP demand that the objectives and principles set out 
therein shall guide all organs and agencies of State in applying or interpreting the constitution 
or any law, and in making and interpreting any policy decisions for the establishment and 
promotion of a just, free and democratic society.
19
 The NODPSP contemplate that the task of 
translating the rights enshrined therein lies with the executive and legislature, which are 
obliged to formulate goals for their protection and promotion.
20
 Commentators accordingly 
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acknowledge that the NODPSP principles are significant, in so far as they have to be effected 
by the agencies of State whenever it is reasonably possible to do so without betraying the text 
of the 1995 Constitution.
21
 This notwithstanding, the NODPSP, in their current form, appear 
to provide minimal support to the actual enjoyment and enforcement of socio-economic 
rights.
22
  
3.3 THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND ITS ENFORCEMENT IN THE 1995 
CONSTITUTION    
The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (1995 Constitution) contains an elaborate bill of 
rights which enumerates most human rights recognised within international law.
23
 This bill of 
rights guarantees several qualified as well as unqualified rights. Although some of the rights 
enumerated are not elaborated upon, the bill of rights details the scope of many of the rights 
contained therein. The 1995 Constitution further contains a limitations clause, which also 
delimits the extent to which the rights can be enjoyed and enforced. Except for those rights 
that are non-derogable, the rights recognised in the bill of rights are subject to a general 
limitation to the effect that: 
In the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms prescribed in this Chapter, no person shall 
prejudice the fundamental or other human rights and freedoms of others or the public 
interest.
24
  
The 1995 Constitution further determines that public interest shall not permit any limitation 
of the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms prescribed by the Bill of Rights, beyond what is 
acceptable and demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society, or what is explicitly 
provided for in the Constitution.
25
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Although, the application of international human rights law within the domestic context 
is not explicitly articulated, it can be inferred within the NODPSP and main part of the 1995 
Constitution. The NODPSP stipulates that the State’s foreign policy shall espouse respect for 
international law and treaty obligations,
26
 whereas Article 287 affirms that international 
treaties which were in force prior to promulgation of the 1995 Constitution continue to bind 
Uganda. While these provisions do not explicitly determine that the principles and 
interpretations of international law are applicable within the domestic system, it is plausible 
to argue that the application of international law can be inferred from the purpose and intent 
of the NODPSP and Article 287. Particularly, as will be elaborated below, this proposition 
may be extended to support the argument that any interpretations of the Constitution ought to 
be read in light of applicable international law.  
 The 1995 Constitution envisages an interpretive function for the Constitutional court, 
which includes the interpretation of the rights enshrined in the bill of rights.
27
 Article 137(1) 
provides that ‘Any question as to the interpretation of the Constitution shall be determined by 
the Court of Appeal sitting as the constitutional court.’ It further appears that while fulfilling 
its interpretive role, the Constitutional Court is mandated to scrutinize the legislative 
outcomes and executive action against standards imposed by the rights in the Bill of Rights.
28
  
The 1995 Constitution envisages judicial enforcement of the bill of rights as well as 
judicial remedies for violations of the human rights enumerated therein. First, the 1995 
Constitution stipulates that citizens can bring claims against the state and its institutions for 
rights violations. Article 50 determines that: 
Any person who claims that a fundamental or other right or freedom guaranteed under 
this Constitution has been infringed or threatened is entitled to apply to a competent 
court for redress which may include compensation.
29
 
 Even where violations or threats of violations arise from statutory enactments or executive 
actions, the courts are constitutionally obliged to provide redress to citizens. Indeed, Article 
137(3) stipulates that: 
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  A person who alleges that- 
(a) an Act of Parliament or any other law or anything in or done under the authority 
of any law; or 
(b) any act or omission by any person or authority, 
is inconsistent with or in contravention of a provision of this Constitution, may 
petition the constitutional court for a declaration to that effect, and for redress where 
appropriate.
30
   
The 1995 Constitution thus bestows courts with wide discretionary powers to remedy 
violations of rights in the Bill of Rights. For instance in the exercise of judicial review, the 
Constitutional Court may make a declaration of unconstitutionality and where necessary 
determine the appropriate redress.
31
 This envisages that, in the enforcement of rights, courts 
may be required to go beyond the rhetoric of mere declarations and may, in appropriate 
circumstances, have to provide substantive relief to successful claimants.
32
  
3.4 INFERRING A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO WATER FROM THE 
1995 CONSTITUTION  
As in the case with other socio-economic rights, there is no right to water in the justiciable 
Bill of Rights in the 1995 Constitution. Explicit reference to a human right to water is only 
made within the NODPSP, which recognise the freedom to access water and freedom from 
interference with existing water supplies. The NODPSP stipulate that:  
The State shall endeavour to fulfil the fundamental rights of all Ugandans to social 
justice and economic development and shall in particular, ensure that- 
.... 
All Ugandans enjoy rights and opportunities and access to education, health services, 
clean and safe water, work, decent shelter, adequate clothing, food, security and pension 
and retirement benefits.
33
  
 
In furtherance of this ideal, the NODPSP add that, ‘The State shall take all practical measures 
to promote a good water management system at all levels.’34 Since the NODPSP are 
fundamental to governing the State, it may be argued that the directives and aspirations 
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relating to universal access to safe and clean water ought to be read into the rights that have 
been explicitly enumerated within the bill of rights.  
Constitutional impetus for reading the right to water into the bill of rights is provided 
by the State’s obligation to comply with international human rights law standards, even in 
relation to non-enumerated rights. Article 45 of the 1995 Constitution reads: 
The rights, duties, declarations and guarantees relating to the fundamental and other 
human rights and freedoms specifically mentioned in this Chapter [Bill of rights] shall 
not be regarded as excluding others not specifically mentioned.
35
  
If Article 45 is given a generous interpretation, the absence of an explicit reference to the 
right to water in the Bill of Rights does not entirely exclude the right from constitutional 
recognition and, ultimately, enforcement. It is plausible to argue that Article 45 allows a 
reading into the constitutional text of other rights such as the right to water, which are 
espoused within international law.  
  There are several rights in the Bill of Rights into which aspects of the human right to 
water may be read. For instance, it is stated that, ‘Every Ugandan has a right to a clean and 
healthy environment.’36 Considering that the UNCESCR’s general comment 15 regards the 
sustainability and quality of water resources as integral components of the right to water, it is 
possible to argue that a human right to water may be read into interpretations of 
environmental rights within the 1995 Constitution.
37
 
 In Article 22, the right to life is guaranteed. The Constitution stipulates that:  
No person shall be deprived of life intentionally except in execution of a sentence passed 
in a fair trial by a court of competent jurisdiction in respect of a criminal offence under 
the laws of Uganda….38 
Given the UN Human Rights Committee’s view that the right to life should be interpreted 
generously, to encompass more than merely a restricted protection from arbitrary taking of 
life, it is possible to read basic survival requirements into a right to life. Given that water is a 
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basic survival requirement, it is thus plausible to argue that a right to life may infer a right to 
water.
39
  
However, the Ugandan right to life has been phrased negatively in the sense that it 
obliges the State to do little more than to respect life. This undermines the possibility of 
actualizing the positive dimensions of the right to life envisaged by UN Human Rights 
Committee’s General comment six.40 Even then, if the broader interpretation of a right to life 
prevailing in international law is accepted as an interpretive guideline for constitutional 
interpretation in Uganda, it is possible to view the right to life as requiring the State to take 
positive measures which would prevent loss of life. In relation to water, it is then possible to 
argue that the State has an obligation to fulfil and promote the right to life by putting in place 
measures which would prevent citizens from succumbing to illnesses arising from consuming 
contaminated water, or from lack of water for growing food for subsistence. 
The human right to water may also be read into constitutional guarantees pertaining to 
the well being of children. In Article 34(3), a child’s right to medical treatment, education or 
any other social or economic benefit is guaranteed. In Article 34(7), the need for special 
protection of orphans and other vulnerable children is recognised. When these provisions are 
read against the broader international law definition of a right to health, it is possible to argue 
that they may be generously interpreted as embodying a right to access safe water for daily 
use and consumption in order to sustain wellness.  
The 1995 Constitution provides that no person shall be subjected to inhuman or 
degrading treatment.
41
 Considering that the UNCESCR’s General Comment 15 has espoused 
the right to water in a manner which seeks to protect the autonomy of the individual, it is 
possible to infer that the 1995 constitutional guarantee of human dignity may allow a reading 
which embodies aspects of the human right to water to the extent that where citizens are 
deprived of access to water, they are being subjected to an undignified existence.
42
  
In addition, the right to water may be read into the 1995 Constitution’s guarantees of a 
right to equality. For instance, in Article 21 the 1995 Constitution stipulates that: 
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All persons are equal before and under the law in all spheres of political, economic, 
social and cultural life and in every other respect and shall enjoy equal protection of 
the law.
43
  
Two dimensions may be inferred from this text. First, it implies that laws must treat citizens 
equally. Secondly, it appears to require that the mechanisms established by the state to 
distribute resources such as water must be distributed equally. Given that the Constitution 
further envisages that it will redress the social and economic imbalances within Ugandan 
society, it is possible to read a guarantee of universal access to water into this provision.
44
 
The notion of equal opportunity espoused in the 1995 Constitution further resonates 
with some important aspects of a human right to water. For example, equal opportunity is 
implied by Article 33(2) of the 1995 Constitution, which provides that the State shall provide 
the facilities and opportunities necessary to enhance the welfare of women. The Constitution 
adds that women shall have the right to equal opportunities in economic and social 
activities.
45
 Given that General Comment 15 has recognised that women and children are the 
greatest victims of violations of the human right to water through the various impediments to 
access which cause them to either walk long distances or spend long hours collecting water 
for their families, it may be possible to read some aspects of a right to water into this 
constitutional guarantee.  
 Having found that it is possible to read international law understandings of the right to 
water into several provisions of the Ugandan Bill of Rights, I now consider the responsibility 
of the State for actualising the right to water. The 1995 Constitution provides that the rights 
and freedoms enshrined in the bill of rights shall be respected, upheld and promoted by all 
organs and agencies of Government and by all persons. This provision may be read as 
facilitating a direct interface with the UNCESCR’s tripartite typology of state obligations to 
respect, protect and fulfil, as discussed in chapter 2. In relation to water, the obligation to 
respect appears to envisage deference to the constitutional norms by all organs and agencies 
of government as well as persons.
46
 The obligation to protect seems to infer responsibility to 
look after natural resources, which include water bodies such as lakes, rivers, springs and 
streams, on behalf of the citizens.
47
 The obligation to promote appears to infer taking all 
practical measures to advance a good water management system,
48
 and to promote 
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sustainable development and public awareness of the need to manage water resources in a 
balanced and sustainable manner for the present and future generations.
49
 The obligation to 
fulfil appears to envisage that the State ought to endeavour to fulfil the fundamental rights of 
all Ugandans to social justice and economic development and in particular to ensure that all 
development efforts are directed at ensuring the maximum social and cultural well-being of 
the people.
50
   
The actual manner in which the State’s obligations to facilitate enjoyment of clean and 
safe water for citizens must be realised is contemplated by the 1995 Constitution. For 
example, the 1995 Constitution envisages a system of governance in which some level of 
executive and legislative responsibility is devolved to the lowest units of government 
(referred to as the local governments of districts). As such, local governments are vested with 
the responsibility to provide water services to people within their areas of governance.
51
 If it 
is accepted that a right to water is inherent to the Constitution, it is possible to argue that the 
Constitution envisages that there is an obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the right to 
water in the exercise of local government authority.  
To sum up, the 1995 Constitution appears to guarantee an implicit right to water, which 
at least operates as a directive principle to the legislature, executive and judiciary. It seems 
that, at most, the right to water can be read into the constitutional text by applying generous 
interpretations to other explicitly guaranteed rights which can be vindicated by citizens. Even 
then, its exact internal content and external reach remains abstract. I thus explore the extent to 
which the right to water is fleshed out in Uganda’s national legislative and policy framework 
and consider whether this framework portrays the aspirations of the 1995 Constitution.  
3.5 ELABORATING THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER WITHIN THE 
NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 
In the exercise of its constitutional powers, Parliament is mandated to make laws on any 
matter for the development and good governance of Uganda.
52
 Considering that the NODPSP 
and Article 8A of the Constitution envisage that the State shall fulfil its obligations by 
enacting laws to give effect to the rights enumerated in the NODPSP, there are two primary 
pieces of legislation which directly impact water delivery and supply. These are the Water 
Act and its attendant regulations, and the National Water and Sewerage Corporation Act 
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(NWSC Act).
53
 Both of these Acts were promulgated in the aftermath of the 1995 
Constitution and as part of broader water reforms. Of course, the timing of their promulgation 
is significant, given that Parliament and the executive were assuming significantly novel roles 
within a new constitutional dispensation. 
 Three considerations provide an important background to the motivation of these water 
law reforms. Prior to the enactment of these two pieces of legislation, there were several laws 
from which the principles of regulating water resources and water delivery could be pieced 
together. Even these were outmoded and inadequate.
54
 It would seem that a key motivation 
for enacting new legislation was to harmonise the water legislative framework, such that 
water resources management was comprehensively dealt with in one piece of legislation. 
Secondly, the State had ratified the Ramsar Convention relating to the protection of wetland 
resources which had not been protected under any previous laws.
55
 Given the emphasis on 
environmental rights within the NODPSP and main body of the 1995 Constitution it would 
seem that, at the time of promulgating the Constitution, the State was keen to articulate 
principles for the protection and management of the environment.
56
 Thirdly, and a matter 
which is revisited later in this chapter, was the question of privatising water delivery services. 
It appears that the State was keen on preparing the National Water and Sewerage Corporation 
(NWSC) for divestiture and was motivated to concretise and legitimise its commercial goals 
in order to make the NWSC conducive for divestiture. These motivations ought to be borne in 
mind in considering how water was conceptualised within the two pieces of legislation 
designed to drive the constitution’s water related NODPSP. 
3.5.1 The Water Act 
The Water Act stipulates that the provision of water for domestic use is central to its purpose.  
For instance, the Water Act emphasises as one of several objectives: ‘to promote the 
provision of a clean, safe and sufficient supply of water for domestic purposes to all 
persons.’57 The Water Act affirms the freedom to access water for basic human needs in 
section 7 which stipulates: 
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 The Water Act and NWSC Act were promulgated in 1995.  While the NWSC Act Chapter 317 Laws of 
Uganda came into force in 1995, the Water Act came into force in 1997.  
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 Water service delivery was governed by NWSC Decree 34 of 1972. Water management was governed 
through a Public Lands Act 1969 and Rivers Act (1907) Chapter 357. 
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 Uganda acceded to the Ramsar Convention in March 1988. 
56
 At about the same time that the Water Act and NWSC Act were promulgated, Parliament also promulgated 
the National Environment Act 1995 chapter 153. 
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 The Water Act, Chapter 152, Laws of Uganda, section 4(b). Under the definition section (1) ‘domestic use’ 
includes, use for the purpose of human consumption, washing and cooking by persons ordinarily resident on the 
56 
 
 … a person may- 
(a) While temporarily at any place; or 
(b) Being the occupier of or a resident on any land, 
where there is a natural source of water, use that water for domestic use, fighting fire 
or irrigating a subsistence garden.
58
 
And that: 
…the occupier of land or resident on land may, with the approval of the authority 
responsible for the area, use any water under the land occupied by him or her on 
which he or she is resident or any land adjacent to that land.
59
 
 
The Water Act prescribes water supply standards and elaborates the institutional 
framework within which water is supplied.
60
 For instance, the Act envisages the creation of 
water supply areas delineated along local governments. The local governments which 
constitute water supply areas are required to establish water supply authorities and it is these 
water supply authorities that are ultimately mandated to deliver water to the individual at 
household level.
61
 In urban areas, the water supply authority is the NWSC. Apart from these 
provisions, the rest of the Water Act is dedicated to management and protection of water 
resources. 
However, while the right to access water sources appears to be couched in rights 
conscious language, the water which is the subject of the Water Act appears to be slightly 
different from that conceptualised in General Comment 15. The term ‘water’ is defined by 
the Water Act as including: 
(i) Water flowing or situated upon the surface of any land; 
(ii) Water flowing or contained in-  
(A) Any river, stream, watercourse or other natural course for water; 
(B) Any lake, pan, swamp, marsh or spring, whether or not it has been altered or 
artificially improved; 
(iii) Ground water; 
(iv) Such other water as the Ministry may from time to time declare to be water.62 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
land where the use occurs; watering not more than 30 livestock units; irrigating a subsistence garden; and 
watering a subsistence fish pond.  
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 Section 7(1)(a) and (b). 
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 Section 7(2). Domestic use is defined in section 1(1) of the Water Act in substantially the same manner as 
General Comment 15. It includes purposes of human consumption, washing and cooking by persons ordinarily 
resident on the land where the use occurs; watering not more than 30 livestock units; irrigating a subsistence 
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 Sections 45-61. 
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Ministry of Water and Environment Joint Water and Environment Sector Strategic Plan Final Programme 
Document, April 2013 (JWESSP 2013-2018) 1, 11.  
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 Section 1(oo). 
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It would seem that the Water Act appears to be skewed towards broad water 
management of lakes, rivers and swamps as opposed to prescribing the manner in which the 
right to water may be enjoyed by citizens.  
In terms of implementation, the Water Act appears to have enhanced enjoyment of the 
right to water by establishing several local government based water supply authorities, 
thereby actualising the NODPSP. As a result, there appear to be more people who can access 
safe and clean water through the local government water delivery system. But even then, 
there is still inequity in water supply, considering that a significant number of the population 
still does not have access to water or to a consistent and reliable water delivery mechanism.  
It is plausible to suggest that the limited success in enhancing enjoyment of the right to 
water may be attributed to the Water Act’s failure to articulate the full extent and scope of the 
human right to water. This obvious gap is likely to detract from the state much of its 
constitutional responsibility for providing water to its citizens in a manner which 
encapsulates the rights-based approach envisaged by the NODPSP. 
3.5.2 The National Water & Sewerage Corporation Act 
The NWSC Act, which was also promulgated in the aftermath of the 1995 Constitution, 
stipulates that the objects of the Corporation include, among others, the provision of water 
supply services for domestic and other uses.
63
 In particular, the NWSC Act provides that the 
corporation shall develop the water and sewerage systems in urban centres and big national 
institutions.
64
 Inevitably, the NWSC operates within a limited scope of urban centres and 
state owned institutions. The remainder of the NWSC Act details how the corporation shall 
be managed as a commercially viable entity.
65
  
While the individual’s autonomy to access water services through the NWSC is 
guaranteed, the use of water derived from the water authorities’ supply infrastructure attracts 
a charge or fees for service provision.
66
 Such charges have implications. First, the initial 
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Regulations 1999, determines that charges are payable within a period of 14 days from the date of receipt of 
notice. Charges may be assessed on the basis of quantity of water supplied, or any other manner approved by the 
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entitlement to a water connection requires individuals to support their formal application for 
domestic water connection with a connection fee.
67
 Secondly, NWSC is allowed by law to 
index its water service rates to prevailing market prices. By way of example, the Water Act 
(General Rates) Instrument determines that the rates payable are subject to annual indexation 
against the domestic price index, the exchange rate, the foreign price index and the electricity 
tariff.
68
 It is arguable that, even where water authorities set out to price water at an affordable 
rate, such annual indexation would negate affordability if it is accepted that other determining 
factors of the water price consistently rise sharply annually.
69
 Subsequently, the matter of 
fees and their negative impact on the affordability of water appears to be the most 
controversial aspect of the current water delivery paradigm. 
One ironic aspect of the NWSC Act which merits consideration is its approach to water 
rates as encumbrances. Under the NWSC Act, water constitutes a charge on land.
70
 As such, 
the potable water that flows from NWSC’s infrastructure cannot become accessible to an 
individual unless the particular person can show legitimate claims to a portion of the land to 
which the water infrastructure has been installed.
71
 It is arguable that access to water is not 
perceived as a universal entitlement of all citizens. Rather, it is viewed as an entitlement to 
those who can lay claim to land by either being owners or holders of a legal interest, such as a 
tenancy or a lease, over the land. Secondly, the consumer is obliged to pay fees for services 
provided irrespective of their financial situation. Where these rates remain unpaid for thirty 
days, the water authority is authorized to disconnect or restrict a water supply and to demand 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Minister. According to s 94(4) Water Act, a water authority is authorised to establish the minimum charges to be 
paid for water supplied and the charges to be paid per unit of water supplied albeit with the prior approval of the 
Minister. Also see s 5(2)(b) NWSC Act, which mandates the Corporation to set tariffs and charges. 
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Regulation 8(2) Water Supply Regulations 1999 the prescribed form for applying to get a connection includes 
application and installation fees. In practice the initial connection fees are waived where the government 
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land owner allowing installation of a public stand tap on his/her land.  
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Regulation 3 Water Act (General Rates) Instrument, Statutory Instrument No 30 of 2006. 
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For instance in an interview with the NWSC-Kampala Water Legal Services Manager in September 2013, I 
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charges alone for supplying water within Kampala alone (The interview transcript is on file with author). 
70I use the term ‘charge’ in the sense that provision of water services creates a legal encumbrance over one’s 
land.  
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Regulation 8(2) Water Supply Regulations. Form A in the Schedule requires the land owner to sign the 
application form consenting to the water connection. Obviously this has implications where the applicant is not 
legally mandate to settle on the land. The requirement to accompany the application with a land title or proof of 
interest was brought to my attention during an interview with NWSC- Kampala Water’s Legal Services 
Manager in September 2013 (The interview transcript is on file with author). 
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that the payment be settled.
72
 Subsequently, it appears that the legislative framework 
facilitates a situation where clean and safe water is accessible to some and not all citizens.  
While I acknowledge that some amount of control and regulation is required to manage 
and supply water services, the provisions in the NWSC Act appear to be disconnected from 
the purpose and intent of the 1995 Constitution’s NODPSP and Bill of Rights, given that the 
legislation only marginally elaborates on the human right to water or embodies a rights 
consciousness. Even where the limitations to the bill of rights are taken into account, these 
statutory provisions, when read together, do not entirely lend themselves to a rights-based 
approach to delivery of water services. 
In the end, when the Water Act and NWSC Act are considered together, it is possible to 
conclude that the impact of the NODPSP on water legislation has been limited. Drawing from 
this conclusion, I argue that there is a link between the weak elaborations of the right in 
national legislation to the manner in which the right to water is only present by implication 
within the overarching constitutional setting. 
3.5.3 Appraising the national water policy framework 
Initiating and implementing national policies that, ideally, embrace a rights-based approach 
to delivering water services is a function that is within the executive’s constitutional mandate. 
Urging a closer reading of executive policies, commentators have cautioned that the 
country’s economic policy framework may well be responsible for the impediments to full 
actualization of socio-economic rights in Uganda. These commentators argue that the 
economic policy framework has over the years promoted liberalization of the economy and 
privatization of national institutions hitherto responsible for delivery of basic services in a 
manner which does not reflect the spirit of the 1995 Constitution.
73
 In this sub-section, I 
explore the extent to which the NODPSP have influenced policies relating to water, as well as 
the policies’ impact on the enjoyment and elaboration of a human right to water for 
Ugandans. 
There are several policies pertaining to water use and management that have been 
developed and implemented over the years. In this section, I focus particularly on the 
National Development Plan, because it provides a benchmark for current national planning 
processes and is instructive of the perception of water within the planning organs of State. 
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Thereafter, I consider specific water-related policies, particularly the National Water Policy 
and the Pro-poor strategy for water and sanitation, because they elaborate on water supply for 
domestic needs. Finally, I briefly consider the water privatisation policy and the ways in 
which it has impacted on the actual delivery of water services.  
The National Development Plan was developed and adapted by Parliament in 2010.
74
 It 
aims to ensure poverty eradication, with an emphasis on ‘economic transformation and 
wealth creation’.75 The National Development Plan anticipates that poverty will be eradicated 
by implementing eight objectives. Chief among these is ‘increasing access to quality social 
services, through among others, safe water coverage’.76 The term is used to refer to 
increasing the number of places where water can be collected in particular areas. As a driver 
for planning water services delivery, this suggests that the executive has been influenced by 
the NODPSP in articulating its vision for development. However, a closer look at the 
National Development Plan shows that the emphasis is on market-based approaches to 
alleviate poverty, without much attention being paid to advancing a rights agenda to the 
delivery of social services. 
The National Water Policy, adopted in 1999, is the single most specific policy 
document elaborating on water delivery. It explicitly recognises that the policies enumerated 
within it are founded upon the 1995 Constitution’s directive to provide clean and safe water 
and the state’s responsibility to manage water resources sustainably. In view of this, the 
policy recognises that domestic water use must be given the highest priority when addressing 
water development and use. Indeed, the water policy stipulates that the key criteria to be used 
in allocating water resources will be the provision of water, ‘in adequate quantity and quality 
to meet domestic demands’.77 Having been formulated after the promulgation of the 1995 
Constitution, the Policy appears to adhere to the directive principles’ ideals, by envisioning 
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water supply within the context of meeting universal basic human needs envisioned by the 
1995 Constitution.  
The National Water Policy elaborates on the nature of water necessary to meet basic 
human needs, by making implicit reference to the quality of water sources from which water 
for human consumption ought to be sourced. For instance, the Water Policy anticipates that 
‘water’ for domestic use is to be sourced from protected springs, hand pump equipped 
shallow wells or boreholes, or from a tap on a stand.
78
 This is presumably because these 
water sources can be carefully monitored to guarantee for quality of water and availability of 
water channelled through them.  
In addition to recommending sources for water suitable for human consumption, the 
National Water Policy embeds the responsibility of the State to make safe water available to 
citizens. The Policy stipulates that the water quality should be that recommended by the 
WHO until such a time as the country develops its own national water quality standards.
79
 In 
2009, the National Water Quality Management Strategy proposed to put in place national 
drinking water guidelines.
80
 This strategy document is in effect an adoption of the WHO 
standards for water quality, given that the WHO guidelines are the benchmark for 
international water quality standards.  
In the context of access to water, the National Water Policy stipulates a reasonable 
distance to a water source in urban and rural areas, by setting a recommended standard for 
distance from a rural public water point as being preferably within 1500 metres of the 
households. Within built up areas and peri-urban zones, it is recommended that a public water 
point be located within a walking distance not exceeding 200 metres. The policy stipulates 
that individual public water points in the urban areas should not serve more than 300 
persons.
81
 Finally, the Water policy recommends that in urban areas, the government’s focus 
should be on the poorest communities in order to improve their access to water.
82
  
The National Water policy specifies the amount of water that is ideally necessary for 
citizens’ well being. In both rural and urban areas the basic service level for water supply 
means providing 20-25 litres per capita per day. This standard is in line with that 
recommended by the WHO and would appear compliant with international law standards.  
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In sum, it appears that the National Water Policy adheres to the NODPSP and has 
conceptualised water delivery for domestic needs within a rights conscious framework. In 
addition, it refines specific standards of water delivery which, if well implemented, can go a 
long way to enhance enjoyment of the right to water. 
The Pro-Poor National Strategy was designed to promote equity in access to water by 
improving access to water sources in urban and peri-urban areas, where the negative impact 
of population growth to water services appears to be most felt.
83
 The Strategy aims at 
extending the water infrastructure to areas that previously had no access to the water supply 
network. For instance, the Strategy set out to pave way for extending water pipes to rural and 
urban slum settlements which hitherto had no existing water infrastructure. In addition, the 
requirement for a connection fee was waived in these areas. Considering that the initial cost 
of connecting to a water supply was known to impede citizens’ access to water, subsidies 
received from Uganda’s development partners were used to waive these charges in the urban 
slum settlements.
84
 The Pro-Poor National Strategy proposes to improve the ease with which 
citizens can reach water. The executive has implemented this undertaking by increasing the 
number of stand pipes and public service points in urban slum settlements. In many of these 
areas, the stand pipes are pre-paid stand taps which allow several users to share a water 
source while retaining individual responsibility for the cost of the water. 
But there are still contradictions which show that the translation of a right to water 
through executive policy cannot entirely actualise enjoyment of the right for citizens and 
realise the constitutional aspiration for social transformation. By way of example, the Pro-
Poor National Strategy indicates that the motivation for the Strategy arose from the fact that 
rates charged for water remain inequitable among citizens.
85
 Particularly, where the water 
delivery system breaks down in urban slum settlements, the cost at which water is supplied 
by private water vendors tends to be higher than the cost at which consumers with in-house 
connections access water.
86
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 Even where the government has proposed a series of initiatives to promote equity by 
the introduction of pre-paid meters; price controls for water sold at public yard taps or stand 
pipes; and finally encouraging consumers to use yard taps as opposed to buying water from 
commercially driven private water vendors, it has withdrawn the benefits of such initiatives 
without much consideration of the lived realities of the poor and vulnerable.
87
 For instance, 
within three years of introducing water subsidies, and at a time when the benefits of easily 
accessible water had began to trickle down to the poor, government proposed that the 
increased numbers of people accessing potable water was indicative of a potential source of 
tax revenue for the State. It then proposed to use the growing base of water connections as a 
means to raise national revenue.
88
 Although the tax was aimed at private domestic water 
users who neither receive water through the pre-paid mechanism nor from public stand pipes, 
in some parts of Kampala, the capital city, water rates were immediately hiked by water 
vendors on account of the value added tax.
89
 This shift in focus from enhancing water access 
for the poor to increased national revenue provides evidence that a weak legislative basis for 
a right to water impedes its full enjoyment and actualisation.  
However, the impact of the executive’s proposal to introduce a value added tax to water 
services may have indirect advantages. One immediate advantage appears to have been the 
dialogue which ensued between Parliament and the executive relating to this proposal. 
During the last two years, Parliament’s committee on natural resources has debated and 
consistently recommended that government drops proposals of the value added tax on 
domestic water supply, in order not to forestall access to safe water where citizens cannot 
afford clean and safe water.
90
 This would appear to have generated the much desired dialogue 
between the executive and legislature on at least one component of the human right to water. 
Even though the tax was nevertheless implemented, the debates and dialogue it stirred point 
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to the potential of a rights-based approach, to the extent that it can compel justification of 
executive policy where this is likely to impede enjoyment of the right to water. 
The Water Privatisation Policy has impacted on the manner in which water is 
conceptualised and delivered for citizens. Even though the NWSC, which is responsible for 
water delivery in many urban centers, was not divested to a private company as was initially 
planned, the delivery of water services was adapted to accommodate private companies in the 
delivery of water. The privatisation of water delivery has taken the form of performance- 
based contracts between the government and the NWSC, as well as other private companies 
mandated to supply water within local government water supply areas. This unique model of 
involving private companies in the delivery and supply of water services was adopted after a 
long debate over whether an outright sale of NWSC would be more effective in improving 
water services than a rigorous private enterprise reform.   
Whereas the privatisation of water services has enhanced availability and accessibility 
of water and facilitated the improvement of water quality, it does not appear to facilitate a 
rights-based approach to water delivery. A close reading of the performance management 
contract model does not reflect rights consciousness. For instance, within the performance 
management system which was devised for measuring NWSC’s performance in delivering 
services to citizens, four key aspects were prioritised. These were articulating targets for 
improving efficiency in billing and collection; ensuring that corporate planning and 
budgeting best practices were complied with; incentive payments of up to 25% of senior 
managers’ salaries; and performance contract review in order to recommend appropriate 
bonuses for staff.
91
 Subsequent performance contracts have expounded on the scope of 
targets to include extending services to the poor in urban areas. 
While the direct effect of privatisation of water services, which may have entrenched 
harsh market oriented policies to water delivery, appears to have been avoided through the 
preferred public enterprise reform approach that was applied to water services delivery, the 
negative effects of privatisation were not completely avoided.
92
 Public enterprise reform was 
not devoid of neo-liberal tendencies and may have created impediments to the enjoyment of 
water services for many Ugandans. 
Returning to the question of whether the directive principles have impacted on 
elaboration of policy and ultimate enjoyment of a human right to water, it would seem that 
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the NODPSP in the 1995 Constitution have gone a long way towards enhancing enjoyment of 
the human right to water. It is possible to argue that the Water Policy and Pro-Poor Water 
Strategy exhibit human rights based consciousness to conceptualizing and delivering water to 
citizens, which was likely implored by the the NODPSP.  
The policies discussed in this section have all been implemented. They have also been 
subjected to periodic review and have not remained stagnant. From its own reports the 
executive appears to demonstrate that these programs and policies have substantially 
increased the number of households with access to clean and safe water within urban and 
rural areas. For instance, the reports provide evidence to the effect that during the period 
2007-2012, there was remarkable progress made in increasing the number of additional 
people served by the water supply systems both in the rural and urban areas.
93
 Indeed, these 
reports have enumerated gains made in terms of the five core components of a human right to 
water: universality of access to water, adequacy of water, safety of water and affordability of 
water.  
However, while the human rights based consciousness apparent within water specific 
national policy must be lauded, examples from the lived experiences of citizens such as that 
provided by the urban poor appear to show that the social contexts in which the state policies 
operate appear to undermine the likely strengths of these policies. In the end, it appears that a 
well-articulated right lacking the threat of justiciability may remain only on paper. 
Finally, considering that water seems to be only recognised to the extent that it is a non- 
justiciable right, it is possible to argue that this distinction between rights and justiciability 
may have re-surfaced in the model applied to elaborating legislation and policy on water. It 
seems that the most articulate contemplation of the right to water was again relegated to non-
enforceable policy documents which cannot provide anchor to an individual’s claims for 
enjoyment of the right to water. While policies may be designed to be human rights 
conscious, they lack the force of law and have failed to absorb the inequity still associated 
with water delivery. It seems plausible to argue that problems with enjoyment of the right 
may be traced back to the manner in which the constitutional making process treated water. 
3.5.4 A brief note on proposed water reforms 
                                                          
93
 Government Of Uganda Joint Water and Environment Sector Strategic Plan op cit note 61 at 9-10 (On file 
with author). At the same time, the program anticipates that between 2013-2018, an additional total of 3.4 
million Ugandans will benefit from the plan by accessing clean and safe water from the program. 
66 
 
During the course of 2013, the Ministry of Water and Environment initiated proposals for 
broad water legislation reforms. This reform has been motivated by the need to incorporate 
many of the developments in water resources management and water delivery which have 
taken place over the last 14 years. Given that these proposals have not come into force, they 
are not yet applicable to the legal regime governing water.
94
 Nonetheless, I briefly consider 
two significant proposals, the proposed National Water Policy and the proposed Water 
(Amendment) Act. The proposed National Water Policy proposes six guiding principles for 
reformulating the domestic water supply policy. They are: to prioritize protection of the 
environment; to enhance participation of women in water service delivery; to strengthen 
communities to implement and sustain water and sanitation programs; to enhance financial 
viability of public utilities; and to ensure the allocation of public funds for water supply 
development activities in a manner that prioritizes those segments of the population who are 
presently inadequately served or not served at all.
95
 Even at this stage, the proposed policy 
appears to have marginally considered a re-conceptualisation of water delivery in a manner 
which incorporates the human right to water and its implications for domestic water supply. 
Within the proposed Water Act, the significant proposal is to extend the entitlement to 
access water to include a clause to the effect that residents are entitled to access water 
through the use of rain water harvesting techniques, such that an owner or occupier of land 
may construct any works for rainwater harvesting or for the recycling of used water for 
domestic purposes without having to seek approval or a permit from the water authority.
96
 
While this may elaborate on an entitlement to use water, it clearly regards responsibility for 
domestic water as being primarily an individual and not State responsibility. 
Whereas these proposals for reform must be welcomed, it appears that they will change 
little in terms of the substantive enjoyment of a human right to water, to the extent that the 
scope of the right remains vague and the obligations attaching to the State for actualisation of 
the right remain largely absent.  
3.6 THE POTENTIAL AND CHALLENGES OF ADJUDICATING THE 
RIGHT TO WATER IN UGANDA 
Notwithstanding the mandate granted to the courts under the 1995 Constitution, the 
adjudication of socio-economic rights issues in Uganda has remained infrequent and no 
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decision has concerned the right to water. This section considers challenges which appear to 
have impacted on how the courts have so far vindicated socio-economic rights within the 
cases before them and how these rights have been interpreted. Although not directly 
concerned with the enforcement of socio-economic rights within the NODPSP, there are a 
few Supreme Court, Constitutional Court and High Court decisions which have addressed the 
broader interpretations of the right to life, the right to a means of livelihood, and albeit, only 
tentatively the right to health. These decisions engage with the application of the NODPSP, 
the doctrine of separation of powers and the political question doctrine. It is from these 
decisions that I seek to map out the potentials and pitfalls of adjudicating a right to water 
within the current adjudicative paradigm.  
3.6.1 The courts’ application of international law 
Given that the 1995 Constitution does not explicitly refer to the application of international 
law by the courts, some scholars have questioned whether there is a legitimate basis upon 
which international law can be applied in the interpretation of domestic law.
97
 However, the 
jurisprudence emerging from the courts provides an explicit answer. The courts are willing to 
interpret constitutional provisions in light of international law. Although the decisions in 
which international law has been referred to in interpreting the constitutional text do not 
involve socio-economic rights, there is nothing to suggest that they are excluded from this 
willingness.  
 Two principles emerging from the courts’ decisions illustrate this position. When 
interpreting the 1995 Constitution, courts have maintained that international law must be 
taken into account. Where there are several plausible interpretations applicable to the 
constitutional text; courts as a rule avoid those interpretations which are inconsistent with 
international law.
98
 Secondly, courts will take cognisance of the fact that Uganda has acceded 
to international covenants.
99
 It is therefore arguable that their stance relating to international 
law enables them to consider the general comments of the UNCESCR as persuasive when 
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determining the meaning of constitutional rights. This means that it is possible for Ugandan 
courts to recognise a justiciable right to water inherent to other rights in the Bill of Rights.   
3.6.2 The courts’ approach to adjudicating socio-economic rights claims  
Several principles of constitutional interpretation which are pertinent to understanding the 
adjudication of socio-economic rights within the Ugandan context have emerged from 
decisions of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court. First, the Constitutional court 
has affirmed that, in the interpretation of the bill of rights, it will take cognisance of the fact 
that a constitutional provision containing a fundamental right is a permanent provision 
intended to cater for all times to come. The constitutional provision will accordingly be given 
the widest construction possible in order to realise the full benefit of the guaranteed right.
100
  
Summarizing the cardinal principles of constitutional interpretation in Davis Wesley 
Tusingwire v The Attorney General, the Constitutional Court has more recently re-stated 
three other principles of interpretation which are of relevance here. It affirmed that in 
interpreting the Constitution, the rule of harmony or completeness must be applied. This 
means that constitutional provisions are looked at as an integrated whole meant to sustain 
each other and should not be looked at in isolation.
101
 Secondly, where several provisions of 
the Constitution have a bearing on the same subject, they should be read together so as to 
ensure that the full meaning and effect of their intent is affirmed.
102
 Finally, the 
Constitutional court has affirmed that a non-derogable article of the 1995 Constitution 
confers absolute protection and should be enforced by all government and non-government 
organs as well as individuals.
103
  
 In the first constitutional petition subsequent to the promulgation of the 1995 
Constitution, the Constitutional Court in Tinyefuza v Attorney General referred to abiding by 
the values in the NODPSP and wrote: 
In applying or interpreting the constitution or any other law, the courts and indeed all 
other persons must do so, so we are ordained, for the establishment and promotion of a 
just, free and democratic society. That ought to be our first canon of construction. It 
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provides an immediate break or departure with past rules of constitutional 
construction....
104
 
Later, Salvatori Abuki & Another v Attorney General also engaged with the application of the 
NODPSP in vindicating the constitutional rights of the petitioner, in addition to deciding 
challenges to the constitutionality of the Witchcraft Act.
105
 The petitioner sought to vindicate, 
among others, the constitutional guarantee to equality and freedom from discrimination found 
in article 21(1), and the right to dignity in article 24. In the Constitutional Court, while 
declaring a banishment order to be an infringement of a right to dignity, Egonda Ntende J, 
stated: 
I am prepared to take judicial notice of the fact that the majority of Ugandans live in 
rural Uganda working the land for their livelihood. The effect of a banishment order as in 
this case, would be to exclude such a person from shelter, food by denying him access to 
his land, and also means of sustenance, without provision of an alternative. The person 
so banished is rendered destitute on leaving the prison gates.
106
  
Most significant was the Constitutional Court’s casting of justiciable human rights within the 
frame of the NODPSP. The judge stated that: 
I take this view guided by the National Objectives and directive principles of state 
which we are enjoined to apply in interpreting this constitution in part thereof. …. 
An exclusion order under section 7 ... seems to me to be set in the opposite direction 
from assuring access of the person banished to any shelter, food, security, clean and 
safe water, and healthy services.
107
  
Both Tinyefuza v Attorney General and Salvatori Abuki & Another v Attorney General  
have been lauded for demonstrating the court’s willingness to read the NODPSP into the Bill 
of Rights, which suggested a willingness to perceive the rights enumerated in the NODPSP as 
justiciable.
108
 The decisions show that the courts can vindicate rights located in the NODPSP, 
provided that they are willing to generously interpret entrenched rights in a manner which 
allows for the NODPSP to be read into the bill of rights.  
However, none of the constitutional cases decided subsequent to Salvatori Abuki & 
Another v Attorney General followed this approach to interpreting the NODPSP.
109
 Indeed, in 
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Centre for Health, Human Rights and Development (CEHURD) v Attorney General 
(CEHURD) the petitioners invoked the argument that the NODPSP were binding upon the 
executive and justiciable without success.
110
 The petition arose from grievances of relations 
of two women who had died in hospital during the course of child birth. The petitioners 
alleged that the government’s failure to provide the basic minimum maternal health package 
amounted to an infringement of the constitutional right to access health services and of the 
right to life. The Constitutional Court dismissed the petition on a preliminary point of law 
without evaluating any of the petitioners’ arguments. As it stands, the CEHURD case 
showcases the shortcomings of relying on the NODPSP to enhance enjoyment of socio-
economic rights, and additionally, the CEHURD case waters down the potential of indirect 
vindication of socio-economic rights.
111
 
On the other hand, the courts must be lauded for not quashing the hopes of adjudicating 
socio-economic claims, given that the Constitutional Court has marginally acknowledged 
their justiciability. For instance, although the CEHURD bench dismissed the petition at a 
preliminary stage of the trial and found that there were no questions that merited 
constitutional interpretation, the court did not go as far as to declare that the right to health 
could not be justiciable. Indeed, the Court stated that the petitioners could claim redress from 
the High Court, on the basis of Article 50 of the 1995 Constitution.
112
 In the aftermath of 
CEHURD, claims for the right to health have already been filed before the High Court 
although they are still at trial stage. It remains to be seen how the courts will deal with the 
matter of interpreting a right ensconced in the NODPSP. 
It would therefore appear that there is a possibility of a direct claim arising from Article 
50, for any rights recognised within the NODPSP. I would go so far as to argue that the Court 
implied that there is a directly justiciable right to health for Ugandan citizens. Given that the 
right to health is also only referred to in the NODPSP, it is then plausible to argue that the 
right to water may also be similarly justiciable. Of course, this argument is yet to be tested. 
3.6.3 The courts’ interpretation of the right to life 
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A review of the constitutional matters requiring an interpretation of the right to life indicates 
that the Ugandan courts have refrained from adopting the generous interpretation of the right 
suggested by the UN’s Human Rights Committee’s General Comment six and followed in 
some foreign jurisdictions. Two cases illustrate this. In British American Tobacco Limited v 
The Environmental Action Network Ltd, the petitioner’s allegations that a tobacco 
manufacturer’s failure to disclose the risks of smoking contravened the right to life were 
deemed to be too remote to implicate the right to life. Even though the court was willing to 
accept that smoking in public places was an environmental risk, it was unwilling to regard 
such an environmental risk as a threat to life.
113
 
 Further, in a matter challenging the constitutionality of the death penalty, as a violation 
of the right to life, the Constitutional court rejected the South African Constitutional Court’s 
generous interpretation of the right to life. Even though the South African Constitutional 
Court’s jurisprudence was relied upon in interpreting the right against inhumane and 
degrading treatment in Salvatori Abuki, the court was reluctant to also apply the South 
African Court’s interpretation of the right to life.114 It decided that, even though some 
commonwealth jurisdictions whose decisions could be persuasive to the Ugandan courts had 
found the death penalty to be a violation of the right to life, Article 21 of the 1995 
Constitution could not be interpreted as meaning that there were no circumstances in which 
life could be lawfully terminated.
115
 Although the main contention in this case was the 
constitutionality of capital punishment, the decision nonetheless points to the Ugandan 
court’s restrictive reading of the right to life. 
But the courts appear to construe a threat to life more broadly where survival 
requirements are at stake. In Salvatori Abuki the constitutional court bench appeared willing 
to generously interpret the constitutional right to life when the Constitutional Court reasoned 
that the effect of the exclusion order made against the petitioner could be read as extending to 
abrogating life or threaten the right to life, which was unconstitutional.
116
 In this way, the 
Constitutional court impliedly affirmed the proposition that circumstances which are so 
deplorable that a citizen is deprived of food and water may infringe on their right to life and 
thereby entitle them to constitutional relief.  
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These decisions tell us that there is no textual impediment to a generous and permissive 
interpretation of the right to life. Indeed, its potential to found a claim for satisfaction of a 
right to water appears to depend solely upon judicial willingness to explore the exact content 
and scope of the right, within the context of international and foreign law. 
3.6.4 The separation of powers  
As elsewhere, rights-based adjudication in Uganda often evoke tensions in relation to Courts’ 
perceived counter-majoritarianism and their pushing the boundaries of conventional notions 
of the separation of powers. But the Ugandan courts’ record with the interpretation and 
enforcement of civil and political rights has shown that the courts affirm that the 1995 
constitutional dispensation envisaged moderate notions of a separation of powers and 
mandated judicial review of governmental actions and omissions.
117
 Courts are at once 
expected to articulate a balance between governmental interest and citizens’ interests as well 
as protectors of the constitution. Indeed, the courts have not shied away from deliberating 
over executive and legislative actions or omissions where constitutional rights and the rule of 
law appeared to be at risk.
118
 However, when presented with matters related to socio-
economic rights, it is difficult to discern how the Ugandan courts perceive their role. With 
respect to socio-economic claims, it seems that courts have interpreted their constitutional 
mandate narrowly, implying that these are matters which are within the constitutional powers 
of the legislature or the executive and as such are beyond the purview of adjudication. More 
specifically, the courts appear to perceive engagement in such matters as interfering with 
political questions.  
Uganda’s constitutional law jurisprudence inherits the political question doctrine traced 
back to American jurisprudence. The doctrine urges caution in the balance of power 
constitutionally exercised by the three arms of government.
119
 The doctrine is based on the 
notion that there are certain issues which courts can refrain from determining because the 
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constitution envisages that they are matters to be resolved by the democratically elected 
organs of government.
120
 In Uganda, the doctrine was first adopted in a 1960’s politically 
motivated decision in Uganda v Commissioner of Prisons, ex-parte Matovu.
121
 
In a post 1995 Constitutional Appeal Attorney General v General David Tinyefuza, the 
political question doctrine was resurrected.
122
 One of the justices urged that the doctrine was 
applicable to the constitutional petition before the court. He stated: 
Even where courts feel obliged to intervene and review legislative measures of the 
legislature or the administrative decisions of the executive in circumstances where a 
challenge on the grounds that the rights or freedoms of individuals are clearly 
infringed or threatened, they do so sparingly and with the greatest of reluctance.
123
 
The judgment relied on the definition of a ‘political question’ established by the 
American Supreme court in Marbury v Madison. In Uganda, the Judge urged (in relation to 
the determination of terms and conditions of service for the military), that courts should avoid 
adjudicating upon political matters unless individual liberty or the Constitution are clearly 
infringed or threatened.
124
  
Whereas the remarks in Tinyefuza were not explicitly endorsed by the full 
constitutional appeal bench, and were not followed in subsequent constitutional cases, the 
doctrine influenced the Constitutional Court in the single, most important case invoking the 
socio-economic right to health.
125
 In Centre for Health, Human Rights and Development 
(CEHURD) v Attorney General, the political question doctrine was resurrected to quash any 
hope of vindicating socio-economic rights through the Courts.
126
 In CEHURD v Attorney 
General the doctrine was described as referring to: 
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“Questions of which Courts will refuse to take cognisance, or to decide on account of 
their purely political character, or because their determination would involve an 
encroachment upon the Executive or Legislative powers”.127 
The Constitutional Court adeptly dismissed the petitioners’ claims. At the hearing of 
the petition, the Attorney General raised a preliminary objection challenging the legitimacy 
of the petition, to the effect that matters of health policy, such as that which the court was 
being called upon to determine, raised questions of a political nature. The Attorney General 
argued that to determine such questions required the Constitutional Court to adjudicate over 
matters that were within the discretion granted to the executive and legislature in the 1995 
Constitution. Citing the judgment of Kanyeihamba in Attorney General v David Tinyefuza, 
the Constitutional Court determined that it was bound by the earlier position of the Court. It 
stated that: 
Much as it may be true that government has not allocated enough resources to the 
health sector and in particular the maternal health care services, this court is, with 
guidance from the above discussions reluctant to determine the questions raised in this 
petition. The Executive has the political and legal responsibility to determine, 
formulate and implement polices of Government, for inter-alia, the good governance 
of Uganda. This duty is a preserve of the Executive and no person or body has the 
power to determine, formulate and implement these polices except in the 
Executive.
128
 
Even though the political question doctrine had not been relied upon in previous 
constitutional rights cases and does not appear to hold traction in the Constitutional Courts’ 
jurisprudence, it appears to have resurfaced in a matter in which the right vindicated was not 
explicitly recognised within the Bill of Rights. It is plausible to argue that the Constitutional 
Court appears to have re-conflated the separation of powers with the doctrine of political 
question in a socio-economic rights case and thereby chose to avoid engaging with claims for 
the enforcement of socio-economic rights within the NODPSP.  
However, the Court’s cautious approach may be explainable. Given that the right to 
health was not explicitly entrenched within the 1995 Constitution as a justiciable right, the 
Constitutional Court may have found difficulty in adopting a generous interpretive approach 
to the NODPSP. When the Court’s actions are viewed as pertaining to socio-economic rights 
claims within the NODPSP, and not necessarily to the entire Bill of Rights, it is arguable, that 
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to date, the courts have not fully grasped the powers vested in them by the 1995 Constitution 
on account of their attitude towards the adjudication of socio-economic rights.  
3.7 CONCLUSION  
The chapter set out to explore the extent to which a human right to water is embodied within 
Uganda’s constitutional and legislative framework and the implications of such recognition 
for the enjoyment of water as a right by citizens. It finds that there is no explicit reference to a 
human right to water within the main part of the 1995 Constitution. At most, there is a non-
justiciable right to water, emerging from the NODPSP set out in the preamble to the 
Constitution. However, considering that the 1995 Constitution implicitly allows an 
international law understanding of the right to be taken into account in interpreting the bill of 
rights, there appears to be ample space for interpreting the text of several rights within the bill 
of rights as implicating a human right to water. But this weakens the basis upon which the 
right is founded and does not facilitate better understanding of the obligations that may flow 
from the right. Indeed, the vague manner in which the right to water is set out in the 1995 
Constitution may have impacted on the extent to which the right later finds translation within 
law and policy. 
Indeed, the water legislation barely exhibits a rights-based approach to conceptualizing 
and delivering water to citizens. This said, the harsh effect of legislation is somewhat 
countered by a more rights conscious policy regime. Various executive planning documents 
have enumerated the successes made in terms of the five core components of a human right to 
water: universality, access, adequacy, safety and affordability. These redeeming features of 
policy provide some relief to beneficiaries and make it possible to distill some normative 
content of the right to water. In addition, the implementation of policy has enhanced the 
enjoyment of the human right to water in many areas. Even then, the shortcomings of relying 
on government policies to articulate and realise the human right to water mainly arise from 
the fact that their success has not allowed full actualisation of the right. Moreover, while 
policies may be designed to be human rights conscious, they are watered down by the force 
of law. As such, without executive benevolence, citizens appear to be hard pressed to make 
rights-based claims for water. 
 The chapter has also shown that, although the courts have not had opportunity to hear a 
claim related to a human right to water, the outcomes of adjudicating other rights claims 
illustrate some common trends. The courts are willing to apply a generous interpretive 
approach to the provisions of the 1995 Constitution. Furthermore, they are willing to apply 
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international law in the interpretation of the 1995 Constitution, which goes a long way to 
introducing international human rights standards into the domestic setting.  
The pattern which seems to emerge from the study of the Constitutional court cases 
shows that the court focuses on three matters in deciding a rights-based challenge: First, the 
primary focus appears to be interrogating its own jurisdiction to hear the petition. This may 
show that the court’s primary concern is with institutional legitimacy. The court then 
examines whether there is a prima facie violation of the right and finally if the violation is 
justifiable. This may tell us that the Constitutional court does not pay due attention to 
interpreting the normative content of the rights impugned because of its own attitude to 
addressing rights violations.  
  At the same time, the courts are clearly unwilling to determine claims arising from 
socio-economic directives of state policy. Since the courts appear open to giving the 1995 
Constitution a generous interpretation and have vigorously enforced rights explicitly 
enumerated within the Bill of Rights, it would seem that the underlying problem with socio-
economic rights claims is with the manner in which they have been articulated as non-
justiciable within the NODPSP. I therefore contend that the courts’ jurisprudence so far does 
not support claims for a human right to water and that this weakness may be attributed to the 
manner in which the right to water has been classified as a NODPSP.  
 Commenting on the motivations for applying a political question doctrine, Alexander 
Bickel argued that American courts applied the doctrine as a technique to avoid judicial 
review of executive action or omissions, so as to avoid legitimising political positions.
129
 But 
critics have argued that when courts refuse to adjudicate over such matters, they shut the door 
to the possibility of ever having such matters deliberated upon, given the rules of judicial 
precedent which bind the courts.
130
 Bickel’s arguments may have motivated the Ugandan 
courts because judges may be more concerned about protecting their legitimate institutional 
space and are generally reluctant to read rights into the constitutional text beyond those which 
have explicitly been recognised as justiciable. Given that courts are likely to adjudicate 
claims on the basis of precedent, it seems that the underlying problem of a vague 
constitutional right to water may endure, and will accordingly remain an impediment to full 
realisation of the right. 
 Finally, an indirect consequence of the current stance taken by the Constitutional Court 
has been that the court has avoided interaction and dialogue between the legislature, 
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executive and judiciary over the nature and content of socio-economic rights. Such 
interaction or dialogue may have been useful to destabilise or soften the neo-liberal tone of 
state policies, which appears to hold sway over a rights-based approach to the actualisation of 
a human right to water for Uganda.  
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CHAPTER 4 
INDIRECT VINDICATION: ENFORCING THE RIGHT TO WATER IN INDIA 
4.1 BACKGROUND 
India is a developing country with a long and rich constitutional history, having gained its 
independence more than a decade before Uganda.
1
 As already indicated, a case study of India 
adds significance to this thesis because even though the two countries are very different, there 
are several pertinent similarities. First, the structure of India’s constitution is textually similar 
to that of Uganda in that both include directive principles of State policy, which were 
envisaged to be non-enforceable, in a separate and distinct part of the Constitution from the 
Bill of Rights. Secondly, India’s Constitution has been tested for over 60 years and the 
constitutional rights entrenched therein have benefited from adjudication since the 1970s. Its 
Supreme Court potentially provides the broadest jurisprudence on socio-economic rights. 
Additionally, both countries have faced challenges with addressing poverty amongst the 
larger sections of their populations and have dealt with the effects of adopting the new 
economic policies championed by developed states in the 1990s. A case study of India may 
particularly illuminate the possibilities and challenges of indirect adjudication of a right to 
water and offer lessons to reflect upon how the legal regime in Uganda may enhance 
enjoyment of the right if a similar approach is followed. Like Uganda, India is a common law 
jurisdiction, which implies that the principles of common law and adjudication which 
emerged from England have deeply affected the understanding and application of legal 
principles.  
The historical context in which India and Uganda’s constitutions were enacted are 
similar, given that both countries had come to the end of political struggles and were looking 
to enacting Constitutions that would transform the State and the lives of their citizens. 
Constituting 395 articles and 8 schedules, the Constitution of India (1950 Constitution) came 
into effect after a lengthy process of debate by the Constituent Assembly.
2
 Much like the 
Ugandan Constituent Assembly, there was debate over the inclusion of justiciable socio-
economic rights within the constitutional framework. As in Uganda, the majority adopted the 
view that the socio-economic needs could only be provided by the State to the extent possible 
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 India became independent in 1947. Its Constituent Assembly finalised the country’s Constitution in 1949 and it 
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 There have been at least 98 amendments to the Indian Constitution from 1950 to 2014. See Mahendra P Singh 
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and could not be included in the Constitution as justiciable fundamental rights. But unlike 
Uganda, socio-economic rights were included as a separate chapter in the main part of the 
constitutional text.
3
  
In terms of water resources, India is a water stressed country. In other words, the 
demand for water is much higher than the amount of available water. To illustrate the 
importance of water resources for India, the United Nations Environment Program reports 
that in the coming decades, India’s single most significant problem will be the availability of 
fresh water.
4
 A 2006 United Nations Human Development Report focusing on water 
disclosed that amongst poor communities living in informal settlements, Indian citizens used 
far less water than the amount recommended by the WHO.
5
 It has been said that 
approximately 65,000 Indian villages do not have access to a sufficient number of nearby 
water sources to satisfy the international human rights law standard relating to reasonable 
walking distance from a public water source.
6
 
The main sources of India’s fresh water are the country’s rivers, ground water aquifers 
and annual rainfall. The water from these rivers is delivered to citizens using various 
technologies. One notable method is the creation of water storage facilities by creating small 
reservoirs (i.e. ponds or man-made lakes). The country has developed technologies to tap its 
groundwater, although in some areas the ground water has been over-exploited. India also has 
a high annual rainfall which boosts these water sources. Most of the ground water harnessed 
feeds into irrigation of agricultural land and supports the supply of drinking water for the 
country’s large cities.7  
Availability and access to water for the majority of the people living in towns and cities 
is dependent on the transfer of water from rural areas to the cities, through pipelines and 
tankers. Given that these services are operated by private water vendors who supplement the 
public service providers, this makes water more expensive and less readily available, 
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especially during the summer months. For India’s urban slum dwellers the situation is even 
worse, as they often need to make direct payments for every litre of their drinking water, and 
yet suffer the burden of having to carry it over long distances.
8
  
The enjoyment of the right to water within India must further be understood within a 
particular social context. For instance, the manner in which water is accessed and delivered is 
historically biased by a social caste system. The social caste system which prevailed prior to 
promulgating the 1950 Constitution determined the manner and extent to which social 
benefits were distributed. It entrenched a systematic exclusion of citizens from social and 
economic benefits, including water. One of the main aims of India’s constitutional order is to 
transcend this past and transform India’s society through constitutionalism.9 But, six decades 
after the 1950 Constitution was promulgated, caste inspired segregation still impedes the 
enjoyment of the human right to water, because it remains deeply engrained in Indian society 
and its effects are still apparent in the country. The 2006 UNDP report indicates that, while 
water scarcity prevails in communities which were historically poor and segregated, it does 
not appear to affect the wealthier and socially privileged communities.
10
  
Accordingly, in this chapter I claim that some of the impediments to the enjoyment of 
the right to water in India may be attributed to the absence of a constitutionally entrenched, 
justiciable right to water. I then show that India’s current legislative framework does not 
reflect a rights conscious approach to water services and delivery. However, there is 
significant recognition and enjoyment of the right to water, which may be attributed to the 
boldness of the country’s apex court and their willingness to read the right to water into other 
rights. Welcome though this may be, it nevertheless has limited the potential to achieve the 
full scope of the right, as envisaged within international human rights law.  
To this end, I begin this chapter by traversing the constitutional and national legislative 
framework to explore the manner in which the right to water is embodied in the country’s 
legal regime, and evaluating the extent to which other constitutionally entrenched rights may 
allow a reading in of the right to water. I then examine several decisions of the country’s 
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Supreme Court and federal High Courts which have elaborated on a human right to water, in 
order to determine the extent to which these courts have elaborated on the internal contents 
and external reach of the right. In the final section, I evaluate the prospects and shortcomings 
of the Indian model to vindication of the right to water.  
4.2 AN OVERVIEW OF INDIA’S CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK  
Two parts of the 1950 Constitution are significant for this dissertation. Part three of the 
Constitution enumerates the fundamental rights inherent to citizens. Some of these 
fundamental rights are spelt out as express declarations while others appear to be 
prohibitions.
11
 In part four, the Constitution enumerates directive principles of State policy, 
by which the State is to be governed. These are set out as instructions for the future guidance 
of the executive and legislature. 
The 1950 Constitution does not explicitly recognise socio-economic rights. Nonetheless 
those basic needs which international human rights law has come to recognise as underlying 
socio-economic rights are mostly articulated within the directive principles of state policy. 
For example, the directive principles broadly include economic rights and social welfare 
principles. The State is directed to ensure, among others, an adequate means of livelihood, a 
fair distribution of material resources, conditions of work that ensure a decent standard of life 
and full enjoyment of leisure, social and cultural activities, public assistance in cases of 
undeserved want, nutrition, and a healthy environment.
12
 
It is significant that the directive principles envisage respect for international law and 
treaty obligations.
13
 India has acceded to many of the international covenants from which a 
right to water can be located in international law.
14
 Commentators attribute the frequent 
reference to international law instruments such as the UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR in Indian 
jurisprudence to this constitutional provision, which effectively obliges the executive, 
legislature and courts to comply with international law, and anticipates the application of the 
ICESCR within the domestic legislative framework.
15
  
In Article 37, the 1950 Constitution expressly distinguishes fundamental rights from the 
directive principles on grounds of enforceability. The Article provides that:    
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The provisions contained in this Part [Part IV] shall not be enforceable by any court, but 
the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the 
country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws.
16
 
To emphasise the importance and distinction with fundamental rights, the 1950 
Constitution additionally determines that the fundamental rights are inviolable except for the 
limitations defined in the Constitution itself. It provides in Article 13(2) that the state shall 
not make any law which takes away or abridges the fundamental rights in the Constitution.
17
  
At the same time, the Supreme Court is invested with authority to interpret and ensure 
the protection of fundamental rights in the Constitution.
18
 The persons who can make claims 
for the direct enforcement of rights are enumerated within Article 32 of the 1950 
Constitution, which determines that any person has the right to institute legal proceedings 
before the Supreme Court where rights have been violated.
19
 Where claims for fundamental 
rights violations are made, the High Court is granted concurrent jurisdiction to hear the 
petitions.
20
   
More significantly, the 1950 Constitution provides for the direct enforcement of these 
fundamental rights, by awarding the Supreme Court and High Court powers to grant a wide 
range of remedies where claims are founded on violations of fundamental rights.
21
 Article 
32(2) stipulates that: 
The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including 
writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and 
certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of the rights conferred....
22
 
Like the Ugandan Constitution, the 1950 Constitution clearly grants wide and effective 
remedial powers to the courts on matters relating to human rights.  
4.3 LOCATING A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO WATER 
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The ‘fundamental rights’ enumerated in the 1950 Constitution include equality rights, speech 
freedoms, the right to life, education, freedom from exploitation and forced labour, religious 
freedoms, minority and cultural rights as well as rights to constitutional remedies.
23
 There is 
no explicit right to water in the Bill of Rights nor, is it mentioned in the directive principles. 
However, in line with an international law understanding of the interconnectedness and 
interdependence of rights, there are several provisions in the 1950 Constitution that may in 
certain contexts be read as including some of the internal content of the right to water.  
Several of the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the 1950 Constitution may be 
read in a manner which implicitly embodies the human right to water, especially when the 
rights are given the expansive interpretation envisaged by the UN Human Rights Committee 
and UNCESCR. Particularly, Article 21 provides that, ‘No person shall be deprived of his life 
or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.’ Although the textual 
formulation of the right to life does not suggest a right to water, the Indian courts have read 
the right to water into the right to life, as is elaborated in section 4.5 below.  
At the same time, dimensions of a right to water may be read into the foundational 
constitutional right to equality before the law and the equal protection of the law in terms of 
Article 14 as well as the guarantee of non-discrimination in Article 15(1), which determines 
that: 
The State shall not discriminate against any citizens on grounds of religion, race, caste, 
sex, place of birth or any of them.  
Article 15(2) extends this prohibition to indirect discrimination, when it determines that: 
No citizen shall on grounds only of  religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of 
them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to-  
(b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained 
wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of the general public.
24
  
It is possible to read these provisions as embodying the universal aspirations of equality and 
non-discriminatory practices, which are themselves attributes of a human right to water.   
Undoubtedly, there are limitations to the constitutional guarantee of non-discrimination. 
For instance, it is anticipated that the State can discriminate in order to improve the social 
conditions of a particular section of the community. This kind of positive discrimination is 
anticipated in Article 15(3) which provides that the guarantee against discrimination shall not 
prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children. In line with 
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84 
 
this, it is plausible to argue that the 1950 Constitution envisages that legislation may be 
passed to ensure that the State takes positive steps towards enhancing equity in access to 
water sources. This would further imply that the freedom from discrimination and inequality, 
imposes positive obligations on the State to ensure equal enjoyment of the right to water.  
Up to this point I have located a right to water within the enforceable fundamental 
rights entrenched in the 1950 Constitution. The right to water may further be implicitly read 
into the directive principles of state policy, which require the State to develop policy directed 
at securing an adequate means of livelihood.
25
 The 1950 Constitution aspires to promote the 
welfare of citizens. Article 38 (1) determines that: 
The State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting 
as effectively as it may a social order in which justice, social, economic and political, 
shall inform all the institutions of the national life.
26
 
Given that UNCESCR General Comment 15 articulates livelihood as including the 
availability of water for basic human needs, it may be argued that the 1950 Constitution 
envisages state responsibility to formulate policy which, when implemented, satisfies water-
related needs at least insofar as this  enhances the livelihood of individuals.  
The directive principles further anticipate that the State has an obligation to promote the 
right to water. For example, Article 47 provides that the ‘State shall regard the raising of the 
level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people and the improvement of public 
health as among its primary duties....’ Furthermore, Article 46 determines that the ‘... State 
shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections 
of the people, and in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes....’ It may 
be possible to read these ‘economic interests’ as also encompassing those relating to access to 
water, in so far as the directive principles provide for the promotion of the needs of the 
vulnerable castes and tribes who are predominantly the poorest communities within India’s 
society. 
More specifically, the directive principles stipulate that the State must ensure that 
children are given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in 
conditions of freedom and dignity.
27
 The express reference to protecting food, health needs 
and an ideal standard of living are precisely the same rights within which the UNCESCR 
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embodies the right to water that is adequate to sustain subsistence food production and to 
support the primary health needs of individuals, as well as a life of dignity. It is therefore 
possible to interpret these directive principles as embodying the right to water as a 
determinant of health, food and dignity.  
In Article 41, the directive principles stipulate that the State shall, within the limits of 
its economic capacity and development, make effective provision for securing public 
assistance in cases of undeserved want.
28
 This may imply a responsibility on the State to 
physically provide water to those who cannot access it, either as a result of distance from 
water sources or as a result of the cost of water from such sources. In this sense, it may be 
argued that the Constitution envisages that the State guarantees that there are no impediments 
to enjoying the right to water for those who bear the burden of sourcing water for themselves. 
Article 41 can thus be read as implicating the obligation to fulfil the human right to water.  
In relation to preserving the sanctity of the environment, the directive principles 
provide in article 48A, that the State shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment. 
Article 48A may be read in a manner which aligns with the General Comment 15 
recommendation to States to ensure that traditional water sources are protected from unlawful 
pollution.
29
 The constitutional guarantee to protect the environment may further be read to 
imply that water necessary to sustain life is embodied within the meaning of a clean and safe 
natural resource environment.
30
 In so doing, the constitutional protection of natural resources 
such as rivers, lakes or wells, may allow a reading into the constitution a promise that the 
water made available for consumption by citizens is safe. Given that India’s available water 
resources have been significantly depleted and many others have been heavily polluted to the 
extent that some water sources are no longer fit for human consumption or even agriculture, 
the state’s obligation to protect citizens from the effects of pollution is given even more 
impetus.
31
  
Overall, as in Uganda, the absence of an expressly articulated right to water in the 
Indian Constitution does not in and of itself hinder the recognition of the right if the 
Constitution is interpreted generously and purposively, in line with applicable international 
law.  
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4.4 THE RIGHT TO WATER WITHIN NATIONAL LEGISLATION 
The 1950 Constitution empowers the Parliament to make national legislation, but particularly 
devolves legislative competence relating to water supply to the state legislatures.
32
 The 
institutional framework envisaged by the 1950 Constitution contemplates a decentralised 
system of government, whereby legislative competence for water services is devolved to the 
28 federal states and the national capital.
33
 As a result, there appears to be scanty legislation 
at national level, prescribing the management and use of water. National legislation relating 
to the prevention of pollution, protection of the environment and human rights in general, 
may possibly provide some indirect elaboration for a human right to water. I attempt to trace 
the right within such national legislation and reflect on the implications of the proposed draft 
National water framework bill was prepared in 2013, and proposes an overarching national 
water legislative framework.
34
   
The actual responsibility to provide water services for domestic use is delegated to 
municipalities. Consequently, there are more than 20 pieces of state-specific legislation 
which affect water supply and delivery, which cannot be satisfactorily explored here.
35
 
However, the 1950 Constitution appears to exclude legislation aimed at giving effect to the 
directive principles from judicial review, regardless of whether the review aims at 
challenging the constitutionality of the legislation or whether it aims to challenge the 
legislation’s failure to realise the directive principles.36 It appears that the State-specific 
legislation relating to water delivery may be outside the purview of judicial review and, 
accordingly, that the content may not offer much guidance to the questions interrogated in 
this thesis. 
At national level, the Protection of Human Rights Act envisages that the State 
maintains responsibility for the protection of all rights.
37
 In section 2(1)(d) the Protection of 
Human Rights Act expressly defines the term ‘human rights’ as meaning the rights relating to 
                                                          
32
 Section 246; and 7
th
 Schedule, List II, which states that: Water, that is to say, water supplies, irrigation and 
canals, drainage and embankments, water storage and water power subject to the provisions of entry 56 of List I. 
33
 7
th
 Schedule list II of 1950 Constitution. 
34
 For a more elaborate discussion on how federal states have legislated over water refer to: Philippe Cullet & 
Sujith Koonan (eds) Water Law in India: An Introduction to Legal Instruments (2011) chapter 2 and 4; Philippe 
Cullet Water Law, Poverty, and Development: Water Sector Reforms in India (2009); Philippe Cullet ‘Evolving 
regulatory framework for rural drinking water: Need for further reforms’ in India Infrastructure Report (2011) 
151-161; Philippe Cullet ‘Water law in India: Overview of existing framework and proposed reforms’ 
International Environment Law Research Centre Working Paper (2007) 1-12. 
35
 Article 243W of the Constitution which details the powers, authority and responsibilities of municipalities as 
well as the 12
th
 Schedule of the Constitution. Philippe Cullet & Sujith Koonan (eds) Water Law in India ibid at 
49 provides a list of available water policies by state.  
36
 Article 31C. 
37
 Act 10 of 1994 as amended by the Protection of Human Rights (Amendment) Act 43 of 2006. 
87 
 
life, liberty, equality and dignity of the individual guaranteed by the constitution; or 
embodied in the international covenants; and enforceable by courts in India.
38
 Undoubtedly, 
the covenant rights most closely connected to water include life, health, housing, food and 
social security. It is within the embodiment of these rights that the right to water may be read 
into the legislation. While this appears to offer some reprieve, from a rights based 
perspective, the Protection of Human Rights Act appears weak and may at most embody a 
right to water indirectly. At the same time, it does not seem to elaborate on any remedies for 
its infringement.  
Other Statutes specifically articulate various elements of the right to water. For 
instance, regulation of water quality is cursorily referred to within the preamble to the Water 
(Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, which states its purpose as including to provide for 
the prevention and control of water pollution and the maintaining or restoring of 
wholesomeness of water.
39
 Section 3 of the Environment Protection Act vests the central 
government with powers to take all measures necessary for purposes of protecting and 
improving the quality of the environment and for preventing, controlling and abating 
environmental pollution.
40
 When these two aspects of the legislation are viewed together they 
reflect alignment with the obligation to ensure the quality of water for basic human needs.  
In sum, the national legislation appears to be inclined towards management of water 
sources rather than elaborating on a human right to water. Consequently it does not appear to 
espouse a rights based consciousness to the administration and distribution of water in India. 
The manner in which water is treated within national legislation underscores the impediments 
to enhancing enjoyment of a human right to water. The weaknesses exposed within the 
national legislation may further the claim that because the human right to water is neither 
explicitly recognised within the fundamental rights nor the directive principles of the 1950 
Constitution; it has been interpreted in an inchoate manner at provincial level.  
4.4.1 Assessing the national policy relating to water 
The National Water Policy 
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Matters of water supply and delivery have been elaborated upon in various water policies at 
the national level. A National Water Policy was first adopted in 1987, subsequently revised in 
2002 and more recently in 2012. The main objective of this centrally approved National 
Water Policy is ‘to propose a framework for creation of a system of laws and institutions and 
for a plan of action with a unified national perspective’. This essentially provides a general 
frame with which state policies are expected to align themselves. The National Water Policy 
has set out several basic principles on which the planning, developing and managing of water 
resources ought to be founded.
41
 There is no explicit reference to adhering to constitutional 
and international standards essential to actualising a human right to water within the National 
Water Policy. Even so, it remains a significant step towards developing national legislation 
relating to water supply, given that the lack of an overarching national water law regime 
appears to have impeded a coherent articulation of the right across the federal states.
42
  
The National Water Policy affirms three basic principles that may allow a reading 
which implicates the normative content of a human right to water. First, it adopts notions of 
equity and social justice as essential to informing how water is used and allocated; secondly, 
it espouses good governance through transparent informed decision making; and, thirdly, it 
determines that safe water for drinking and sanitation should be considered as pre-emptive 
needs when allocating water.
43
 The policy recommends that, in recognising water as a scarce 
resource, it must be managed as a community by the state, under the public trust doctrine to 
achieve food security, livelihood, and equitable and sustainable development for all.
44
  
Another significant aspect of the National Water Policy is the apportioning of 
responsibility over water for basic needs across all spheres of government. The Policy 
recognises that the central government, states and local governance institutions must ‘ensure 
access to a minimum quantity of potable water for essential health and hygiene to all its 
citizens, available within easy reach of the household.’45 Furthermore, the National Water 
Policy proposes an overarching water pricing policy. It proposes that equitable access to 
water for all and its fair pricing are central to water used for drinking.
46
 To cater for those 
who may not afford the price of water, the Policy recommends that the principle of 
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differential pricing may be retained for the pre-emptive uses of water for drinking and 
sanitation, food security and supporting a livelihood for the poor.
47
 When these propositions 
are read together, they provide the most explicit articulation of a human right to water to be 
found in the Indian policy framework. 
The Drinking Water Supply Policies 
The central government routinely adopts guidelines to developing specific legislation at the 
federal state level. Therefore, the federal state legislative system is able to craft regulations 
and standards with the support of the central government’s overarching national guidelines. 
These national guidelines often provide a framework, upon which the federal states can rely 
in the absence of national legislation or national policy. Demands for the supply of drinking 
water have led to the national government proposing such guidelines in relation to drinking 
water. As such, even though there is no national legislation, there is a specific regulatory 
framework. This framework aims to define the quantity and quality of drinking water 
standards within rural and urban areas. The draft guidelines set out the standards for supply of 
drinking water which is accessed from public water systems; standards relating to quality of 
water; and criteria to assure a supply of safe and clean drinking water within both rural and 
urban settlements.
48
 What these policies show is that, to a great extent, the human right to 
water in India has been elaborated upon and clarified predominantly through non-enforceable 
executive policy. Given that commentators continue to surface the inequity in water delivery 
schemes across India, it appears that implementation of executive policy has not yielded ideal 
outcomes.    
As I will discuss in the section that follows, the emphasis on articulating drinking water 
standards may be attributed to the dialogue between the courts and executive pursuant to 
citizens vindicating a right to water. Even though it appears that water reforms have evolved 
slowly, this outcome must be welcomed as a major benefit of rights adjudication. 
4.4.2 A Note on the Proposed National Water Framework Law 
In 2013, the Indian Ministry for Water Resources proposed a Draft Water Framework Bill.
49
 
Even though this is not equivalent to a law in force, it points to the manner in which the 
national government envisages translation and actualisation of the human right to water in 
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India. The Bill’s preamble recognises that the country needs a cohesive framework among 
federal states in the form of guiding principles for the protection, conservation and regulation 
of water, in order to bring about equitable, socially just, conflict-free, efficient and 
sustainable management of water. The Bill proposes that the framework law’s principles will 
be justiciable. It further proposes that water shall be subjected to pricing on economic 
principles to ensure its development costs and efficient use, and to reward conservation.
50
  
Even though the Bill is in draft form and may be revised, one point of weakness 
appears to lie with the proposed approach to pricing. Considering that General Comment 15 
recognises that affordability is an aspect of the right to water, this does not seem to align with 
the proposal in the draft bill, which appears to commodify water. Even though the draft 
Water Framework Bill proposes that each state ought to ensure equitable access and fair 
pricing of water and envisages that the supply of water to those below the poverty line may 
be subsidised, the future implications of such neo-liberal underpinnings in some clauses may 
outweigh the subsequent equitable pricing proposition.
51
 
Nonetheless, the draft Water Framework bill substantially makes in roads in defining 
the internal parameters for a human right to water in several provisions. In a country that is 
rapidly industrialising, it proposes that allocations for water shall ensure that water for human 
life shall take precedence over other uses such as industry and agriculture. For instance it 
proposes that: 
Every individual has a right to a minimum quantity of potable water for essential 
health and hygiene and within easy reach of the household.
52
 
Further, it determines that: 
The minimum quantity of potable water shall be prescribed by the appropriate 
government after expert examination and public consultation. 
Provided that the minimum quantity of potable water shall not be less than 25 litres 
per capita per day.
53
 
The Draft Water Framework Bill proposes to clarify the exact obligations of the State. 
This is underscored by a statement that the State shall continue to bear the obligations even 
where water is corporatized or privatised. In summary, it is arguable that many of the 
principles ensconced in the Bill espouse an explicit right to water which, once enacted into 
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law, will be a major step towards its full translation. The direct benefit of this proposed law 
may be found in its legitimising of direct claims for a human right to water.  
To conclude, it appears that the last 27 years have seen the most rigorous executive 
policy changes relating to water delivery for India. Yet, these changes have only partially 
defined and enabled actualisation of the human right to water. It is therefore arguable that the 
slow shift towards enacting rights conscious legislation and policy which would enhance the 
ultimate enjoyment of the right for citizens may be attributed to the fact that the right to water 
can at best be indirectly located within the constitutional text.  
4.5 ADJUDICATING THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER IN INDIA  
The Indian Supreme court and State High Courts have been famous for passing landmark 
decisions interpreting the fundamental rights and the directive principles in the 1950 
Constitution. In many of these decisions, the courts have vindicated socio-economic rights to 
food, housing, health and water by integrating the directive principles of State policy within a 
reading of the fundamental right to life, the directive principles relating to health and 
environmental concerns, and the obligation to raise the standard of nutrition and living.
54
 
The Supreme Court of India has set out various principles of constitutional 
interpretation useful to understanding the context in which the human right to water has 
emerged in the courts’ jurisprudence. First, the Supreme Court found that the directive 
principles of State policy are, while not enforceable, fundamental to the governance of the 
country, in the sense that the State has a duty to apply these principles while making laws.
55
 
Commentators have urged a reading of this proposition to mean that directive principles and 
fundamental rights are mutually reinforcing and complimentary.  
Secondly, while elaborating on its interpretive function, the Supreme Court has 
reiterated the principle that the Constitution cannot be construed narrowly. It must be given a 
wide and generous interpretation, taking into account changing conditions and purposes, so 
that the constitutional provision does not get fossilized. The Court has emphasised that it 
needs to remain flexible enough to meet newly emerging problems and challenges while 
interpreting fundamental rights in the Constitution.
56
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 Thirdly, even though the 1950 Constitution does not explicitly mandate the courts to 
interpret the constitutional text in light of international law, the Supreme Court has affirmed 
in a number of its decisions that its interpretation of the bill of rights will take into cognisance 
international law. Relying on a generous interpretation of Article 51(c) of the 1950 
Constitution, the Supreme Court has held that international law instruments become part of 
Indian law as long as they are not inconsistent with it.
57
 The Supreme Court has affirmed that 
the courts will maintain a focus on the core principles embodied in international covenants 
and must aim to give them effect within the domestic setting. 
4.5.1  The Courts’ interpretation of the fundamental right to life 
Prior to pronouncing itself on the right to water, one of the earliest precedents made by the 
Supreme Court interpreted the ambit and scope of the right to life. In Francis Coralie Mullin 
v The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi and Others, the Supreme Court determined 
that the ambit of the right to life extended to dignity and an adequate standard of living.
58
 In 
discussing the nature of the right to life, the Supreme Court stated: 
We think that the right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and all that 
goes along with it, namely the bare necessaries of life such as adequate nutrition, 
clothing and shelter and facilities for reading, writing and expressing oneself in 
diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing and commingling with fellow human 
beings.
59
   
The normative content of the right to life was further expounded upon to include the 
notion of a right to livelihood. In Olga Tellis & Others v Bombay Municipal Corporation and 
Others pavement dwellers petitioned the Supreme Court, claiming that demolishing their 
makeshift and slum settlements would deprive them of accommodation near the city which 
consequently would deprive them of their jobs and their means of existence.
60
 The Olga 
Tellis decision was important because it extended the right to living conditions, hitherto 
confined within the context of the social and economic directive principles of State policy, to 
constitute an integral part of the right to life. Affirming that the content of the right to life 
included the right to livelihood, the Supreme Court stated that: 
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The sweep of the right to life conferred by Article 21 is wide and far reaching. It does 
not mean merely that life cannot be extinguished or taken away as, for example, by 
the imposition and execution of the death sentence, except according to procedure 
established by law. That is but one aspect of the right to life. An equally important 
facet of that right is the right to livelihood because, no person can live without the 
means of living, that is, the means of livelihood. If the right to livelihood is not treated 
as a part of the constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person his 
right to life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the point of 
abrogation. Such deprivation would not only denude the life of its effective content 
and meaningfulness but it would make life impossible to live.
61
  
The Olga Tellis Supreme Court went a step further by articulating the corresponding 
State obligations attaching to the right to life. In doing so, it inferred a negative obligation on 
the State to respect citizens’ opportunities to make a living. I emphasise the obligation to 
respect here, because it would seem that the Olga Tellis Supreme Court subtly narrowed an 
interpretation of the obligations engendered by the right to life as being confined to imposing 
negative obligations, when it stated that it was not possible for the court to make orders 
which compelled the State to take specific actions towards relieving the conditions of 
citizens.
62
  
4.5.2 Indirectly vindicating the right to water from interpretations of the right to life 
Explicit judicial acknowledgement that the right to life could be interpreted to include water 
was later forthcoming from a number of Supreme Court and High Court decisions. The 
content of the right to water was then elaborated upon in Subhash Kumar v State of Bihar & 
Ors.
63
 The petition alleged that a private company had been discharging effluent which found 
its way into a river, making the water unfit for drinking and irrigation purposes. The Supreme 
Court held that the right to life included the right to enjoy ‘pollution free water’ in order to 
realise the full enjoyment of life. As such, anything that endangered or impaired the quality 
of life amounted to a derogation of the Constitution.
64
 Although the Supreme Court did not 
hear the case on its merits, the decision remains important because the Supreme Court 
explicitly elaborated on the content of the right to life as including access to safe water. 
The courts have further pronounced upon the sufficiency of water to meet human needs 
as an aspect of the right to water and hence the right to life. In S K Garg v State of Uttah 
Pradesh & Others, the petition sought suitable directions to ensure a regular supply of water 
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to the citizens of Allahabad.
65
 The petition disclosed that the town had suffered from an acute 
water shortage for a long time. The petitioners averred that, in some instances, the water 
supplied was filthy and in others, the hand pumps provided water in trickles, causing long 
queues for those collecting water.
66
 The High Court held that the right to get water is part of 
the right to life and that a large proportion of the citizens of Allahabad were being deprived 
of this right.  
The High Court vindicated claims for a right to drinking water in Vishala Kochi 
Kudivella Samarkshana Samithi v State of Kerala, where the State had taken an excessively 
long period of time to actualise its plans to supply drinking water to the community. The 
High Court held that the State’s failure to supply safe drinking water to the community was a 
violation of the fundamental right to life and ordered the State to take and complete steps to 
ensure a supply of drinking water to the community within a period of six months.
67
 
The court in S K Garg v State of Uttah Pradesh & Others made orders implicating the 
state obligations to fulfil the right to water. The High Court ordered that, to ensure water 
quality, the water supplied for drinking in the area had to be tested regularly to ensure that it 
was potable.
68
 In making this order, the Court affirmed that the State and its agents had an 
obligation to fulfil the right to water by taking measures to ensure that the quality of water 
supplied was of a particular standard. 
In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India, a public interest petition challenged the 
living and working conditions of bonded labourers for, amongst other things, violating their 
right to life.
69
 The claims relating to water were that these labourers could only access dirty 
water from a stream as a source of drinking water. Drawing from its previous interpretations 
of the right to life as including the right to live with dignity, the Supreme Court set out the 
content of the right to water and the obligations it engendered. The Supreme Court stated that 
the bonded labourers were entitled to pure drinking water and specifically that this obligation 
was to be borne by their employers.
70
  In what appears as an attempt to elaborate on the 
obligations of the federal state and central government, the Court directed both governments 
to ensure that the applicable legislation, which provided for specific amounts of drinking 
water which had to be provided to workers in mines was immediately enforced.  
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FK Hussain v Union of India
71
 dealt with the question of achieving a delicate balance in 
enhancing water supplies while actualising the right to life. In this matter, the High Court was 
faced with a petition seeking to preserve the natural water resources at the expense of a 
technologically enhanced water supply. The petitioners lived on islands which had limited 
ground water resources. The community’s demand for water had increased and the local 
administration decided to augment ground water supply by using electric or mechanical 
pumps. The petitioners, as residents, argued that the action of the local administration would 
amount to an invasion of the right to life by depleting the islands’ limited natural resources. 
The petitioners adduced expert evidence which demonstrated that the existing fresh water 
equilibrium would be upset if the local administration’s project were to proceed. They sought 
orders to restrain the administration from implementing the scheme.
72
  
In response to the petition, the state contended that the growing need for water made it 
impossible to maintain the traditional means of collecting water. It averred that the islands 
had poor sanitary conditions and a prevalence of water borne diseases, which made it 
necessary to introduce a scheme of protected water supply. In a bid to account to the 
aggrieved citizens, the state argued that the available water was of bad quality and required 
purification, contending that its plan would be implemented in a manner which ensured the 
pumping of water would be controlled in order to minimize the likelihood of excessive 
withdrawals of water.
73
  
The High Court relied on the expert reports, which found that the existing ground water 
was limited and that excessive withdrawals of the ground water would diminish potable water 
on the islands. The Court found that the right to life had several attributes, amongst which 
was the right to ‘sweet water’. The Court found that the right to potable water, being a basic 
element of life, had to be prioritised above other water needs.
74
 While the court did not 
elaborate on the term ‘sweet water’, within the context of the petition, I presume that the 
Court perceived water in terms of the ideal balance of acidity and alkalinity in fresh water, 
which affects its taste and hence its acceptability to the community. 
The obligations of the State were brought into sharp focus in FK Hussain v Union of 
India in which the State had made compelling arguments for enhancing water supply in the 
area to remedy shortages of clean water and water borne illnesses. At the same time, the 
experts invited to advise the court during the trial had shown that there were other methods of 
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enhancing water supply in the area beyond the available ground water resources.
75
 The High 
Court affirmed the State’s obligation to fulfil the right to water in a manner which did not 
violate the entitlement of other citizens to enjoy their human right to water.  
Narmada Bachao Andolan v Union of India involved a contestation of a large dam 
project on the Narmada River which flowed within a number of federal states. There were 
fears that the dam project would adversely affect the environment.
76
 The Petitioners claimed 
that the implementation of the project would cause mass displacement of citizens and adverse 
environmental consequences, thus violating the right to life. Upon evaluating detailed 
responses on the conflicting gains and disadvantages of the project, the majority Supreme 
Court bench determined that the project would be instrumental in enhancing the adequate 
supply of water to meet all the requirements of the people who previously had inadequate 
water supply. Put otherwise, the dammed water would be able to cater for multiple purposes 
and provide water beyond drinking needs – such as water for agriculture and industry.77 The 
Supreme Court reiterated that: 
‘water is the basic need for the survival of human beings and is part of right of life and 
human rights enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India...The Resolution of the 
U.N.O in 1977 to which India is a signatory, during the United Nations Water 
Conference resolved unanimously inter alia as under: All people whatever their stage of 
development and their social and economic conditions, have the right to have access to 
drinking water in quantum and of a quality equal to their basic needs’78 
The Narmada Bachao Andolan court explicitly defined a right to water with reference 
to international law standards emerging from International Declarations affirming the right to 
sufficient and potable water for basic needs. However, in effect, the court upheld the dam 
project which is alleged to have caused the displacement of 500,000 to 4 million citizens.
79
 
As a result, this case is usually criticised as an indication of the court’s weak stance in the 
face of capitalist development and an example of the shortcomings of a neo–liberal bench 
more interested in protecting its own class and donor interests.
80
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The faults of Narmada Bachao Andolan  notwithstanding, it provides authority for the 
position that the ambit of the right to water extends beyond a bare satisfaction of drinking 
water needs to having enough clean water to meet a range of basic needs.
81
 Secondly, the 
decision affirms that the State has a continuing obligation to providing potable water in areas 
which have none. 
Even though no reference was made to the ICESCR, Gautam Uzir v Gauhati Municipal 
Corporation
82
 presented the High Court with an opportunity to explore the State’s obligation 
(akin to Article 2(1) of the ICESCR) to use available resources to progressively realise the 
right to water. This judgment relates to two petitions which were heard jointly by the High 
Court. The petitioners sought relief from the perpetual scarcity and impurity of water in the 
municipal area. Ingeniously, the respondent Municipal Corporation, while admitting that it 
was aware of its duties regarding the supply of drinking water, argued that it was faced with 
financial and spatial constraints which made it unable to augment its existing water plant.
83
 In 
its affidavits in response it acknowledged that only 30% of the Corporation area was covered 
by the existing water supply network.
84
 The Corporation blamed the bleak situation on a lack 
of funds and legal restrictions which had disabled it from increasing water rates for 24 years. 
In its ruling, the high court re-stated the Supreme Court’s position that clean water is 
essential for life within the interpretation of Article 21.
85
 The novelty of the decision lies with 
the high court’s interpretation of the role of the state government in realising a right to water. 
For instance, the Court noted that, even though the State did not have the financial resources 
to finance large projects, this did not do away with the State’s responsibility to mitigate the 
crisis of water scarcity within its available resources. The High Court recommended that the 
State could have met its obligations if it started by implementing smaller schemes rather than 
constructing none at all.
86
 It accordingly ordered the State to initiate small, affordable 
schemes, so as to gradually improve the water situation in phases.
87
 The court further 
observed that: 
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We feel that it may not be possible for us to believe that the Respondents are helpless 
and shall continue to supply 1/3
rd
 of the water required and that too, not very clean. 
Concrete, workable, practical and affordable scheme have to be framed by them....
88
    
In my view, the court aimed to give application to the international human rights law 
principle that the government is obliged to take steps to progressively realise the right to 
water within its available resources.  
4.5.3 Reading the right to water into the directive principles 
The Supreme Court has relied on the directive principle imploring the State to improve the 
level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people, as well as the principle pertaining to 
protection of the environment, in order to affirm the human right to water. In Hamid Khan v 
State of Madhya Pradesh, the High Court heard a petition in which it was claimed that the 
water supplied by the state government contained excessive fluoride, which had consequently 
caused deformities amongst thousands of people within the state who had consumed the 
water.
89
 The High Court affirmed that Article 47 of the 1950 Constitution, which determined 
that the state had a responsibility to raise the level of nutrition, standard of living and improve 
the public health of its people, included a responsibility to provide unpolluted drinking water. 
It accordingly held that the state had violated its duty to supply pure drinking water to 
citizens.
90
 
Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v Union of India vindicated an entitlement to water of 
a particular quality, as embodied within the right to a clean environment. The petitioners 
alleged that a large leather tanning industry in the State discharged untreated effluent into the 
river which was the community’s main source of water.91 As a result, the area suffered from 
acute shortages of drinking water. The Supreme Court referred to the principles of sustainable 
development, affirming that Indian law recognised the principle that development had to 
eradicate poverty and improve the quality of life while at the same time remaining mindful of 
maintaining the existing eco-systems. The Supreme Court integrated the directive principles 
within its reading of Article 21 and found that:  
The Constitutional and statutory provisions protect a persons right to fresh air, clean 
water and pollution free environment, but the source of the right is the alienable common 
law right of clean environment.
92
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4.5.4. The right to water as it relates to water resource allocations  
The Indian courts have additionally affirmed the right to access water for citizens in cases 
involving competing claims for water within communities. In these cases, tensions within 
communities have been heightened between those with a vested interest in extracting water 
from public water sources for irrigation on the one hand, and those who depend on these 
water sources to derive water for their basic needs on the other. Delhi Water Supply and 
Sewerage Disposal Undertaking v State of Haryana
93
 was a dispute between the water board 
of Delhi and the upstream State from which Delhi’s drinking water was sourced. The 
residents of Delhi depended on the State of Haryana for the bulk of their drinking water 
needs, but the State of Haryana on several occasions failed to supply water to Delhi on 
account of its obligation to supply water for irrigation within Haryana. The Supreme Court 
stated: 
The primary use to which the water is put being drinking, it would be mocking the 
nature to force the people who live on the bank of a river to remain thirsty, whereas 
others incidentally placed in an advantageous position are allowed to use the water for 
non-drinking purposes.
94
 
The Supreme Court’s decision expounds the understanding of a right to water in the context 
of water allocations. It affirmed that when allocating water resources, the right to drinking 
water ought to be paramount over any other use of water, such as water for irrigation. It is 
plausible to read into this precedent an affirmation that water allocations must prioritise basic 
human needs.
95
 
The Supreme Court has further deliberated on the limitations to the enjoyment of the 
right to water. Particularly in the enjoyment of the individual’s right to water, a person cannot 
be at liberty to prejudice the enjoyment of other citizens’ right to water. In Venkatagiriyappa 
v Karnataka Electricity Board the court was faced with the delicate question of balancing 
individual rights as against communal rights to access water.
96
 Venkatagiriyappa involved 
several petitions which had been made by farmers in the State, asserting the right to dig 
private boreholes to irrigate their farms as an extension of the right to life. The petitioners’ 
boreholes contravened the respondent’s executive order, which required that boreholes be 
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constructed at least 825 feet apart in order to avoid stressing the water table. The available 
research indicated that water supply to the communal rural water supply schemes would be 
significantly depleted to the disadvantage of villagers if the private farmers were allowed to 
have their way.
97
 The Court held: 
The right to life cannot however be extended to mean living according to one’s own 
whims and caprices without caring for life and liberty of others. The acknowledgement 
of the concept of fundamental right envisages the enjoyment of such right without 
affecting the rights of other citizens.
98
  
Providing a contextual view, it further stated that: 
In a developing country like India, no citizen can claim absolute right over the natural 
resources ignoring the claims of other citizens. It is true that life without water cannot be 
conceived. But, it is equally true that water resources being limited, its user has to be 
regulated and restricted in the larger interests of the society and for the welfare of the 
human beings. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the right under Article 21 which is 
available to all citizens, can be held at the most to have water for drinking purposes, as, 
admittedly, without it, the life cannot be enjoyed at all. However, the right to have water 
for irrigation purposes cannot be stretched to the extent of bringing it within the ambit of 
Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
99
 
The Venkatagiriyappa High Court provides a most lucid account of the internal and 
external dimensions of the right to water. In elaborating the internal dimensions of the right to 
water, the case brought to surface the notion that water has to be perceived with reference to 
its utility to the individual. In respect of the external dimensions, the case emphasized that the 
scope of a human right to water must necessarily be limited by the competing basic needs of 
others in the community.   
4.5.5 The right to municipal services  
The Supreme Court considered the question of the constitutional obligation to provide 
municipal services to slum dwellers in Municipal Council, Ratlam v Shri Vardhichand.
100
 
Even though the matter related to provision of sufficient sanitary facilities, its principle is 
instructive. The respondents had made a petition in a lower court claiming that the municipal 
council had failed to provide public conveniences for slum dwellers who were, as a result, 
causing a public health risk to the locality. The Court found in favour of the residents and 
ordered the municipality to provide public sanitation facilities, along with a water supply, for 
the slum dwellers.  
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On appeal by the municipality, the Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s findings. 
Given that the proceedings had been pending for seven years, the Court added that the 
municipal council’s claims that it lacked resources to improve the sanitation system were 
unreasonable. In its judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed that the municipal council was 
constitutionally obliged to provide sanitary facilities to all residents of the municipality 
within the context of the directive principle to improve public health in Article 47 of the 
Constitution. Consequently, while the court orders would require the municipality to adjust 
its budget, the Supreme Court was willing to indirectly vindicate the rights of the slum 
dwellers by ordering positive action on the part of the State.  
4.5.6 Evaluating the Indian courts’ jurisprudence 
Although the preceding subsections did not review all the decisions in the High Courts and 
Supreme Court of India concerning socio-economic rights and water, they considered a 
significant number of the courts’ reported decisions spanning a period of at least fifteen 
years. It is therefore possible to draw conclusions on the manner in which the Indian courts 
have addressed the typical impediments to enforcing the right to water, as well as on the 
impact of the indirect judicial vindication of the right to water.  
Concerns of institutional illegitimacy do not appear to have impeded the enforcement 
of a right to water through the Indian courts. Those opposed to the manner in which the court 
has interpreted and enforced socio-economic rights have mostly criticised the Supreme Court 
for its activist role through public interest litigation. These critics urge that the Supreme 
Court has usurped executive and legislative authority by adjudicating upon matters which are 
constitutionally outside the judiciary’s purview. Even then, the judicial overreach argument 
appears to be mostly overstated.
101
 Indeed the jurisprudence shows that the courts have 
interpreted the right to water by reading this right into the right to life, while simultaneously 
interpreting the directive principles of state policy. Given that constitutional interpretation is 
within the purview of the Supreme Court, it appears that the courts have circumvented the 
institutional illegitimacy impediment and enforced a right to water, without subjecting the 
programs and policies elaborating socio-economic rights to direct judicial review. The lesson 
therefore to be drawn from the experience of India is that a willing court can negotiate space 
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within which it can legitimately exercise its constitutional mandate, without necessarily 
conflicting with deeply held notions of a separation of powers.
102
 
Secondly concerns about the ideological shortcomings of a right to water and other 
socio-economic rights do not appear to have impeded the enforcement of a right to water 
through the Indian courts. Although commentators have urged that the directive principles 
constitute constitutional aspirations which cannot be immediately realised and therefore 
cannot become the subject of adjudication, the approach of the Indian courts has prevailed 
over this impediment.
103
 The courts have used the interdependence and inter-relatedness of 
rights to elaborate and interpret the right to life in a manner which encompasses several other 
socio-economic rights, including water. The Supreme Court’s approach appears to be one 
which aims to harmonise the fundamental rights and directive principles rather than to 
perceive directive principles as being somehow inferior. It would seem that this approach has 
successfully circumvented the typical opposition to the justiciability of directive principles 
and a right to water. 
The Indian courts have not only overcome the usual concerns against adjudicating the 
right to water, but their judgments have had a direct impact on the manner in which the right 
to water is conceptualised and actualised. Commentators have remarked that there are 
dialogical benefits of adjudication which indirectly enhance the enjoyment of rights for 
citizens because, when judges adjudicate, they inevitably engage with policy and thereby 
make citizens’ needs more visible. In so doing, courts act as a catalyst to legislative and 
executive activity rather than to paralyse.
104
 The Supreme Court’s decisions may accordingly 
have facilitated the opportunities to review water related policies. 
For instance, in the aftermath of Subash Kumar, the first Supreme court decision which 
explicitly affirmed a right to water, several claims for a right to water were decided, both in 
the Supreme court and in the federal High courts. Commentators attribute this to the power of 
the Court’s decisions to embolden the poor.105 The major outcome has been that Indian 
jurisprudence has gradually crystallised a right to safe and clean drinking water for citizens. 
Even though water reforms had already began prior to the Subhash Kumar Supreme Court 
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decision, it is plausible to relate the emphasis on drinking water guidelines at national and 
provincial level to the outcome of this and subsequent decisions of the courts.
106
  
Another related outcome appears to be the enhanced enjoyment of a right to drinking 
water for many citizens. In many federal states, clear guidelines articulating the standard for 
drinking water supply have been adopted. Once passed into law, the current National Water 
Bill, which envisages an enforceable right to water, may introduce a direct remedial 
framework for claimants of a right to water. Commentators suggest that the adjudication has 
had an indirect effect on executive policy given that the executive has been excruciatingly 
slow in responding to the courts’ judgments.107 Even then, in comparison to the nearly fifty 
years it has taken the executive and legislature to adopt the aspirations of the directive 
principles, the outcome of adjudication cannot be overemphasised.  
A closer look at the approach and outcomes of adjudication for India indicates that the 
justiciability and ultimate enforcement of a right to water has been an outcome of judicial 
willingness. Unlike Uganda, where the Constitution’s directive principles expressly make 
reference to water, this is not the case for India. The courts have therefore creatively used 
their constitutional mandate to interpret the Constitution and enforce fundamental rights for 
the benefit of citizens in a manner which ultimately realises the transformative ideals of the 
1950 Constitution.   
The jurisprudence of the Indian courts has accordingly been welcomed as exemplary in 
adjudicating socio-economic rights in general and the right to water specifically. 
Commentators have described the Supreme Court’s record in adjudicating socio-economic 
rights as evidencing a dynamic approach to social justice.
108
 In many ways, the courts have 
stretched the possibilities of the 1950 Constitution to vindicate socio-economic rights claims 
while empowering the lower, and more easily accessible, state high courts to use their judicial 
mandate to protect the rights of poor and vulnerable citizens. 
But the Court’s record has not been entirely without criticism. Commentators have 
argued that the cases have exposed an underlying lack of principle, to the extent that the 
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courts have issued several ‘inconsistent and contradictory judgments.’109 Using the Olga 
Tellis case as evidence of this inconsistency, Paul O’Connell observes that the Supreme 
Court, while declaring a right to livelihood, granted orders that effectively allowed the State 
to evict the pavement dwellers. In this way the substantive outcome of what appeared to be a 
pro-poor decision was not in favour of the vulnerable street dwellers. 
While this may bear some truth, in respect of the water related cases, I propose that 
such claims of inconsistency are not borne out. I would rather argue that the courts’ main 
weakness has been its failure to go beyond the rhetoric of affirming rights. The court could 
have provided more clarity on the internal dimensions of the right to water by expanding on 
the standards of quality, adequacy and access to water. However, a possible reason for the 
Supreme Court’s failure to expound its jurisprudence in a way which addresses these 
underlying constitutional issues may be a result of there not being express constitutional 
norms relating to water upon which it could decisively base its jurisprudence.
110
 
Given that enforcing the positive obligations of the state to its citizens is a critical 
feature of the progressive realisation of the human right to water for those most in need, 
commentators have been critical of the underlying class interests that the courts seem more 
inspired to protect. Critics highlight the shift towards using public interest litigation to protect 
the class interests of the privileged, while undermining the rights of the poor and vulnerable 
classes.
111
  
A case that has been singled out by most commentators in this regard is the Narmada 
dams case, where the judgment adeptly relied on international law conventions to define the 
right to water before swiftly dismissing claims that the poor communities in the area would 
suffer irreparable injury by the massive project. The Court’s paternalistic approach to the 
petitioners’ claim of the community’s right to remain in their locale is telling. It stated that 
‘the rehabilitation sites they will have [those relocated] will have more and better amenities 
than which they enjoyed in their tribal hamlets.’112 Commentators point to two main 
implications of this shift in mindset. First, it is urged that an increasingly neo-liberal leaning 
bench is showing increasing disregard of rights claims of the poor and vulnerable, behind the 
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façade of development for the betterment of the poor.
113
 Furthermore, it would seem that the 
role of public interest litigation has shifted from serving the poor and vulnerable, who ought 
to be the beneficiaries of its outcomes, to the wealthier classes who already have economic 
and political power.
114
 This shift in the judicial mindset is perhaps the most far reaching 
negative outcome which points to the limitations of an indirect vindication of rights. If 
concerns about the bench’s neoliberal tendencies hold, a lasting challenge may be to craft a 
solution which has the ability to counter the more powerful liberal interests against which the 
protections of poor citizens’ needs are pitted using the force of a rights conscious legal 
framework. 
Another shortfall of these decisions would appear to be the underlying effect that 
judicial precedent may have on the crafting of rights claims. It seems that the right to water is 
not justiciable as an independent right, but only as a survival requirement inherent to the right 
to life. This may imply that there has to be a risk or a violation of a right to life prior to a 
claim being actionable. The effect of this is that only the negative and core dimensions of the 
right to water appear to be truly enforceable. This may consequently impede full realisation 
of a right to water.  
Commentators have argued that it appears to be difficult for the Supreme Court to use 
socio-economic rights adjudication as a means of challenging the financial and economic 
decisions of government. Yet these financial and economic decisions are determinants of full 
actualisation of the rights.
115
 It seems that, for an individual to successfully put forward a 
claim where the State has not taken any further steps towards reviewing its programs or their 
implementation to achieve key milestones, the claim must be anchored to a life threatening 
risk.
116
 Consequently, the outcomes in these cases may have in fact narrowed the possibility 
of enforcing the positive obligations of the state. 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
The case study of India appears to suggest that the manner in which the right to water is 
articulated in the Constitution of a state is an important factor. Directive principles of state 
policy appear to have provided minimal direction to executive policy and legislative content. 
Even then, the manner in which the constitution articulates the right to water may not be the 
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only determinant as to whether or not the right will be actualised. Rather, the case study 
suggests that there are other factors, particularly, the willingness of the various agencies of 
government.  
In India this willingness emerged from a Supreme Court which has negotiated for itself 
a space within which it was able to focus on adopting a rights based approach to exercising 
its constitutional mandate to enforce socio-economic rights. Using this method, it indirectly 
vindicated rights which would otherwise have not been entertained before courts. Judicial 
willingness has additionally given the dialogue on constitutional aspirations more meaning.  
The momentum gained from the Supreme Court’s interpretation of fundamental rights 
may have stimulated the legislature and executive into action, culminating in the substantive 
protection and enjoyment of the right to water that we can now see in India. Therefore, 
indirect vindication can over time enhance enjoyment of a right to water, albeit very slowly.  
 
107 
 
CHAPTER 5: 
ENFORCING THE RIGHT TO WATER IN SOUTH AFRICA 
5.1 BACKGROUND 
Within Sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa is one of the only constitutional democracies with a 
budding socio-economic rights jurisprudence. As I already indicated, a case study of South 
Africa’s constitutional and legislative framework and jurisprudence will be useful to this 
study for several reasons. South Africa provides an ideal comparator as an African country 
with a similar transformative political agenda to Uganda. The widely celebrated Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, reflects a transformative agenda and was promulgated 
at about the same time that Uganda promulgated its current constitution. The result is that 
both countries have constitutions which are nearly the same age. But South Africa’s 
constitution explicitly recognises and makes justiciable the right to water. In fact, its apex 
court has already adjudicated upon several socio-economic rights including the right to water. 
Therefore, a study of South Africa may be a valuable comparator for what could have been 
possible in Uganda, shading light on the potential and pitfalls of enforcing constitutionally 
entrenched socio-economic rights in a developing country. 
Nonetheless, the historical context in which the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 (1996 Constitution) was promulgated differs somewhat from Uganda’s. Even 
though debates about the contents of a new constitution began when both countries had come 
to the end of their respective political struggles, in South Africa the arguments for 
entrenchment of socio-economic rights, served a symbolic function. Socio-economic rights 
were perceived as a means to advance the goal of achieving social transformation and 
signified a complete break from the apartheid era.
1
 This was important for South Africa 
because, during the apartheid era, the unequal enjoyment of socio-economic goods and 
services was intricately linked with the legal and institutional framework through which these 
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basic goods and services were distributed. For instance, water delivery mechanisms ensured 
that white South Africans enjoyed better access to water for domestic and agricultural use.
2
  
The new constitutional order therefore aimed to realise radical social welfare reforms in 
order to transform South African society and enhance the welfare and economic opportunity 
of its citizens.
3
 In South Africa’s context therefore, it was essential for the country’s post 
apartheid constitution to cement socio-economic rights, by buttressing them with the force of 
judicial enforcement.  
At present, South Africa is on the threshold of being regarded as a water stressed 
country. Apart from providing water for domestic use, the country’s water resources are 
shared amongst the agricultural, forestry, mining, manufacturing and power generation 
sectors. Considering that the country receives less rainfall than the world average, this means 
that its major rivers, which are its main water sources, have increasingly less available water.
4
 
The main means of water delivery in urban areas are through the municipal piped water 
systems. In informal settlements and areas where natural water resources’ quality has 
deteriorated, municipal trucks periodically deliver water which is stored in tanks by residents. 
In rural areas, citizens access water from public water taps although there are still some who 
source water directly from rivers. 
Given this background, I begin this chapter by exploring the constitutional framework, 
within which rights are interpreted and enforced. The third section explores the ambit and 
scope of the right to water in the 1996 Constitution. In the fourth section, I traverse the 
national legislative and policy framework to explore the extent to which the constitutional 
right to water finds elaboration, and to evaluate the extent to which this framework reflects 
the rights consciousness of the 1996 Constitution. The three sections which follow examine 
the High Court and Constitutional Court jurisprudence which has elaborated on the right to 
water. To conclude, I evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the South African model of 
constitutional protection of water rights as it impacts upon substantive enjoyment of the right 
to water for poor and vulnerable citizens. 
In this chapter I claim that the entrenchment of a justiciable right to water may account 
for the extent to which the right has been elaborated upon within the South African legislative 
and policy framework. I also claim that this has enabled the courts to crystallise the nature of 
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the State’s obligations to realising the right while adjudicating claims for its enjoyment. More 
importantly, I claim that a constitutional right to water may have facilitated deliberate 
dialogue between the three main organs of government, as well as within the spheres of 
government, in a manner which has advanced substantive enjoyment of the right. 
5.2 SOUTH AFRICA’S CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
The preamble to the 1996 Constitution recognises that the Constitution was promulgated in 
order to establish a society based on democratic values, social justice, and fundamental 
human rights and to improve the quality of life of all South African citizens.
5
 Towards this 
end, the 1996 Constitution determines that its founding values include ‘human dignity, the 
achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms’.6 The 1996 
Constitution additionally contains an elaborate bill of rights in chapter two, enumerating a 
range of universally accepted human rights and freedoms.  
The 1996 Constitution provides explicit guidance on what must be taken into account in 
the interpretation of its Bill of Rights. First, section 39 determines that, when interpreting the 
Bill of Rights, a court or tribunal must consider international law and may consider foreign 
law.
7
 South Africa has acceded to the ICESCR and although it has not yet been ratified, the 
country has ratified other conventions such as CEDAW, the CRC and the African Charter, 
which ensconce elements of a right to water.
8
 In addition, when interpreting national 
legislation that gives effect to constitutional standards, the 1996 Constitution demands that 
courts give preference to any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent 
with international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with 
international law.
9
 Therefore, the UNCESCR’s interpretations of the rights to water and 
health, as well as the Human Rights Committee’s interpretation of the right to life, must be 
taken into account when considering the meaning of the equivalent rights in the 1996 
Constitution. 
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In the same vein, the 1996 Constitution provides that ‘when interpreting the Bill of 
Rights, a court, tribunal or forum must promote the values that underlie an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.’10 The constitutional 
values of human dignity, equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms are 
expressly referred to in section 1 of the Constitution as forming the foundations of the State. 
They also constitute fully fledged human rights.
11
 This shows that the interpretation of the 
right to water must embody these constitutional values. 
Within the Bill of Rights, the 1996 Constitution includes socio-economic rights 
alongside civil and political rights, affirming the principle of interdependence and 
indivisibility of the rights emerging from the UDHR. This implies that the 1996 Constitution 
also rejects the distinctions historically framed around enforceable civil and political rights 
against non-enforceable socio-economic rights.
12
 It is plausible to expect that, when 
interpreting and enforcing the bill of rights, a court will aim to advance the interdependence 
and interrelated nature of the constitutional rights. 
Understandably, enjoyment of the rights enumerated within the Bill of Rights is 
limited. Section 36 determines that: 
 (1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of 
general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable 
in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including - 
(a) the nature of the right;  
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;  
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;  
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.  
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the 
Constitution, no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights. 
 
Even though this general limitation clause implies that it is applicable to all rights 
enumerated in the Bill of Rights, it is not entirely clear whether it remains applicable in 
instances where rights also specifically include internal modifiers or limitations. 
Commentators have mostly agreed that section 36 applies to the limitations arising from the 
rights which attach negative obligations on the State.
13
 Nonetheless there remains debate as to 
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whether section 36 would also apply in instances where a challenge relates to the rights 
which attach positive obligations, given the particular phrasing of the socio-economic rights 
enumerated in the 1996 Constitution.
14
 
The manner in which enforcement of the rights in the Bill of Rights is envisaged, for 
whom and against whom enforcement is possible, are all matters which are explicitly spelt 
out. Like the Ugandan Constitution, section 38 of the 1996 Constitution recognises the right 
to seek legal redress for an infringement or threatened infringement of the Bill of Rights.
15
 It 
provides:  
Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging that a 
right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant 
appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights.  
 
 At the same time, section 38 mandates a court to make declarations and where necessary 
grant appropriate relief in matters relating to infringement of the Bill of Rights. The actual 
import of the term ‘appropriate relief’ has been teased out by commentators and the courts, to 
mean that the relief granted by a court in the context of a constitutional claim must be that 
which is required to effectively protect and enforce the Constitution.
16
  
 Accordingly, the 1996 Constitution mandates the courts to exercise their discretion in 
the manner in which they make awards to claimants.
17
 The court is constitutionally vested 
with wide latitude to grant orders, to the extent that these orders are just and equitable. It has 
been proposed that this provision carries with it important consequences for claimants of 
socio-economic rights. It appears to envisage a court which is empowered to be flexible and 
creative in crafting remedies for socio-economic rights claimants, subject only to the 
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appropriateness, equity and just nature of its orders.
18
 Much like the Ugandan Constitution, 
the courts are therefore granted wide remedial powers when vindicating constitutional rights. 
Considering that, within international law, water is perceived both as a right and a 
service, the 1996 Constitution appears to integrate this conceptualisation while apportioning 
executive competence over water amongst the different spheres and different arms of 
government. The executive shares responsibility over water services with the local 
governments (which consist of municipalities). One significant constitutional responsibility 
for local governments is the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner.
19
 
In addition, the 1996 Constitution directs local governments to structure and manage their 
administrative and budgeting processes in order to give priority to the basic needs of 
communities.
20
 This shows that the 1996 Constitution envisages that the national government 
as well as municipal governments will translate the right to water through executive policy. 
The 1996 Constitution further envisages concurrent legislative functions between the 
Parliament and local government.
21
 As such, it determines that municipalities are mandated to 
make and administer by-laws for the effective administration of the matters within their 
sphere of administration.
22
 Water and sanitation services within the context of potable water 
supply systems are enumerated as one such area which requires shared administration in 
Schedule 4 of the 1996 Constitution.  
Furthermore, section 33 of the 1996 Constitution determines that everyone has the right 
to just administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. It also envisages 
that legislation must be enacted to give effect to this right. It is therefore expected that 
legislative provisions and municipal by-laws pertaining to water delivery will take citizens’ 
procedural rights into account. Consequently, it is expected that, at both national and 
provincial levels, legislative competence over water supply for domestic use will remain 
concurrently shared.  
5.3 DEFINITION AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO WATER 
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The human right to water may find embodiment within several provisions of the 1996 
Constitution. For instance, much the same way as it is implicitly recognised within 
international law, the right to water may be read into a right to access health services.
23
 Other 
rights which can be read to imply elements of the right to water include the right to food,
24
 
the right to life,25 the right to have one’s dignity respected and protected,26 the right to 
equality before the law and equal protection and benefit of the law given that equality 
includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.
27
 The human right to water 
may also be read into the right to an environment that is not harmful to health and well-
being.28 The human right to water may additionally be inferred from children’s rights to basic 
nutrition, shelter, health care and social services,
29
 the right to housing
30
, and the right of 
prisoners to conditions of detention that are consistent with human dignity, including 
adequate accommodation and nutrition.
31
 Given that water is inextricably linked to the 
enjoyment of all these rights, it makes sense to understand these rights as encompassing 
elements of a right to water.  
But the 1996 Constitution provides far more than an implied human right to water. It 
explicitly recognises a fully justiciable human right to water which is the main focus of the 
remainder of this section. In section 27, the Constitution states: 
(1) (b) Everyone has the right to have access to…sufficient …water; 
(2) The State must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its 
available resources, to achieve the progressive realization of [this] right.  
 
The use of the word everyone in the text of section 27(1) (b) has been understood to 
mean that the entitlement to water enshrined in the Constitution is a universal entitlement. 
This may imply that the right to water applies to every individual person within South 
African territory.
32
 It is suggested that the term ‘everyone’ also includes all juristic persons, 
because the 1996 Constitution extends its protection to juristic and natural persons.
33
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The implications of a constitutional entitlement to social inclusion and protection are 
two-fold. First, it implies that water and water facilities ought to be distributed to everyone, 
without discrimination. Secondly, it implies that there ought to be efficient measures put in 
place to guard against discriminatory practices while establishing and maintaining water 
sources. The State is thus implored to ensure that its laws, policies and their implementation 
do not lead to a result that discriminates against certain sections of the population.
34
 
Nonetheless, in line with section 9(2) of the Constitution, it is to be expected that policies 
may positively discriminate, in order to facilitate the inclusion of those in most desperate 
conditions. 
The right to water enshrined in the 1996 Constitution is defined as a right of access. 
Access to water literally means entitlement to have water within easy physical reach.
35
 This 
interpretation corresponds to the definition provided by the UNCESCR in General Comments 
14 and 15, which envisage that water sources ought to be within easy walking distance for 
citizens. It also means that the State ought to take measures to facilitate the realisation of the 
right to water so that people are able to rely on their own means and resources to enjoy water. 
Access may also imply that water must be affordable, so that everyone is able to enjoy 
sufficient water, regardless of their income. Commentators agree that section 27 does not 
mean that the State should provide water to everyone at no cost. However, this does not 
imply that no individual would ever be entitled to water free of charge. The consensus 
appears to be that a constitutional right of access to water embodies a responsibility upon the 
individual to pay a reasonable fee for the benefit received when accessing water services, and 
conversely that the State should make special provision for assistance to those individuals 
who are unable to meet the cost of the water required for their basic needs.
36
  
Finally, the ‘access’ standard set out by the 1996 Constitution should as far as possible 
be aligned to the UNCESCR’s understanding of the similar standard in international law, 
which it views as entailing autonomy to enjoy water as a human right exists where 
individuals are guaranteed an adequate amount of water which is regularly available, of a 
quality which is acceptable to them, and backed by information which is relevant to enabling 
them make decisions regarding their enjoyment of a right to water.  
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The text of section 27 (1) (b) further provides that the constitutional entitlement is to 
sufficient water. Presumably, each person is entitled to have an amount of water that is 
enough to cater for his/her most immediate daily basic needs, such as cooking, drinking and 
personal hygiene. Commentators propose that ‘sufficient water’ includes the qualitative and 
quantitative aspects of water accessed by people, since it would be pointless to define 
quantities without giving consideration to quality.
37
 In sum, the constitutional standard for 
sufficient water ought to be interpreted as meaning entitlement to enough water for basic 
human needs. This understanding of adequacy appears to dovetail with the international 
standard, which envisages that water must be enough for the individual to meet their most 
basic human needs.  
Section 27 (1) (b) guarantees a right to access water. The nature of water envisaged in 
this section is not defined. What is clear is that the water should suffice to support human 
needs, health and wellness. It is arguable that the text of the Constitution is broad enough to 
allow a generous and conjunctive reading of section 27 (1), which would draw in attributes 
such as water services, water facilities and tangible water. 
The State’s general obligations arising from the right to water are generally provided 
for in section 7, which stipulates that the State ‘must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the 
rights in the Bill of Rights.’ This ought to be read together with section 8, which stipulates 
that the Bill of Rights applies to all laws and all institutions. As such, in the exercise of their 
obligations, the branches of government at the national, provincial and municipal level are 
obliged to act within the confines of the 1996 Constitution. In order to conform with the 
constitutional requirements, these institutions must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the 
right to water. Given the similarity of these standards the tripartite typology of obligations 
envisaged by the UNCESCR, it appears that the international law framework can provide 
guidance to the interpretation of the human right to water within the South African context.
38
 
More specific obligations are stated in section 27(2). First, section 27(2) implies that 
the State is primarily responsible for enabling realisation of the right to water.
39
 The State is 
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thus obliged to take positive steps to enable citizens to have a sufficient amount of potable 
water within their reach. This obligation pertains to all organs and levels or spheres of 
government. As already shown, the legislature, executive and judiciary as organs of State 
each have distinct responsibilities affecting the right to water as enshrined in the Bill of 
rights. Thus, the institutional design envisaged by the 1996 Constitution appears to 
presuppose a level of interaction between the various institutions, in order to actualize 
enjoyment of the human right to water. 
Corresponding with the ICESCR standard of state responsibility, the 1996 Constitution 
determines that the State’s obligations towards realising the right to water is to be achieved 
through the use of reasonable legislative or any other measures. The State must thus 
promulgate subsidiary legislation to give effect to section 27(1) rights. Consequently, it is to 
be expected that, at both national level and local government level, and in the exercise of 
their constitutional mandate, the parliament, provincial and municipal legislatures must 
promulgate legislation on matters of domestic water supply, which must embody the 
constitutional right to water.  
The State as the primary duty bearer can also use ‘any other measures’ to realise the 
right to water. These measures may include national plans, policies and standards to ensure 
access to sufficient water. Others have interpreted this as implying that, at a minimum, such 
plans, policies and standards should have four distinct components. These components 
include the development of clear goals, that the state should develop realistic strategies for 
the achievement of these goals, that the state should have time-related benchmarks to 
measure its progress in achieving the goals, and, finally, that the state should establish 
monitoring and review mechanisms by which progress in achieving the goals and, ultimately, 
the realization of the human right to water, may be measured.
40
  
The 1996 Constitution envisages that the progressive realisation of the human right to 
water is subject to resource constraints. The constitutional standard requires that legislative 
and other measures must be taken within the available resources.
41
 This implies that any 
efforts to realise the right to water must take cognisance of what is possible within the means 
accessible to the State. The cost of implementing policies and programs particularly ought to 
fit within the same resource envelope required to actualize other equally important rights, 
such as the rights to access health services and food.  
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The term resources also includes financial, human and natural resources. Financial 
resources refer to the sum of fiscal monies available to the State and are therefore not limited 
to the budgetary appropriations of the State. Put otherwise, an inquiry into the financial 
resources must consider the total resource envelope prior to appropriation to the different 
sectors in the economy. These financial resources may include fiscal resources available 
within the State and those provided through development assistance from other States.
42
 If 
this is accepted, then it appears that the constitutional standard is less demanding than the 
international law requirement, requiring a State to use its maximum available resources’.43 
Water itself is a natural resource and, particularly, is a scarce resource within South 
Africa. As a natural resource, it constitutes an input in agriculture as well as an input into 
potable water which is, in many instances, chemically treated water prior to channelling to 
domestic users.
44
 The obligation on the State therefore is twofold: First, to adequately 
apportion water as it naturally occurs, to ensure equitable distribution for the basic water 
needs of individuals within the state. Additionally, to ensure that appropriate amounts of 
financial, human and other resources are available to ensure that water services infrastructure 
is constructed and remains functionally able to supply water services to citizens. For instance 
the State must be able to account for the total amount of fresh water available and how it is 
appropriated between domestic, industrial or large scale agricultural uses. In so doing, the 
State must demonstrate that appropriate amounts have been apportioned to domestic use, in 
the course of fulfilling the constitutional promise of availing sufficient water to all. 
The progressive realisation standard is intended to oblige the State to demonstrate 
compliance with its obligations over time. This means that the steps taken towards 
progressive realization should be purposive, expeditious and effective for realizing the right 
to water.
45
 For instance, Liebenberg proposes two main implications arising from the 
‘progressive realisation’ standard, for all socio-economic rights. First, it acts as a limitation 
on the pace of the State’s fulfilment of its obligations. Already having acknowledged that the 
                                                          
42
Pierre De Vos op cit note 3 at  97-98; Sandra Liebenberg ‘The Interpretation of Socio-Economic Rights in 
Stuart Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (Revision service 5 2013) OS 12-03, 33-54-
33-57; Philip Alston & Gerard Quinn ‘The nature and scope of states parties’ obligations under the international 
covenant on economic, social and cultural rights’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 156; A contrasting view is 
offered by Mike Muller ‘Parish pump politics: the politics of water supply in South Africa’ (2007) 7 Progress in 
Development Studies 33, who argues that there are several competing factors which affect the decisions around 
making these resources available; Kevin Iles op cit note 14 at 454. 
43
 For instance see Marius Pieterse ‘A different shade of red: socio-economic dimensions of the right to life in 
South Africa’ (1999) 15 SAJHR 372, 379; Sandra Liebenberg ‘The ICESCR and its implications for South 
Africa’ (1995) 11 SAJHR 359, 366. 
44
Mike Muller op cit note 42 at 35. 
45
Anton Kok & Malcolm Langford op cit note 38 at 202. Also refer to General Comment No 3 (1990). 
118 
 
right to water cannot be realised immediately, a standard of progressive realisation means that 
the State’s progress will be gradual. Secondly, it implicitly invites an interpretation that the 
conduct of the State will demonstrate gradual progress towards realising the right to water, by 
breaking down the existing barriers to access. For instance, there should be evidence that 
legal, administrative, operational and financial impediments to enjoying water services are 
being reduced over time, in order to demonstrate progress.
46
 The main import of this 
progressive realization standard is that it requires the State to make budgetary decisions and 
allocations with the aim of systematically fulfilling the right to access water. In sum, the 1996 
Constitution advances a substantive human right to water and envisages communal and 
individual claims for water against the State, which mostly align with the international law 
standards for the right to water.  
Finally, considering that the 1996 Constitution enumerates a specific right to water and 
also engenders a host of negative and positive obligations on the part of the State to realise 
the human right to water within South Africa, it is arguable that the constitutional norms set 
out appear to envisage that the agencies of State must adopt a rights-based approach in their 
efforts to improve the enjoyment of water services for poor and vulnerable citizens of the 
country.  
5.4 TRANSLATING THE RIGHT TO WATER THROUGH NATIONAL 
LEGISLATION  
The institutional framework envisaged by the 1996 Constitution contemplates a decentralised 
system of local government, whereby legislative responsibility for water services is 
apportioned between the national government, the provinces and the municipal councils. At 
national level, the National Water Act 36 of 1998 and Water Services Act 108 of 1997, which 
both came into force after the promulgation of the 1996 Constitution, are the two foremost 
pieces of legislation which aim to fulfil the constitutional mandate for reform of water use 
and management. The Local Government Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 spells out the 
overarching responsibilities of municipalities. At municipal level, there are nine provinces, 
each with several municipal by-laws which spell out the municipal mandate and standards of 
water services. In this section, I explore the extent to which these pieces of legislation and 
relevant regulations align themselves to the 1996 Constitution and effectively serve to 
concretise the contents of section 27(1)(b). Considering that the Johannesburg municipality 
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water services regulations have been the subject of adjudication by the apex court in 
Mazibuko & Others v City of Johannesburg & Others, the analysis relating to municipal 
regulations focuses on these particular regulations. 
5.4.1 The National Water Act 
The primary aims of the National Water Act reflect a broad intention to equitably and 
sustainably use South Africa’s water resources. Having come into force after the 
promulgation of the 1996 Constitution, the Act’s preamble recalls that discriminatory 
practises in the past had prevented equal access to water and the use of water resources and, 
as a result, the national government has an obligation to facilitate equitable distribution of 
water resources. Even though no explicit reference is made to the 1996 Constitution, given 
the time at which the National Water Act was passed, and its reference to ideals which are 
textually similar to those espoused in the Constitution, the Act can be understood as 
contemplating the translation of the constitutional commitment to equitable enjoyment of 
water resources.   
To affirm this goal, in section 2, the National Water Act provides that the primary 
purpose of the Act is to ensure that national water resources are protected, used, developed, 
managed and controlled in ways which take into account, amongst other factors- 
(a) Meeting the basic human needs of present and future generations; 
(b) Promoting equitable access to water; … 
(d) Promoting the efficient, sustainable and beneficial use of water in the public 
interest.
47
 
 
To effectively facilitate autonomy in accessing water, the National Water Act 
determines that any person may use water in or from a water source for reasonable domestic 
use.
48
 To this extent, the National Water Act translates into national legislation two important 
aspects of a right to water emerging from international law standards: equitable access to 
water resources and sustainable use of resources to facilitate availability of water resources 
for future generations. Beyond this, the National Water Act sets out standards for water 
allocation which give domestic water primary importance and contains an implementation 
plan for water resource management.
49
 
5.4.2 The Water Services Act and Regulations 
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Considering the importance of enhancing water delivery, the Water Services Act, which 
focuses on specific water delivery for household use, was also enacted soon after the 
promulgation of the 1996 Constitution.
50
 In the preamble, the Water Services Act affirms 
that, ‘...rights of access to basic water supply and basic sanitation necessary to ensure 
sufficient water and an environment not harmful to health or well-being’ are recognised.51 It 
also affirms the obligation of all spheres of government to ensure that water services are 
provided in a manner which is efficient, equitable and sustainable.   
In section 3, the Water Services Act states that ‘everyone has a right of access to basic 
water supply ….’ The term ‘basic water supply’ is defined as: 
(1) ...the prescribed minimum standard of water supply services necessary for the 
reliable supply of a sufficient quantity and quality of water to households, 
including informal households, to support life and personal hygiene.
52
 
 
But the Water Services Act stipulates that the right to a basic supply of water, set out in 
section 3, is subject to the limitations contained in the Act.
53
 It determines that, ‘Every person 
who uses water services provided by a water services provider does so subject to any 
duplicable condition set by that water services provider.’54 Further, it stipulates that a Water 
Services provider must set out the conditions upon which water in a specific area is supplied. 
These conditions must, among other issues, clarify the determination and structure of tariffs, 
the conditions for payment, the circumstances under which water services may be limited or 
discontinued, and procedures for limiting or discontinuing water services.
55
 The specific 
conditions for accessing a water supply are then elaborated through the Water Services 
Regulations. 
The Water Services Regulations, which were gazetted in 2001 prescribe the minimum 
standard of water supply services referred to in the Water Services Act.
56
 The prescribed 
standard provides the closest attempt to expressing the goal of promoting equitable access to 
water. Regulation 3 stipulates that: 
 The minimum standard for basic water supply services is- 
(a) the provision of appropriate education in respect of effective water use; and 
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(b) a minimum quantity of potable water of 25 litres per person per day or 6 
kilolitres per household per month- 
i. at a minimum flow rate of not less than 10 litres per minute; 
ii. within 200 metres of a household; and 
iii. with an effectiveness such that no consumer is without a supply for 
more than seven full days in any year.
57
 
In situations of emergency, where this minimum standard may not be supplied, Regulation 4 
specifies the amount which must be supplied: 
A water services institution must take steps to ensure that where the water services 
usually provided by or on behalf of that water services institution are interrupted for a 
period of more than 24 hours for reasons other than those contemplated in section 4 of 
the Act (conditions for provision of water services), a consumer has access to 
alternative water services comprising - 
(a) at least 10 litres of potable water per person per day; and 
(b) sanitation services sufficient to protect health.
58
 
There are several other legislative provisions addressing availability, quality and 
affordability of water. For instance, section 9 (3) of the Water Services Act provides that, 
when prescribing standards, the Minister responsible for water must consider the need for 
everyone to have a reasonable quality of life and equitable access to water services.
59
 In 
addition, Regulation 3 (2) provides that: 
A water services institution must consider the right of access to basic water supply 
and the right of access to basic sanitation when determining which water services 
tariffs are to be subsidized. 
In section 10 (1), the Water Services Act provides that: “The Minister may, with the 
concurrence of the Minister of Finance, from time to time prescribe norms and standards in 
respect of tariffs for water services.” Section 10 (4) then elaborates that “No Water Services 
Institution may use a tariff which is substantially different from any prescribed norms and 
standards”. Given the assurances to take quality of human life into account while determining 
the cost of water, it appears that the Water Services Act sets standard norms which take into 
account the importance of keeping water prices for domestic users minimal. The need to 
maintain a decent quality of life is thus arguably embedded as a norm of water pricing for 
basic needs. 
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Water services institutions are required to take reasonable measures to realise the right 
to access water.
60
 Indeed, section 11 of the Water Services Act stipulates that water 
authorities have a duty to all consumers and potential consumers in their area of jurisdiction, 
to progressively ensure efficient, affordable, economical and sustainable access to water 
services. The Water Services Act goes further to require that in emergency situations, the 
water authority is obliged to take reasonable steps to provide basic water supply to any 
person within its area of jurisdiction, which water supply may, where necessary be provided 
at no cost to the consumer.
61
 
The Water Services Regulations proceed to prescribe the quality of water suitable for 
human needs. Regulation 5 (1) provides that ‘a water services authority must include a 
suitable programme for sampling the quality of potable water provided’ to consumers within 
its water services development plan. Further, Regulation 5 (3) states that a water services 
institution must compare the results obtained from the testing of the samples with the 
Specifications for Drinking Water, or the South African Water Quality Guidelines published 
by the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry. These regulations demonstrate that the 
State acknowledges the norm that the quality of water supplied to individuals must be of a 
basic, acceptable standard. 
Within the municipal sphere, municipal by-laws prescribe the terms upon which water 
will be delivered to citizens. For example, within the municipal area of Johannesburg, the 
city’s by-laws provide for terms of access by setting various parameters of water service for 
individual users. Johannesburg City by-laws prescribe three service levels and thus restrict 
the circumstances under which water could be accessed.
62
 Notably, the by-laws state: 
 Levels of service 
3(2) The levels of service shall comprise- 
(a) Service Level 1, which must satisfy the minimum standard for basic water supply and 
sanitation services as required in terms of the Act and its applicable regulations and 
must consist of- 
(i) a water supply from communal water points; … and 
(b) Service Level 2, which must consist of- 
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(i) an unmetered water connection to each stand with an individual standpipe;… 
provided that- 
(aa)  the average water consumption per stand through the unmetered water 
connection for the zone or group of consumers in the zone does not exceed 6 
kilolitres over any 30 day period; 
(bb) the water standpipe is not connected to any other terminal water fittings...; 
(dd) the Council may adopt any measures necessary to restrict the water flow to 
service level 2 consumers to 6kl per month. 
(c) Service Level 3 which must consist of- 
(i) a metered full pressure water connection to each stand; and 
(ii) a conventional waterborne drainage installations connected to the Council’s 
sewer. 
3(3) If a consumer receiving Service Level 2 contravenes sub-paragraph (aa) and 
(bb) to subsection (2) (b)- 
(a) the Council may install a pre-payment meter in the service pipe on the 
premises; and 
(b) the fees for water services must be applied in accordance with section 6. 
3(4) The level of service to be provided to a community may be established in 
accordance with the policy of the Council and subject to the conditions 
determined by the Council. 
An additional limitation to the extent to which access to water can be enjoyed is stipulated in 
Regulation 4, which stipulates that: 
4. (1) No person, other than a consumer on Service Level 1[communal water point], 
may consume, abstract or be supplied with water from the water supply system, or 
utilise the sewage disposal system or any other sanitation services, unless he or she 
has applied to the Council on the prescribed form for such services, and such 
application has been agreed to. 
(2) An application for the use of water services approved by the Council constitutes 
an agreement between the Council and the applicant, and takes effect on the date 
referred to in the application.
63
 
5.4.3 The Local Government Municipal Systems Act 
Framework legislation necessary to re-define municipal responsibility over water services 
within the sphere of municipal government was promulgated in 2000. The Local Government 
Municipal Systems Act provides that a municipality is enjoined to give effect to the 
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provisions of the Constitution in the exercise of its authority.
64
 Municipalities are therefore 
required to give priority to the basic needs of the local community, to promote the 
development of the local community and to ensure that all members of the local community 
have access to at least the minimum level of basic municipal services.
65
 The municipal 
services must be equitable and accessible, and must be provided in a manner that is 
conducive to prudent, economic, efficient and effective use of available resources and the 
improvement of standards of quality over time.
66
 The Act also states that a municipal council 
must adopt and implement a tariff policy on the levying of fees for municipal services 
provided by the municipality itself, or by way of service delivery agreements.
67
 The Local 
Government Municipal Systems Act thus spells out the positive obligations that specifically 
attach to the state within the local government sphere and advances the notion that there is a 
minimum acceptable standard of basic services for all citizens.  
5.4.4 An evaluation of legislative translations of the right to water 
Although, like the Ugandan water legislation, the National Water Act reflects little rights 
consciousness, overall, the framework legislation was clearly conceptualised with reference 
to constitutional obligations and should be credited for expanding the normative content of a 
human right to water. Particularly, the Water Services Act comprehensively translates water 
delivery within the terms of the constitutional right to water and its attendant obligations on 
the State to promulgate reasonable legislative or other measures. The standards set out in the 
Water Services Act provide clear, claimable benefits for the individual and demarcate 
specific obligations for the national and provincial government. As a result, citizens have a 
firm basis upon which claims for water services can be made and upon which they can hold 
the national and provincial government to account.  
Even so, there appear to be some concerns relating to the extent to which the right to 
water has been translated. The most problematic is the decidedly neoliberal framing of the 
entitlement to water. The Water Services Act frames enjoyment of a right to water within a 
paradigm of consumers of water. Commentators remain concerned that translating 
constitutional rights as accruing to ‘consumers’ falls short of the constitutional ideal of non-
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exclusion and presents a neo-liberal ideology which impedes the translation of constitutional 
entitlements.
68
 It is argued that constitutionally entrenched rights are purposely aimed at 
correcting historic social inequity and ought not to be carved out to serve a particular class, 
namely those who are able to pay for services. It appears that the current legislative paradigm 
has conceptualized water as an entitlement due to a special class of citizens. This 
delegitimizes the claim to enjoyment of the socio-economic right for those who are unable to 
pay for water, because such citizens are perceived in negative light, as being poor and 
dependent. Within this context, commentators argue that neo-liberal ideology ultimately 
serves to systematically exclude some individuals from the sphere of protection guaranteed 
by constitutional rights.
69
  
When this argument is applied to the water delivery mechanisms and standards set out 
in the Water Services Act, the implication is that the consumer based paradigm detracts from 
the constitutional guarantee of access to water. All persons who identify as consumers and 
access water through water services institutions are entitled to a minimum amount of potable 
water. In my view, this implies that those who do not identify as consumers by virtue of the 
fact that they are unable to access water through the established institutional framework are 
excluded from this entitlement to a minimum amount of potable water.
70
 For instance, 
citizens whose source of water is a spring or river are especially not guaranteed a minimum 
amount of water, since the amount of water they are able to access is determined by factors 
such as distance from the water point and ability to carry larger amounts of water. For those 
residing within urban areas, it appears that the consumer based paradigm denies their 
entitlement to anything over and above the minimum amount of free basic water, should they 
be unable to pay for it. 
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Finally, the 2014 South African Human Rights Commission report on water delivery 
points to the fact that the legislative standards have not been operationalised nationwide. As 
such, there remains a wide gap between the legislative translation of the right to water and 
actual enjoyment of the right, particularly for poor and vulnerable citizens of South Africa.
71
 
This may indicate that the legislation has not been entirely effective as a means to enhance 
enjoyment of a right to water.   
5.4.5 Executive translation through water policies 
Efforts to reform South African water policy began prior to the promulgation of the 1996 
Constitution and as early as the Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP) of 1994. The 
RDP had acknowledged the widespread demand for improving availability of and equitable 
access to social services. In the context of water delivery, the RDP promised that, in the short 
term, South Africans would have free access to 25 litres of water per person per day and that 
this would be increased to 50-60 litres in the medium term.
72
 This promise appears to have 
been interpreted differently by the executive and technocrats, who later argued that it meant 
that government would extend affordable, water on the one hand,
73
 and citizens, who argued 
that the reference was to a lifeline tariff, or to water at no cost for basic domestic needs on the 
other.
74
 In any case, the RDP promise remained to find space within the national planning 
and implementation process that was to follow.  
There are currently four policy documents that support the water legislative framework. 
They include the White Paper on Water Supply and Sanitation (1994), the White Paper on a 
National Water Policy for South Africa (1997), the White Paper on Basic Household 
Sanitation (2001), and the Strategic Framework for Water Services (2003). The White Paper 
on Water Supply and Sanitation (1994) asserted the principle of entitlement to a basic amount 
of water and to a basic, affordable sanitation service. However, it also explicitly adopted the 
position that, where communities were unable to afford the cost of basic services, 
government would subsidise the cost of infrastructure development to deliver basic minimum 
water services to such communities but would not subsidise the operating, maintenance and 
repair costs for such infrastructure.
75
 This implied that, once water facilities were constructed 
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in an area, citizens would be expected to pay for the water supplied at a price which factored 
in the operation and maintenance of water infrastructure.      
The National Water Policy, which was developed subsequently, aimed to facilitate 
access to basic water services for human needs through equitable, fair procedures and to 
provide water free of charge for all South Africans. Having been adopted after the coming 
into force of the 1996 Constitution, it is pertinent to note that, contrary to the language of the 
1994 White Paper on Water Supply and Sanitation, water for basic needs was conceptualised 
as a fundamental service which needed to be availed to all within rural and urban South 
Africa without recourse to cost.
76
 
In line with this policy principle and underpinned by the constitutional entrenchment of 
the right to water, in February 2001, the national government adopted the Free Basic Water 
Policy. The Free Basic Water Policy guaranteed each household in South Africa a free 
minimum quantity of potable water. This quantity was set at six kilolitres per household per 
month and was based on the assumption that each individual person needs 25 litres of water 
per day and that the average household consisted an average of 8 people.
77
 This minimum 
amount is now regarded as the standard for realising equity in delivery of water for South 
Africans.
78
 But the Free Basic Water Policy proposed that municipalities needed to consider 
ways to restrict water supply, such that consumers were made aware of the requirement to 
pay for additional water consumed. Commenting on the suitability of pre-payment meters, the 
text of the policy described them as being well suited to a free basic water initiative and 
useful to avoid meter reading and billing challenges.
79
  
Subsequent changes to the water policy were initiated in 2013. On this occasion, the 
national government’s review of the water policy included a clarification that the provision of 
free basic water to citizens attached a responsibility to pay for any services consumed over 
and above the free basic amount. While the national government’s review of the water policy 
also clarified that free basic water would be supplied with some limitations, no explicit 
reference to pre-payment water meters was made.
80
 
The Free Basic Water Policy was implemented through the local government structure, 
which is constitutionally mandated with the responsibility for water services delivery. Cities 
and municipal councils thus formulated their own policies and plans of action to facilitate the 
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implementation of the policy in a manner which, in addition to elaborating the policy, was 
aligned to the overarching legislative framework. As a result, while the national government 
adopted the Free Water Policy in 2001, in some municipal areas, its implementation 
commenced much later, due to the differences in the financial and other resource capacity of 
the particular local governments. 
In Johannesburg, the City’s municipal authority adopted its free basic water policy 
within the terms of the National Free Basic Water Policy in 2001. The City’s policy 
stipulated that the basic entitlement to water was 25 litres of water per day per person. The 
City began implementing this policy in areas where conventional meters for water already 
existed. In these areas, once the free allocation was used up, the water user continued to have 
access to water on credit, which was settled in arrears. In 2003, the City initiated the free 
basic water policy within poorer areas and townships, including Orange Farm and Soweto. In 
these areas, implementation of the policy was accompanied by a much disliked pre-payment 
metering system. The households in these areas were installed with pre-payment meters, 
using an elaborate and expensive technological mechanism. The pre-payment meters enabled 
the beneficiary households to receive a maximum of 6 kilolitres of water at no cost. 
Thereafter, any additional water use attracted a charge, which had to be paid prior to the tap 
supplying any additional water. In other words, these pre-payment meters were designed to 
automatically switch off until the water user paid a sum of money to the City.
81
 
In the course of the legal dispute relating to water services initiated by township 
residents against the City, which I discuss in the section that follows, the city of 
Johannesburg introduced a special case policy in 2002. The target groups for the special case 
policy consisted of pensioners, disabled persons, unemployed persons, employed persons 
with low income and HIV/AIDS patients and/or their orphans.
82
 The special case policy 
aimed at providing vulnerable households with relief in the form of charges for municipal 
services. In 2004 and 2005, the policy was amended. In the latter year, it was renamed the 
Indigent Persons Policy. More significant than the change in name was that after July 2007, 
all those who registered as indigents qualified for an additional allocation of free basic water 
of 4 kilolitres per month. As a result, the indigent account holder received 10 kilolitres free 
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basic water per month. Additionally, indigent account holders were entitled to a further 4 
kilolitres of water per annum to cater for emergencies.
83
  
The National Water Policy has been criticised by commentators for several reasons. 
The most pertinent criticism appears to be the extent to which the Policy is neo-liberally 
inspired, given its underlying emphasis on all consumers paying the cost of operating and 
maintaining water services. These underlying neo-liberal elements then appear to find 
traction within municipal policy and by-laws. Commentators also argue that the water policy 
advances neo-liberal attributes by commoditising water as opposed to promoting the social 
attributes of water.
84
  
Given the adoption of a pre-payment water service delivery system among vulnerable 
communities by municipalities, commentators have also argued that the water policy is 
rooted in the notion that the water user is perceived as a consumer who needs to behave 
economically, thus ‘adjusting his means to his ends’.85 In other words, a consumer’s water 
needs are pre-determined by how much they are able to pay, rather than what is necessary to 
live in dignity. In their view, the pre-paid metering policy was designed to provide only the 
water that was affordable to the user without any subsidy which could take into account real 
water needs beyond the free basic amount.
86
 Therefore, it has been argued that the pre-
payment system became a tool to further a neo-liberal water delivery system rather than an 
effective means to improve the lived realities of many poor citizens. 
The third criticism is grounded in the implementation of the Free Basic Water Policy. 
Relying on data collected by the state directorate responsible for water delivery, 
commentators argue that, even as a free basic water supply was being rolled out, millions of 
poor households had their water supply disconnected between 2003- 2007 for non-payment 
of arrears. For many others, the implementation was arbitrarily enforced through pre-payment 
meters, yet the amount of water delivered 10 years after the RDP promise was of a quantity 
which only met the RDP short term promise. It did not go as far as to deliver the 50-60 litres 
per household promised in the medium term. These commentators argue therefore that the 
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implementation of a free basic water supply went against the grain of a rights based approach 
to water delivery.
87
 
While the National Water Policy may be unduly biased in favour of paying consumers, 
this criticism does not take account of the potential relief offered by the Free Basic Water 
Policy, which itself provided a significant departure from the emphasis of commoditising 
water for basic needs and significantly redeemed the most vulnerable citizens.
88
 In most 
municipalities, the potential harshness of these neoliberal leaning policies was softened by 
the implementation of a free basic water policy and extension of water services to many 
citizens who previously had none. For instance, between 1994 and 2004 approximately 10 
million South Africans who previously had no access to water were able to have water within 
200 metres of their households.
89
 For the City of Johannesburg, it is evident that the Free 
Basic Water Policy as well as the Indigent Persons’ Policy numbed the harsher strategies 
aimed at enhancing billing and reducing water losses. 
Even then, while these changes in executive policy are welcomed, they highlight the 
shortcomings of relying on non-enforceable executive policy to actualise enjoyment of the 
right to water. The neo-liberal aspirations which ultimately find expression in the policies and 
the manner of their implementation potentially diminish a rights conscious conceptualisation 
of water. 
The changes within the national and local government policies relating to water may be 
attributed to two factors. First, these changes may have arisen from the explicit and 
constitutionally entrenched right to water. It is plausible that the entrenchment of a 
constitutional right to water galvanized the State’s efforts to elaborate and clarify on the 
nature of the right, given that pre-constitutional debates had emphasized that the right to 
water was not readily enjoyed by many poor South Africans. In this context, it was essential 
that national policy furthered the constitutional norms.  
Secondly, institutional dialogue between the branches of government and social 
dialogue between government and citizens have been advanced as a means through which 
translation and actualisation of socio-economic rights can be enhanced. The ability to sustain 
institutional conversations between the branches of government and rights beneficiaries 
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enriches policies, programs and legislation.
90
 The changes in the national and municipal 
water policies which have occurred since 1994 may manifest an attempt to maintain dialogue 
between the institutions of government, about better ways of enhancing access to water and 
fulfilling the aim of progressively removing barriers to access to water.
91
 Nonetheless, the 
institutional contribution of the executive to translating the right to water cannot be 
overstated. Sandra Liebenberg has cautioned that the basis upon which executive policy is 
crafted and implemented may not necessarily take into consideration the purpose and values 
constitutional socio-economic rights seek to protect.
92
 Like the study of India showed, 
national and provincial water policies are more likely to benefit from the outcomes of judicial 
review of executive policy based on the judicial interpretation of socio-economic rights.
93
 
Given the dialogical benefits promised by socio-economic rights adjudication, the extent to 
which the changes in South African water policy have occurred subsequent to judicial review 
is a question investigated in the section that follows. 
5.5 ADJUDICATING THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO WATER  
5.5.1 Socio-economic rights cases in the Constitutional Court pre-Mazibuko 
Even though water crises are a significant problem for many vulnerable South Africans, there 
have been only a handful of water related claims in the courts of law. Nonetheless, several 
claims relating to other socio-economic rights have established principles which are relevant 
to the adjudication of the section 27(1) (b) right. The Constitutional Court had already 
affirmed the extent to which socio-economic rights were justiciable; and it had clarified the 
extent to which the courts would subject socio-economic rights claims to scrutiny long before 
the first water related claim was to be instituted. Particularly in its three earliest constitutional 
court cases challenging the right to health and the right to housing, the Constitutional Court 
had interpreted the state obligations to socio-economic rights and clarified the courts’ 
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interpretive approach to adjudicating them. The decisions demonstrated that international law 
was an important guide to interpreting the rights in the Bill of Rights. These early decisions 
also significantly impacted on the remedial framework within which socio-economic rights 
were subsequently understood and vindicated by the courts. I focus here on six of the 
Constitutional Court decisions mainly for their similarity in terms of the paradigm in which 
the socio-economic rights claimed therein were adjudicated, and one decision relating to the 
obligations of local government.  
The inclusion of socio-economic rights as justiciable rights in the bill of rights was 
contested during the constitution making process. Subsequently, the Constitutional Court 
addressed the question of the justiciability of socio-economic rights during the certification 
process of the 1996 Constitution. In Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In 
Re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, (the Certification 
judgment) the Constitutional court rejected the objections made against the inclusion of 
socio-economic rights within the constitutional text.
94
 Two of these objections were, first, 
that the socio-economic rights were inconsistent with the separation of powers doctrine 
because the judiciary would encroach on the proper terrain of the legislature and executive. 
Secondly, the inclusion of socio-economic rights was contested on the basis that these rights 
were not justiciable since their enforcement raised budgetary issues which were beyond the 
scope of judicial review.
95
 The Constitutional Court found that budgetary implications could 
not exclude socio-economic rights from being adjudicated. It reasoned that, even when a 
court enforces civil and political rights, the order it makes would often have budgetary 
implications. Most importantly though, the Constitutional Court affirmed that socio-
economic rights were justiciable, stating that ‘at the very minimum socio-economic rights can 
be negatively protected from improper invasion.’96  
Subsequent to the Certification judgment, the socio-economic rights cases before the 
Constitutional court affirmed the justiciable nature of socio-economic rights. The 
Constitutional Court consistently reminded litigants that the issue of their justiciability had 
been put beyond question by the text of the 1996 Constitution and the Certification judgment. 
The Court, on several occasions, reiterated that ‘The question is therefore not whether socio-
economic rights are justiciable under our Constitution, but how to enforce them in a given 
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case.’97 As such, although the early socio-economic rights based claims did not directly 
implicate the human right to water, these cases are still relevant to understanding the extent to 
which the Constitutional court was willing to go in vindicating similar claims.  
The first of these cases was Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal).
98
 The 
appellant challenged the policy of a State hospital which excluded him from entitlement to 
treatment by way of regular renal dialysis.
99
 The appellant based his claim on the 
constitutional right to life in section 11, read together with section 27(3) which provides for 
the right to emergency medical treatment.
100
 The Constitutional Court, hearing the appeal, 
considered that the demand to receive long term renal dialysis was not an emergency and that 
the right to life was not applicable to the matter. It thus considered his claim within the 
context of the right to access health services in section 27(1) and (2).
101
  
Considering that, by this time, comparative jurisprudence from India offered a broad 
interpretation of the right to life implicating several socio-economic rights, it is significant 
that these foreign decisions did not impact on the position taken by the South African 
Constitutional court. While the Soobramoney Court acknowledged that enjoyment of socio-
economic rights was essential to the full enjoyment of life, it declined to infer a right to 
emergency medical treatment from the constitutional right to life. In fact, even though the 
Constitutional Court had not interpreted the positive obligations attaching on the State in the 
context of the right to life prior to Soobramoney, it declined to endorse the Indian 
jurisprudence which read an obligation upon the State to provide emergency medical 
treatment into the right to life. The Court reasoned that the South African Constitution was 
distinguishable from the Indian Constitution considering that the South African Constitution 
explicitly enumerated rights with positive obligations imposed on the state within its Bill of 
Rights. The Constitutional Court thus concluded that its duty was to apply the obligations as 
formulated within the South African Bill of Rights.
102
 On this occasion, the Constitutional 
Court remained hesitant to elaborate on the exact positive obligations that a right to life 
would require of the State.
103
     
                                                          
97
 Government of the Republic of South Africa & Others v Grootboom & Others 2000(11) BCLR 1169 (CC). 
Para 20; Minister of Health and others v Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) and Others TAC (No 2) 2002 (5) 
SA 721 (CC) para 25. 
98
 1998 (1) SA 745 (CC). 
99
 Para 1-3. 
100
 Para 7.  
101
 Para 22. 
102
 Para 15 and 19; para 57. 
103
 See Marius Pieterse ‘Life’ in Stuart Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2013) 2ed 
(Revision Service 5 OS 07-06) 39-17 -21; Marius Pieterse op cit note 43 at 382-3. 
134 
 
In determining whether the State had violated the appellant’s right of access to health 
care services, the Soobramoney Court applied a rationality standard to determine the extent to 
which the State’s positive obligations were fulfilled through executive policy. It found that, in 
the circumstances, the hospital’s policy was rational and had been implemented fairly, 
considering the limited resources available to the hospital.
104
 The decision was significant 
because the Constitutional Court indicated that it would intervene and review a government’s 
decision only if such a decision was irrational and lacking in good faith in allocating scarce 
medical resources available to citizens.  
In 2000, the Constitutional Court dealt with a claim founded in the right to access 
adequate housing enshrined in section 26(1) and (2). Government of the Republic of South 
Africa & Others v Grootboom involved a group of people who had moved out of deplorable 
housing conditions in a squatter settlement within the Oostenberg municipal area.
105
 They 
had illegally settled on vacant land that was privately owned and earmarked for low cost 
housing. Subsequent to a forceful eviction, they set up temporary structures on a sports field 
adjacent to the Wallacedene community centre.
106
 The respondents claimed entitlement to 
temporary housing until such a time as they were provided with permanent accommodation. 
Even though the Constitutional Court had previously declined to read socio-economic 
rights into the right to life, it emphasised the inter-relatedness of socio-economic rights, 
stating that, ‘There is a close relationship between it [right to housing] and the other socio-
economic rights. Socio-economic rights must all be read together in the setting of the 
Constitution as a whole.’107 The Court thus urged that affording socio-economic rights to all 
people would advance equality.
108
 
The Grootboom court interpreted the meaning of access. It clarified that access entailed 
unlocking the system both for those who could afford the housing standard contained in 
section 26(1) and those who could not. It reasoned that, for those who could afford to provide 
their own housing, the right implied access to housing stock, finance, and a legislative 
framework and planning laws to facilitate self-built houses. On the other hand, for those who 
                                                          
104
 Paras 25, 29-30, 36.  
105
 2000(11) BCLR 1169 (CC).  
106
 See paras 4-11; and paras 13-14. Also refer to Grootboom v Oostenberg Municipality & Others 2000 (3) 
BCLR 277, (C). At the trial in the High Court the applicants had inter alia, sought an order directing the 
municipality to provide adequate and sufficient basic temporary shelter and/ or housing to them and their 
children pending their obtaining permanent accommodation. The High Court considered the claim in terms of 
section 26 and found that the municipality had taken reasonable legislative and other measures within the 
available resources to achieve the progressive realization of the right to access adequate housing.  
107
 Grootboom para 24. 
108
 Ibid para 23-24 and 36. 
135 
 
could not afford, access implied that the state would develop the necessary social assistance 
programs.
109
   
However, departing from the rationality standard established in Soobramoney, the 
Grootboom court introduced a standard of reasonableness against which it measured the 
State’s housing program. In clarifying the standard of reasonableness, the court stated that: 
A Court considering reasonableness will not enquire whether other more desirable or 
favourable measures could have been adopted, or whether public money could have 
been better spent. The question would be whether the measures that have been 
adopted are reasonable.
110
 
To assess reasonableness, the Constitutional Court set out criteria which could be objectively 
applied to determine the extent to which government programs were reasonable. It held that a 
reasonable government program must allocate responsibilities to the different spheres of 
government (national, local and provincial governments). Secondly, that a reasonable 
program must be comprehensive and determined by all three spheres of government in 
consultation with each other. Thirdly, the policies and programs had to be reasonable both in 
their conception and implementation. Fourthly, in determining the reasonableness of 
measures, the court would consider whether the program was balanced and flexible and 
whether the program made appropriate provision for attention to housing crises and to short, 
medium and long term needs. Additionally, the Court emphasized that ‘a programme that 
excludes a significant segment of society cannot be said to be reasonable.’ Finally, the Court 
added that a reasonable program would allow for continuous revision and review.
111
    
Having set out the standard and meaning of reasonableness, the Grootboom Court 
interrogated the State housing programme against the reasonableness criteria. It held that the 
municipal council’s measures were unreasonable, because they did not cater for the 
emergency needs of vulnerable communities.
112
 The Constitutional Court held that section 
26(2) required the State to devise and implement within its available resources a 
comprehensive and coordinated programme in order to progressively realise the right to 
access housing. Further, this programme had to include relief for those living in intolerable or 
crisis situations. At the date of the application, the Municipal Council’s housing programme 
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fell short of this standard because ‘it failed to make reasonable provision within its available 
resources for people in the Cape Metropolitan….’113  
In another health services related case, the Constitutional Court expanded its 
reasonableness approach to adjudicating socio-economic rights. Minister of Health v 
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC No 2) was a matter that challenged national policy relating 
to mother-to-child-transmission of HIV within the public health care sector.
114
 The appeal 
before the Constitutional Court was brought by the government seeking to reverse an order 
that had been made in the High Court, requiring government to provide the anti-retroviral 
drug Nevirapine to HIV-positive mothers and their newborn babies who sought health care 
services in public hospitals.
115
 The central question addressed by the Constitutional Court 
was whether the government had shown that ‘the measures it adopted to provide health care 
services for HIV positive mothers and their newborn babies fell short of its obligations under 
the Constitution.’116 Applying the reasonableness standard established in Grootboom, the 
Constitutional Court found that the State’s mother-to-child-transmission of HIV policy was 
unreasonable, because it was inflexible and did not take into consideration the poor women 
who could not access the sites and could not afford to pay for the anti-retroviral treatment.
117
 
More importantly, the TAC No 2 Court expanded the reasonableness criteria to include 
transparency stating that, ‘...for a public programme such as this to meet the constitutional 
requirement of reasonableness, its contents must be made known appropriately.’118  
Another aspect arising from these early socio-economic rights cases that is worth 
revisiting is the Constitutional Court’s views on applying the minimum core principle arising 
from international law. The amici in Grootboom and TAC No 2 had urged the Constitutional 
Court to adopt the minimum core approach expressed in General Comment 3, which would 
require the Court to determine the minimum threshold for the progressive realization of the 
rights to adequate housing and to health care services. The amici particularly urged that this 
standard would be helpful if applied to determining whether the State had acted reasonably. 
Even though the Constitutional Court recognised that relevant international law could be a 
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guide to interpreting the South African constitutional socio-economic rights, it cautioned that 
the weight to be given to international law would vary depending on the rule or principle of 
international law being applied.
119
 In the final event, the Court declined to apply the 
international law standard of a minimum core to its interpretation of a South African right to 
housing and a right to health.
120
 The Court reasoned that it was not possible to determine the 
minimum core in South Africa, because it did not have sufficient information comparable to 
the Committee of the ICESCR.
121
 Yet, it recognised that there were instances where it might 
be ‘possible and appropriate to have regard to the content of a minimum core obligation to 
determine whether the measures taken by the State are reasonable.’122  
The extent to which the right to equality interacts and reinforces other socio-economic 
rights was articulated by the Constitutional Court in Khosa v The Minister of Social 
Development (Khosa).
123
 Khosa was a case challenging the exclusion of permanent residents 
from accessing social grants guaranteed by the right to social security in section 27(1)(c). The 
Constitutional Court found that permanent residents were equally entitled to access social 
grants as other South African citizens. It asserted that:  
Equality in respect of access to socio-economic rights is implicit in the reference to 
‘everyone’ being entitled to have access to such rights in section 27.124 
The Constitutional Court thus affirmed that the phrase everyone embodied the non-exclusion 
standard in enjoyment of human rights envisaged in international law. In relation to a human 
right to water, this decision shows that the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of equality is 
similar to the UNCECSR’s General Comment 15 interpretation of a non-exclusive human 
right to water. 
The Khosa court additionally illustrated the inter-relatedness of the rights within the 
Bill of Rights when it affirmed that where the rights to life, dignity and equality are 
implicated in cases dealing with socio-economic rights, they had to be taken into account 
along with the available human and financial resources in determining whether the state had 
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complied with the constitutional standard of reasonableness.
125
 This somewhat expanded the 
criteria for reasonableness established in Grootboom and TAC No 2. There appear to be 
instances where the Court will take into consideration the inroads made to equal enjoyment of 
other rights while evaluating government programmes for reasonableness.  
The Constitutional Court has also elaborated on the negative obligations arising from 
the socio-economic rights enumerated within the Constitution. Jaftha v Schoeman (Jaftha) is 
one such decision.
126
 The appellants claimed the right to access adequate housing arguing that 
the import of national legislation could not impliedly prevent or impair existing access to 
housing guaranteed by section 26(1). The Constitutional Court affirmed its previous position 
that the negative obligations to respect enjoyment of socio-economic rights were immediately 
justiciable. It thus concluded, that in light of the conception of adequate housing envisaged 
within international law and the 1996 Constitution, ‘any measure which permits a person to 
be deprived of existing access to adequate housing, limits the rights protected in section 
26(1).’127 However, the Constitutional Court went on to add that such a limitation may in 
certain circumstances be justifiable in terms of section 36. 
In addition to vindicating socio-economic rights claims, the Constitutional Court had 
also considered the constitutional obligations attaching to local governments. It had been 
approached by property owners for relief against payment of municipal debt incurred by their 
tenants in Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality.
128
 The Constitutional 
Court held that municipalities were constitutionally obliged to provide water and electricity 
services to residents as a matter of public duty, given that many communities in South Africa 
were still without access to basic facilities.
129
  
In sum, prior to the Mazibuko case, reasonableness had been well established as a 
principled standard against which government programs could be evaluated through the 
adjudicative process.
130
 The reasonableness test is important because it indicates several 
features to which socio-economic laws and policies, including water policies, must adhere, 
particularly that they must not exclude and must satisfy the basic needs of the most 
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vulnerable. At the same time, the Constitutional Court appeared willing to explore the content 
of the constitutional obligations of local government to citizens.  
But, the Constitutional Court’s approach to constitutional rights based claims had been 
criticised as well. The reasonableness standard had been criticised for failing to facilitate a 
more substantive analysis of the socio-economic rights at stake.
131
 Commentators also 
criticised the Constitutional court’s failure to give the right to life a more generous 
interpretation.
132
 Thirdly, the Constitutional Court’s approach had been criticised for being 
too deferent to the executive and consequently for leaving little enforceable entitlements 
inherent to socio-economic rights.
133
   
5.5.2 Adjudicating the Right to Water in the High Court pre-Mazibuko 
Prior to the Constitutional Court’s consideration of the right to water, claims for a specific 
right to water had been made to the High Court in matters which related to disconnection of 
water supply by municipal service providers. These matters addressed a class of citizens for 
whom the right to water had already been realised. The cases thus interrogated the potential 
limitations to enjoyment of the right to water for individual citizens. These challenges arose 
prior to the Water Services Regulations, which elaborated a threshold for basic water 
services.
134
 
In Manqele v Durban Transitional Metropolitan Council
135
 an unemployed woman 
occupying premises together with her seven children challenged the council’s decision to 
disconnect her family’s water supply on account of non-payment of arrears under the 
provisions of the Water Services Act (WSA). The City by-laws provided for disconnection of 
a water supply where an account holder was in arrears. Her application was premised upon 
the argument that the City by-laws impugned the WSA which guaranteed the right to a basic 
water supply, although in argument her counsel sought to rely on section 27 of the 
Constitution. She therefore sought a declaration that the discontinuation of water supply 
services to her premises was unlawful.
136
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The High Court dismissed the claim. The Court relied on the absence of regulations 
prescribing the basic supply of water to find that, in the circumstances, the right to water was 
incomplete and unenforceable. Declining to interpret the Water Services Act in terms of the 
constitutional guarantee of a right to access water, Niles-Dunèr J wrote: 
The interpretation that the applicant wishes me to place upon s3 of the Act, in the absence 
of prescription of the minimum standard of water supply services necessary to constitute 
a basic water supply, requires me to pronounce upon and enforce upon the respondent the 
quantity of water that the applicant is entitled to have access to, the quality of such water 
and acceptable parameters for ‘access’ to such basic water supply. These are policy 
matters which fall outside the purview of my role and function, and are inextricable 
linked to the availability of resources.
137
 
It would seem that the High Court was perhaps persuaded by the City’s evidence that it 
had taken steps to provide a basic amount of 6 kilo litres of water free of charge, even 
without municipal regulations being promulgated. It would also seem that the judge formed 
the view that the applicant’s arrears remained unpaid for a long period while she continued to 
incur more debt with the Council. For instance, the judge wrote that the applicant had been 
given a free basic service and ‘chose however not to limit herself to the water supply 
provided to her free of charge by the respondent, but to consume additional quantities of 
water in respect of which she has an obligation to pay.’138 Contextualising the applicant’s 
precarious position as a choice meant that, in the Court’s view, she did not fall within the 
ambit of those vulnerable citizens who were unable to pay for basic services. This perception 
of the legitimacy of her claim may have discredited the claim before the court.
139
 
A year later, residents of a block of apartments in Johannesburg sought similar relief in 
the High Court. In Residents of Bon Vista Mansions v Southern Metropolitan Local 
Council
140
 the applicants, who were residents of Bon Vista Mansions, a block of flats in inner 
city Hillbrow, sought an order for the reconnection of the water supply on the basis of their 
constitutional right to water. The applicants’ grievances emerged from the fact that the block 
of flats had had its water supply disconnected by the municipal council. At the time the 
application was brought before the Court, their water supply had been disconnected for three 
consecutive days.
141
 The Court found that a reading of section 27(1) together with section 7 
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of the Constitution and section 4 of the Water Services Act collectively established the 
principle that: 
If a local authority disconnects an existing water supply to consumers, this is prima 
facie a breach of its constitutional duty to respect the right of (existing) access to 
water, and requires constitutional justification.
142
 
The High Court found that the local council’s act of disconnecting the supply was 
prima facie in breach of its constitutional duty and this therefore placed the onus on the local 
council to demonstrate that its actions were justifiable. While the Court found that section 4 
of the Water Services Act was a justifiable limitation on the right to water, it held that the 
council did not show that their actions met the requirements of the Constitution and Water 
Services Act to justify the legitimacy of the disconnections. The High Court thus held that the 
balance of convenience weighed in the applicants’ favour and that they were entitled to an 
interim order against the respondent to reconnect their supply.
143
 
The Bon Vista court’s decision is important for signalling a willingness to engage the 
executive by requiring it to explain the basis upon which its decisions were made. 
Additionally, Bon Vista affirmed that the constitutional right to water imposed an obligation 
on the State to respect citizens’ rights to access water.144 It set out parameters for the limits of 
the obligation to respect, by finding that a lawful disconnection of a water supply is a 
justifiable limitation to the right to water. However, such a limitation imposes an obligation 
on the water service provider to justify its actions within the pre-conditions set out in section 
4 of the Water Services Act.
145
  
5.5.3 Adjudicating the right to water: the Mazibuko judgments 
A class action on behalf of residents of Phiri Township within Soweto was instituted in 
Mazibuko v The City of Johannesburg.
146
 It was to be the first case in which applicants 
directly claimed their constitutional right to access to water.
147
 The Phiri township, one of the 
oldest townships of Soweto, had been selected as Johannesburg City’s test case area for the 
implementation of a pilot project code named Operation Gcin’amanzi (Operation Save 
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water). At the core of Operation Gcin’amanzi was a plan to renovate Phiri’s poor 
infrastructure and replace it with a modern and efficient water supply infrastructure. In 
addition, the project would introduce a pre-payment water supply system for distributing 
domestic water supply in the township. Alongside the new pre-payment meters, the City of 
Johannesburg would provide 6 kilolitres of water per month to each household, at no cost. 
Once the 6 kilolitres had been consumed, the water supply to the stand was automatically cut 
off. The affected account holder was then required to either purchase water credits in order to 
be entitled to the supply of water, or to wait until the following month for the next free water 
allocation. For some large households with little or no income, these difficult choices would 
present themselves for a period of about two weeks each month.
148
 
The application in the High Court was brought against the City of Johannesburg as the 
Water Authority; Johannesburg Water as the City’s contracted water services provider and 
the Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry. In the sub-sections which follow I provide a 
factual background to the litigation which founded the claims in the three courts and 
subsequently a summary and evaluation of the decisions reached respectively by the High 
Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court.  
(a) A background to the claims 
The application primarily challenged the constitutionality of legislation, policy and the 
implementation of policy relating to provision of domestic water to individual users within 
the City of Johannesburg. In particular, the applicants claimed that the Regulations relating to 
Compulsory National Standards and Measures to Conserve Water, particularly Regulation 
3(b), which set 6 kilolitres or 25 litres per person per day as the basic water supply to be 
provided free to all households, was unconstitutional because it was an arbitrary amount 
which was not adequate for poor households. Secondly, they claimed that the City of 
Johannesburg and Johannesburg Water had put in place municipal water policies which 
violated the Constitution. Two aspects of the policies were specifically challenged. A policy 
akin to Regulation 3(b) introducing a free water policy limit of 6 kilolitres per household per 
month or 25 litres per person per day, and a policy introducing pre-payment water supply 
through metres in Phiri, where the residents had previously accessed an unlimited supply of 
water charged at a flat rate, and in contrast to other areas in the City, which continued to have 
unlimited water supply on credit.
149
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The applicants sought several orders from the High Court. First, an order to review and 
set aside the two policy decisions of the respondents. The applicants also sought a declaration 
that Regulation 3(b) of the National Standards Regulations was unconstitutional and invalid 
because they were unreasonable. Finally, they sought an order that each applicant and other 
similarly placed residents of Phiri were entitled to 50 litres of water per person per day, with 
an option of a metered supply.
150
 
All these claims were contested by the respondents. More importantly, the respondents 
provided a justification for the policy to introduce the pre-payment meter system in Soweto. 
The City believed that the pre-payment metered water supply system would significantly 
reduce water lost in the infrastructure or ‘unaccounted for water’, since the City remained 
unable to account for 75% of water pumped into Soweto. It contended that the access to 
pressurized, unlimited water in Soweto was unsustainable, in view of the City’s plans to 
extend its water supply to many other people who had none at all.
151
 Additionally, the City 
urged that the project would reduce wastage amongst users who would only pay for water 
actually consumed.
152
   
(b) The High Court in Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg  
The High Court decided the application in favour of the applicants, affirming that individuals 
were entitled to enforce the right to water.
153
 The Court ordered the City to provide the 
applicants and similarly placed residents of Phiri with a free basic water supply of 50 litres 
per person each day, as well as an option of a metered supply installed at the cost of the 
city.
154
  
The High Court extensively interpreted the emerging obligations for the State with the 
aid of international law norms. The High Court also found that interpreting the right to water 
required a conjunctive reading of sections 27 and section 7(2) of the Constitution. It thus 
affirmed that the right to water implicated negative and positive obligations for the State. The 
Court found that the city had violated its obligation to respect the citizens’ right to water, by 
introducing and implementing a prepayment water scheme that was not founded within the 
provisions of the Water Services Act.
155
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Additionally, the High Court determined that the Constitution required the State to 
fulfil the right to water by providing water and water facilities to the poor and most 
vulnerable members of the population, who were clearly unable to pay.
156
 While 
acknowledging that the obligation to fulfil the right to water was actualised at the lowest level 
by the responsible Water Services Authority, the High Court clarified that each Water 
Services Authority had an obligation to ensure basic water provision depending on its 
resources.
157
 Impliedly, the extent to which each Water Services Authority would be expected 
to realise its obligation to fulfil the human right to water would vary from case to case.  
The High Court affirmed that the State had an obligation to protect the right to water by 
facilitating the progressive realisation of the right through policies and legislation which were 
compliant with sections 27(2) and 7(2) of the 1996 Constitution.
158
 Indeed, the Court lauded 
the Minister responsible for Water (who was the 3
rd
 respondent) for having promulgated the 
Water Services Act and regulations, as well as a national policy establishing a national 
minimum basic water amount in fulfilment of the executive’s constitutional obligations.159 
Given that there were still many South Africans who had no access to the basic amount 
of water, the High Court found that the sections of the Water Services Act which provided for 
the limitation or disconnection of water services were justifiable limitations to the enjoyment 
of the right to water.
160
 The judge wrote, ‘Taking account of the State’s position and available 
resources, its infringement of the right to water is understandable.’161 Nonetheless, the Court 
found that, in the particular case, the limitation introduced by automatic water cut off 
mechanisms could not be justified by the respondents.
162
 
Considering that the applicants had set out their contention with the regulations and 
policies along the standard of reasonableness established in Grootboom and TAC No 2, the 
High Court evaluated the reasonableness of the legislative and policy measures adopted and 
implemented by the City. In the end, the Court found that, while the Regulations did not fall 
short of the constitutional standard read together with international law, the pre-payment 
scheme as well as the City’s social policies and the manner in which they were implemented 
fell short of the reasonableness standard. For instance, the Court found that the aim of the 
Gcin’amanzi project was unreasonable, that the manner in which information about the 
                                                          
156
 Ibid para 40-41. 
157
 Ibid para 49. 
158
 Ibid para 41. 
159
 Ibid para 42. 
160
 Ibid para 71- 74. 
161
 Ibid para 102. 
162
 Ibid para 82-84. 
145 
 
project had been provided to the residents was misleading and never consultative, and that 
many households who had more than 8 residents were essentially left without access to water, 
which meant that the policy excluded the most vulnerable and was inflexible. In assessing the 
City’s social policy against a standard of reasonableness, the High Court held that the 
underlying policy aim, which was to entice the poor residents to accept pre-payment meters 
was irrational and unreasonable.
163
  
Commentators lauded the High Court’s decision for its interpretive and evaluative 
approach to the obligations generated by section 27(1). Commentators have remarked that 
Tsoka J’s judgment showed a commitment to utilising a rights-based approach as a means to 
realising the basic needs of poor and vulnerable communities within South Africa, in a 
manner which previous decisions had not accomplished.
164
  
This was the first instance relating to socio-economic rights claims in which a court 
demonstrated willingness to initiate an enquiry into a rights violation by determining the 
exact normative content of the constitutional right to water.
165
 Secondly, the High Court had 
shown willingness to explore the interconnectivity of rights in the Bill of Rights, when it 
acknowledged that water constituted an element of many of the other rights enumerated 
within the Bill of Rights.
166
 The High Court further affirmed that the right of access to water 
corresponded to international norms envisaged in General Comment 15, by elaborating on 
content of the right in a manner similar to the UNCESCR.
167
 
However, other commentators have criticised the High Court for over-reaching its 
institutional mandate, by the manner in which it sought to provide normative clarity to 
section 27(1). Previous Constitutional Court decisions such as Soobramoney and TAC No2 
had indicated that availability of resources was at the heart of the government’s obligation to 
progressively realise section 27 rights. It was therefore argued that, in specifying an exact 
amount of water for individuals’ basic needs, the judgment had the potential of completely 
eroding confidence in the courts, because there was a possibility that the State was not able to 
provide the 50 litres of water. In such circumstances, a prescriptive court order such as this 
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only served to damage the credibility of courts in participating in enforcement of these 
constitutional rights.
168
  
It appears that the applicability of a minimum core content of the right to access water 
remains an unsettled issue. Whereas the High Court acknowledged that the premises upon 
which a minimum core could be identified in Grootboom did not necessarily exist in 
Mazibuko, it expressly declined to rely on the General Comment 15 notion of minimum core 
content of the right to water. Instead, the Court particularised what would amount to 
‘sufficient water’ for the residents of Phiri, as 50 litres per person per day.169 Yet, it would 
seem that the content of the National Regulations provide indications that there may well be a 
minimum content of the right to water.
170
 Commentators have cautioned that, because the 
High Court did not clarify whether the 50 litres was the equivalent of a minimum amount for 
residents of Phiri, it did not provide the normative clarity required on the possibility of 
establishing a minimum core content of the right of access to water.
171
 While this criticism 
may be founded, it does not counter the effect that the court had explicitly granted citizens an 
entitlement to a minimum, specific amount of water. 
(c) The Supreme Court of Appeal in City of Johannesburg v Mazibuko 
In 2009, the City of Johannesburg and Johannesburg Water appealed against the High Court 
judgment to the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA).
172
 The SCA addressed two main issues. 
First, whether the City had a constitutional duty to provide free water to the residents of Phiri. 
Secondly, whether the City could restrict access to water to Phiri residents by means of pre-
payment water meters.
173
 In a unanimous judgment, the SCA set aside the decision to limit 
the free basic water supply in Phiri. The SCA declared 42 litres per person per day to be a 
‘sufficient’ amount, but confirmed that the installation of pre-payment meters was unlawful. 
As an interim measure, the Court ordered that the City provide each account holder in Phiri 
registered as an indigent with the quantified amount of water pending reformulation of the 
City’s policy.174  
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Affirming the interrelatedness of rights to life, health and dignity, the SCA elaborated 
on the meaning of ‘sufficient water’ in terms of section 27(1).175  Streicher J stated that ‘...the 
right of access to sufficient water cannot be anything less than a right of access to that 
quantity of water that is required for dignified human existence.’176 The SCA reasoned that 
the exact quantity necessary for existence was dependent on the circumstances of each 
individual and thus concluded that, for the residents of Phiri whose conditions required water 
borne sanitation, this amount was 42 litres.
177
 
The SCA affirmed that section 27(1) imposed an exact positive obligation upon the 
City to fulfil the right to water. Reasoning that the obligations imposed by the right to water 
extended to meeting the basic water needs of the most desperate and vulnerable members of 
the community, the SCA found that the City had an obligation to provide free water to those 
residents who could not afford to pay for water.
178
 Finally, the SCA stated that the City had 
an obligation to act reasonably and progressively to fulfil its obligations to residents. It thus 
ordered the City to reformulate its free water policy in order to meet the standard of 
reasonableness.
179
 
Considering that legislation is one of the means by which the 1996 Constitution 
envisages that socio-economic rights will be realised, the SCA considered whether the Water 
Services Act and its regulations complied with the 1996 Constitution. It found that section 3 
of the Act and its accompanying regulations were not intended to detract from the right of 
everyone to access sufficient water in terms of section 27(1), and was therefore not 
unconstitutional.
180
 
(d) The Constitutional Court in Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 
Mazibuko and the other Phiri claimants appealed against the SCA judgment to the 
Constitutional Court. The appellants averred that the SCA had erred in determining that the 
sufficient amount of water required by section 27 was 42 litres per person per day.
181
 They 
were also aggrieved with the order of the SCA requiring the City to provide this amount of 
water free of charge only to those on the indigents register, averring that the SCA should 
have declared that the City was obliged to provide this amount of water, free of charge, to all 
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the residents of Phiri who could not afford to pay for their own water.
182
 At the same time, 
the City cross-appealed the decision of the SCA. It took issue with the findings that the 
residents of Phiri were entitled to 42 litres per person per day, that this amount had to be 
provided for free to those on the indigents register and that the instalment of pre-payment 
meters in Phiri was unlawful.
183
 
The Constitutional Court dismissed the applicants appeal and upheld all the grounds of 
the City’s cross-appeal. I evaluate the central aspects of the judgment in the paragraphs that 
follow, in order to tease out the significance of this decision for South Africa’s constitutional 
law jurisprudence.  
i. Justiciability 
The Constitutional Court re-affirmed its earlier stance that, while the constitutional right to 
water enumerated in section 27(1) was justiciable, it did not confer any immediate rights to 
individuals to claim sufficient water from the State. However, the Court clarified that, even 
though immediate individual claims could not be adjudicated in a manner which required a 
Court to specify the content of the socio-economic right, courts could nonetheless subject 
legislation and executive policy which gave content to the right to water to a reasonableness 
analysis. Indeed, the Constitutional Court stated that, at the very least, it would enforce the 
right to water where government took no steps to realise the rights or when the measures 
taken by government were unreasonable. The Constitutional Court distinguished the 
applicants’ claim for a specific amount of water from the orders it had made previously in 
Grootboom and TAC No 2. It reasoned that, in those cases, it had simply evaluated 
government policy for reasonableness and, upon finding that the policy fell short of the 
standard, ordered government to review its policy. Ultimately, the Court reaffirmed that it 
would not order the direct provision of social goods and services on demand.
184
  
ii. Content of the right to water 
One of the most significant aspects of the Constitutional Court judgment was its setting aside 
of the High Court and SCA’s determination of a specific amount of water as being 
‘sufficient’ in terms of section 27(1). Ultimately, the Constitutional Court declined to 
quantify an exact amount of water as constituting ‘sufficient water’ within the scheme of 
section 27(1).To this end, the CC stated that: 
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...what constitutes sufficient water depends on the manner in which water is supplied 
and the purposes for which it is used..... Courts are ill-placed to make these 
assessments for both institutional and democratic reasons.
185
  
It continued to state that: 
These considerations were overlooked by the High Court and the Supreme Court of 
Appeal, which without first considering the content of the obligation imposed upon 
the State by s 27(1) (b) and 27 (2) found it appropriate to quantify the content of the 
right....
186
 
The Constitutional Court followed the principle in Jaftha affirming that the socio-
economic rights within the Constitution imposed a negative obligation upon the State to 
respect the enumerated rights. As such it emphasised that the State had an obligation to 
refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of socio-economic rights.
187
 Ultimately, it found 
that, even though the residents of Phiri had previously had unlimited access to water, the 
installation of pre-payment meters did not constitute interference with their enjoyment of the 
right to access sufficient water.
188
 
Reiterating its own position in Grootboom and TAC (No.2) on the approach to 
interpreting sections 26 and 27 of the Constitution, the Court maintained that the scope of the 
positive obligation imposed upon the State by these provisions is carefully delineated by their 
second sub-section to the effect that the State must take reasonable legislative and other 
measures progressively to realise the right within its available resources.
189
 In this regard, the 
Constitutional Court found that the City had an obligation not only to make policies but also 
to continuously revise them, in order to ensure progressive realisation of the right to water.
190
 
Thus, in interpreting the positive obligation of the State to realise the right to water, O’Regan 
J stated: 
…the right does not require the State upon demand to provide every person with 
sufficient water without more; rather it requires the State to take reasonable legislative 
and other measures progressively to realize the achievement of the right of access to 
sufficient water, within available resources.
191
 
iii. The reasonableness evaluation 
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The Constitutional Court was urged to find that the City’s free basic water policy was 
unreasonable. In evaluating the grounds pointing to unreasonableness advanced by the 
applicants, the Court found that this was not the case. It rejected the argument that the free 
basic water policy was unreasonable because there were large households for whom the 6 
kilolitres was inadequate. The Court reasoned that it would be expensive and inequitable for 
the City to raise the threshold amount of free basic water for all, because this would 
disproportionately benefit stands with fewer residents. Considering that the City’s policy was 
in line with the minimum national standard, the Court dismissed the applicants’ claim.  
The Constitutional Court also rejected the claim that the City’s policy was inflexible, 
instead emphasizing that various changes had been made to the policy after 2001. In the 
Court’s opinion, the evidence adduced by the City showed that the City was continually 
reconsidering its policy and finding new ways to improve services to its poorest inhabitants, 
which contradicted claims of inflexibility.
192
 It stated: 
What is clear from the conduct of the City is that it has progressively sought to 
increase access to water for larger households who are prejudiced by the 6 kilolitre 
limit. It has continued to review its policy regularly and undertaken sophisticated 
research to seek to ensure that it meets the needs of the poor within the city. It cannot 
therefore be said that the policy adopted by the City was inflexible, and the 
applicants’ argument on this score too must fail.193 
iv. A critique of the Constitutional Court’s decision 
The decision of the Constitutional court in Mazibuko did not escape criticism. There was a 
general perception amongst commentators that the Constitutional Court’s strict adherence to 
the reasonableness standard led to its failure to engage with the substantive content of socio-
economic rights claims of poor and vulnerable citizens.
194
 For instance, the Court’s 
evaluation of the reasonableness of the City’s free basic water policy has been criticised for 
failing to measure the policy against the values of equality and dignity underpinning the right 
to water, subsuming the content of the right to water into the qualifications of the right in 
section 27(2).
195
 Sandra Liebenberg, for instance, proposes that the Court should have taken 
into account the basic water needs of the affected households and its impact on their life, 
health and dignity, as was done by the two lower courts. In her view, such an engagement 
                                                          
192
 Ibid paras 90-97. 
193
 Ibid para 97. 
194
 Pierre De Vos ‘Water is life (but life is cheap)’ 2009  http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/water-is-life-but-
life-is-cheap/ ; Sandra Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication Under a Transformative Constitution; 
Stuart Wilson and Jackie Dugard ‘Taking poverty seriously: The South African constitutional court and socio-
economic rights’ (2011) Stellenbosch LR 664 -666. 
195
 Sandra Liebenberg op cit note 1 at 179 and 466-9; Malcolm Langford, Richard Stacey & Danwood Chirwa 
op cit note 30 at 56B-28 and 56B-30 and -31; and Linda Stewart op cit note 166 at 494-5. 
151 
 
with the substantive needs of aggrieved people would be more likely to impact on the 
outcome of an analysis of the reasonableness of the State’s policy.196  
Yet again, the debate over the institutional limitations inherent to adjudicating socio-
economic rights arose in Mazibuko. Commentators accept that judicial review requires a 
court to remain mindful of the constitutional roles of the other arms of governments.
197
 
Additionally, that the legislative and executive branches may be better suited to translate 
specific aspects of socio-economic rights, due to their positioning in terms of information and 
expertise, among other considerations.
198
 While the Mazibuko Constitutional court reminded 
that it would not hesitate to review the decisions of the executive or legislative arms of 
government by way of evaluating legislation or policy for reasonableness, it was felt that its 
subsequent actions reflected an unwarranted deference to the executive.
199
 Commentators 
have particularly criticised the Mazibuko court for only cursorily reviewing the City’s free 
basic water and indigents’ policies and for failing to interrogate the City’s reasons for 
limiting access to water to the claimants.
200
 
It has further been alleged that the Constitutional Court ascribed to a neo-liberal 
conceptualisation of the human right to water, which appears to have affected the outcome of 
the claim. In many instances, O’Regan J referred to the claimants as consumers.201 The 
Mazibuko court appears to have constructed an entitlement to adequate water as being 
available to willing consumers, as opposed to being grounded in the non-exclusion ideal 
espoused in the 1996 Constitution and elaborated upon in Khosa.  Like the Indian court, the 
South African court appeared to construe the right to water within a market based paradigm, 
which serves to protect the interests of wealthier citizens. Yet, this does not sit well with the 
constitutional ideals. 
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This said, some commentators have pointed out that the fact that the matter was 
successfully brought to trial was in itself an achievement, given that it challenged the neo-
liberalism underpinning much of the State’s water policies.202 Patrick Bond and Jackie 
Dugard have previously argued that much of the national water policies, although 
superficially rights conscious, were underpinned by neo-liberal aspirations which valorised 
achieving efficiency in billing and reducing demand for water by eliminating credit for the 
poor. These aspirations conceived of water services as a commodity, the price and supply of 
which were predominantly determined by consumers’ ability to pay. From this point of view, 
Bond and Dugard argued that Johannesburg municipality had adopted the free basic water 
policy not as a means to meet the social aspects of water access, but rather to limit demand 
for water among the urban poor. In their view, the Mazibuko cases therefore compelled the 
City to adjust its policies and their implementation in a manner which centered upon rights 
rather than economics. The litigation process thus proved somewhat effective in countering 
the neo-liberal aspirations of the policies in tempering the harshness of the pre-payment water 
supply scheme.  
A related positive feature of  Mazibuko has been the manner in which it served to hold 
the executive accountable for the actualisation of the right to water. According to democratic 
accountability theory, judicial review provides an important forum in which government can 
be compelled to account to citizens for the manner in which it has decided to distribute state 
resources.
203
 Indeed the Constitutional Court emphasised that the possibility of making the 
executive account to citizens within the adjudicative forum was a means of enhancing 
democratic accountability. 
In Mazibuko, the Constitutional Court had gone to great lengths to affirm that socio-
economic rights litigation enhanced participation of citizens in the matters that most 
concerned them. Indeed, Mazibuko provided an illustration as to how engagement between 
citizens and the executive could be useful to the provision of substantive relief to rights 
claimants, given that the claimants and most indigent residents of Johannesburg appear to 
have benefited from policy reform after the judgment. During the litigation process, the State 
was put to task to disclose why it had formulated the particular policy, its research, as well as 
the reasons why the particular policy option was favoured over other options. In this way, the 
citizens were empowered to meaningfully engage with executive policy, thereby enhancing 
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their participation in crafting measures and solutions to challenges that directly affect 
them.
204
 Indeed, the Mazibuko court admitted evidence on the nature and extent of the water 
services problem and the ways in which the City had sought to extend relief to the poor and 
vulnerable. Commentators welcome this effort, because it offers hope for the possibility of 
transcending the predominantly procedural relief commonly associated with socio-economic 
rights adjudication, to a point where the adjudication enhances accountability of the executive 
and local government authority.  
Mazibuko further illustrates many of the indirect benefits of adjudicating socio-
economic rights claims. Commentators have argued that the threat of judicial review acts to 
influence government action.
205
 The Mazibuko cases provided the evidence. The extent to 
which the City was willing to account for and review its water policies provided perhaps the 
strongest evidence of the power wielded by the threat of judicial review. It is arguable that 
the main policy changes were inspired by the claims made by the applicants and were aimed 
directly at addressing the very grievances which were brought to surface in their affidavits. 
The impact of the Mazibuko litigation on policy continues to reverberate. The Mazibuko 
cases compelled an interaction between the executive and judicial arms of government as 
well as the community in a bid to resolve the substantive problem of access to sufficient 
water among the poorer residents of Johannesburg. While I do not underestimate previous 
efforts that had been made by the City to inform and educate communities on the free basic 
water policy and how it would be implemented through pre-payment meters in some parts of 
Johannesburg, a lot more was gained from the adjudication process.
206
 For instance, the City 
hastened plans to revise its free basic water policy to provide 50 litres of water per person per 
day, thereby enhancing access to sufficient water.
207
 It also made proposals for a policy to 
avail water for emergencies, as well as proposals on increasing accessibility to the indigents 
register. It further proposed to install pre-payment meters which had a trickle device, such 
that when the free basic amount run out, there was a small amount of water that could trickle 
out of the taps as opposed to a total shut down of the water services. While it is arguable that 
all these gains could have been achieved by other means, my contention is that the pressure 
of litigation and, particularly, the initial positive outcome for the applicants could have 
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caused reverberations in other areas of the City and the State, ensuring that the City acted 
with haste. In so doing, there was an effective attempt to progressively realise the right. 
Nonetheless, I acknowledge that the substantive gains made towards removing barriers 
to accessing water in Johannesburg cannot be exclusively linked to the justiciable nature of 
the right to water. There had been several civil society campaigns on the subject and, prior to 
the court cases, the citizens in Phiri had been adequately informed of their constitutional 
entitlements as regards water. From this stand point, they were better placed to articulate and 
make direct and forceful claims to their perceived constitutional entitlements. These factors, 
none of which depend upon the justiciability of the right to water as such, certainly had a 
significant role to play in causing the City to review and adjust its policies and their 
implementation. But this does not detract from the argument that directly justiciable rights 
provide a better stand for those whose basic needs remain unrealised and additionally that 
adjudication can positively contribute to the better enjoyment of rights. 
The Mazibuko cases provided legitimacy to claims for enjoyment of water services, 
which is likely to continue to empower and shape struggles for water beyond the conclusion 
of the case.
208
 Jackie Dugard comments that, prior to Mazibuko, rights activists were 
circumspect of the benefits, if any, of litigating the implementation of a pre-payment meter 
system. However, once the case was initially decided in a manner which affirmed the rights 
of the individual, these activists were provided a useful additional resource for their cause. 
These claims are in line with arguments previously advanced about the utility of legal 
resources as a tool to advance the interests of the poor and vulnerable.
209
  
Finally, Mazibuko illustrated once again that the value of public interest litigation in 
vindicating the needs claims of the most poor and vulnerable members of society cannot be 
determined by court room victories alone. Commentators have cautioned that socio-economic 
rights adjudication is a ‘more contextually specific and complex process’, through which 
similar questions may lead to different answers from a court. As a result, the focus should not 
exclusively be on successful court room outcomes, because it is not always easy to turn a 
court room victory into actual social change. Rather, the emphasis should be on seeking to 
maximise the broader impact of adjudication by analysing whether litigation has had an 
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impact on the social conditions underpinning the lived realities of claimants and thus affected 
existing structures of power.
210
 With Mazibuko, this appears to have been the case. 
5.5.4 Socio-Economic Rights Cases Subsequent To Mazibuko In The Constitutional Court  
Four years after the Mazibuko case was concluded, domestic water crises continue to 
overshadow the benefits of entrenching a constitutional right to water in many parts of South 
Africa. To date, there are still community demonstrations arising from the  State’s perceived  
failure to live up to its obligations to progressively improve the conditions for water access 
and to remove barriers to access to water. For instance, in 2014, there were several service 
delivery protests, a number of which related to water shortages.
211
  Such protests may show 
that executive policy has not responded adequately to the needs of citizens. Nonetheless, this 
does not detract from the benefits inherent to vulnerable citizens being recognised as 
participants in the debate with the executive over formulation and implementation of 
government policy. In order to evaluate the impact of Mazibuko on South Africa’s socio-
economic rights jurisprudence, in this sub-section, I consider three Constitutional Court cases 
which were decided shortly after Mazibuko.
212
  
 In Joseph v City of Johannesburg (Joseph), the Constitutional Court had to determine 
whether a municipality’s disconnection of electricity to municipal residents violated their 
constitutional right to procedural fairness in the exercise of administrative action.
213
  The 
applicants were residents in a block of apartments owned by a private company. The 
municipality’s electricity service provider, City Power, disconnected the block of apartments 
for the landlord’s failure to settle substantial arrears, even though the residents had paid their 
electricity bills directly to the landlord. The applicants approached the High Court seeking an 
order of reconnection, and a declaration that they were entitled to procedural fairness. In the 
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High Court, their claim was unsuccessful. The applicants then appealed to the Constitutional 
court, arguing that their rights were materially and adversely affected by the termination of 
their electricity supply in contravention of section 3 of the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act (PAJA).
214
 They argued that the rights infringed included the right of access to 
adequate housing, the right to dignity, and the contractual right to electricity in terms of their 
contract with the landlord.
215
  
The Constitutional Court considered the relationship created under the 1996 
Constitution between a public service provider and members of the local community.
216
 It 
affirmed that the provision of basic municipal services to all inhabitants of South Africa, 
irrespective of whether or not they had a contractual relationship with a service provider, was 
a cardinal obligation of local government. It thus re-stated its position in Mkontwana that 
municipalities are obliged to provide water and electricity to the residents in their area as a 
matter of public duty.
217
Consequently, the Constitutional Court found that, because City 
Power supplied electricity in fulfilment of its constitutional and statutory obligation to 
provide basic municipal services, the applicants were enjoying a corresponding right to 
receive municipal services. As such, they were entitled to procedural fairness from City 
Power prior to its taking a decision which would materially and adversely affect their 
enjoyment of that right.
218
  
The decision in Joseph is significant because it affirms the public law right to basic 
municipal services derived from the interpretation of local government’s obligations. Given 
that the supply and delivery of water services is among the basic municipal services which 
local governments ought to provide, the decision potentially enhances procedural protection 
against disconnection of water supply. Even though such benefit may appear beneficial only 
to those having paid for water services, it may provide a counterweight to the harsh effect of 
the neo-liberal ‘customer service’ practices, including disconnections.  
 Another, related decision of the Constitutional Court post Mazibuko was Nokotyana v 
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality, which concerned residents of an informal settlement 
claiming for decent sanitary facilities and adequate lighting in public areas.
219
 The claimants 
challenged the reasonableness of their municipality’s sanitation policy which offered one 
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chemical toilet per ten families in the place of their existing pit latrines. Relying on their right 
of access to adequate housing, the claimants proposed that they were entitled to one 
“ventilated improved pit latrine” per household.220 While still in the High Court, the 
applicants also relied on section 27 of the Constitution in seeking an order obliging the 
Municipality to provide their settlement with among others, communal water taps. This claim 
was conceded by the municipality and the Court ordered it to provide these basic interim 
services immediately. On appeal, the Constitutional Court declined to interpret the right to 
housing as implicating a right to sanitation.
221
 Nonetheless, in evaluating the reasonableness 
of the municipality’s decision to improve the slum settlement, the Court found that a delay of 
three years to make a decision to upgrade the settlement to a formal township was 
unreasonable for purposes of section 26 (2). 
The decision in Nokotyana is significant, because it explores the scope of the local 
government’s obligation to progressively enhance enjoyment of constitutional rights. Even 
though the claim for improved sanitation facilities was declined, the fact that the municipality 
did not dispute an immediate entitlement to water services indicates that the South African 
jurisprudence is moving towards establishing an enforceable right to receive basic municipal 
services. 
But these decisions have not been without criticism. While the Constitutional Court was 
willing to supplement reasonableness with an alternative evaluative approach which took into 
account the public law right to receive municipal services, the Court’s approach nonetheless 
reflects neo-liberal undertones. In these two decisions, the Constitutional Court affirmed that 
citizens have a legitimate expectation to basic services. But it has been argued that the 
Court’s notion of what is ‘legitimate’ is impacted by whether citizens have paid for municipal 
services. It is therefore arguable that, even though Joseph appeared to provide an effective 
counterweight to neo-liberal ideology, it did not completely depart from neo-liberalism. It is 
therefore arguable that the extent to which socio-economic rights are enforced will be 
impeded by the Court’s seeming endorsement of neo-liberal conceptualisations of 
citizenship.
222
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This said, Joseph and Nokotyana reaffirm the dialogical advantages of socio-economic 
rights adjudication.
223
 In practical terms, dialogue between citizens and the executive 
inevitably involves local governments, which are directly responsible for ensuring delivery of 
services in a manner which upholds constitutional ideals. In these judgments, it appears that 
the claims provided an opportunity for dialogue between local governments and citizens on 
matters of basic service delivery. The Court appears to have facilitated such dialogue by 
creatively interpreting the constitutional mandate of local government.
224
 
The dialogue facilitated through an adjudicative process gives voice to vulnerable 
citizens to articulate their needs. Once the court provides a forum for such claims, they are 
legitimized. Ultimately, adjudication of claims pertaining to service delivery appears to have 
facilitated a shift in power from the privileged towards the poor and vulnerable, whose claims 
would otherwise have been considered illegitimate.
225
 The judgments  show that citizens can 
legitimately challenge municipal authority in the planning and implementation of policy to 
enhance their enjoyment of basic services. While, in the past, commentators circumspect of 
socio-economic rights’ entrenchment had warned that there was little empirical evidence to 
show that judicial intervention improved living conditions for individuals who were poor and 
vulnerable, it is no longer entirely possible to support such a claim.
226
  
5.5.5  Litigating water rights in the High Court after Mazibuko  
Two years after Mazibuko, the community in Carolina and Silobela initiated a claim in the 
High Court for an order, inter alia, to provide temporary potable water to them. In Federation 
for Sustainable Environment v Minister of Water Affairs
227
(The Carolina case), the High 
Court considered an urgent application seeking to enforce the State’s positive obligations to 
provide water  to residents in Silobela and Carolina in the short and medium term, since the 
area’s water supply was contaminated by acid mine water and there was therefore no access 
to clean and safe water for domestic use.
228
 Due to the unhealthy state of the water supply in 
the area, water tanks were provided to distribute potable water. However, the tanks were not 
filled regularly and the 25 litres per household which was provided by the local government 
was inadequate because the tanks were accessed on a ‘first come first served’ basis. The 
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claimants also alleged that some residents had to walk long distances to access the potable 
water. It further transpired that they lacked water for considerable periods, sometimes 
exceeding seven days, which, it was claimed, amounted to an infringement of their 
constitutional right to access water.
229
 The respondents, on the other hand, denied the gravity 
of the problem, and argued they had acted promptly by providing water tanks, some of which 
were destroyed by the community.  
The High Court found in favour of the applicants. It held that the rights of the 
applicants had been violated and ordered the local government to implement the State’s 
obligation to ensure provision of water services in the area.
230
 The decision affirmed that it 
was still possible for the vulnerable and most desperate individuals to claim for immediate 
fulfilment of their right to water in emergency conditions. This affirms that the constitutional 
protection of a right to water coupled with legislative and judicial translation can effectively 
remedy urgent water needs of poor and vulnerable citizens.  
5.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter set out to explore the extent to which an explicitly recognised constitutional 
right to water has been translated through legislative and executive mechanisms and 
ultimately, through the courts. It transpires that such translation has occurred at all spheres of 
government. Although prior to the coming into force of the Constitution, the 1994 RDP had 
articulated a plan for improving universal access to basic services, the explicit reference to a 
right to water in the 1996 Constitution spurred immediate action to develop specific 
executive policies and legislation, which shaped the standard for water services delivery for 
domestic use. The time it has taken to craft such specific legislation and policy has been 
significantly shorter than appeared to have been the case in India. 
 Nonetheless, the policies and legislation have been criticized for failing to completely 
ensconce the ideals of the 1996 Constitution and instead reflecting a neo-liberal discourse. 
Even then, the constitutional protection of a right to water has offered a chance for effectively 
countering the neo-liberal aspects of law and policy. Two examples demonstrate this. First, 
executive responsiveness to actualising basic needs can be accounted for by the 
transformative nature of the South African Constitution. In the context of water delivery, 
policies have been crafted and reformulated to establish a free basic water entitlement and to 
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remove impediments to enjoyment of water where even this threshold amount is insufficient 
for the indigent.  
The second example relates to judicial responsiveness to socio-economic rights. Unlike 
India, the South African courts are explicitly mandated to enforce socio-economic rights. 
Indeed, the courts have allowed the judicial space to be used as a forum for dialogue between 
citizens and the agencies of government in fulfilment of their constitutional mandate. By 
doing this, the courts have responded to citizens demands for a better articulation of the right 
to water, by elaborating its normative content and interpreting the state obligations. In the 
end, judicial responsiveness has triggered fairly quick executive action towards improving 
water policies and water delivery mechanisms. As such, these examples go to show that state 
agencies appear to derive their willingness to act from the force of the constitutional text, 
which explicitly mandates them to actualise the enjoyment of a right to water.   
 At the same time, a closer look at the method and approach of the courts reveals that 
the enforcement of a human right to water has been influenced by the typical concerns 
relating to the limits of judicial power in the enforcement of socio-economic rights. For 
instance, unlike the Indian Courts, the Constitutional Court appeared to refrain from giving 
substantive content to a right to water on account of the limits of its institutional capacity. As 
such, the Constitutional Court appeared more comfortable with subjecting existing policy and 
legislation to some form of rights-based judicial scrutiny rather than setting out its own 
interpretation of the right to water. The Constitutional Court has also been unwilling to read a 
right to water into other rights such as the right to life. This may neglect some dimensions of 
the right to water. Of course, this difference in approach may be attributed to the existence of 
a legislative and policy framework to which the reasonableness standard could be applied 
which did not exist in India. Even then, it seems that the South African Constitutional Court 
has been more cautious than its Indian counterpart in overcoming institutional competence 
challenges. 
 It appears that judicial willingness to utilise their constitutional mandate in 
interpretation and enforcement of a right to water is critical to realising substantive 
enjoyment of the right. However, like India, the decisions of the South African apex court 
have raised concerns about the underlying ideology through which socio-economic rights 
enforcement is conceptualised. It appears that, in both countries, the courts have been 
influenced by neo-liberal ideology, which prioritises a market approach to delivery of water 
services. However, in South Africa, the neo-liberal ideology appears to be more effectively 
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countered by the explicit recognition of a right to water as well as by the constitutional 
obligation on local government to provide basic services. 
To conclude, even though immediate claims of entitlement to water have not entirely 
succeeded, it would appear that the courts in South Africa have gone a long way in 
empowering citizens to claim and enjoy water as a human right. More importantly, for South 
Africa, even though law, policy and judicial thinking conceptualise a neo-liberal and 
customer-centred model of water service delivery, their full thrust is largely tempered by the 
text and spirit of the 1996 Constitution. It is arguable then, that the 1996 Constitution has 
singularly directed the conceptualisation and realisation of a right to water. Returning to the 
main question raised in this thesis, the example of South Africa shows that explicit 
recognition and direct vindication of a right to water has gone further in facilitating 
enjoyment of a right to water. 
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CHAPTER 6 
TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO REALISING A 
RIGHT TO WATER IN UGANDA 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION  
This dissertation explored and evaluated possible legal mechanisms for enhancing the 
enjoyment of a human right to water for Uganda. Many studies have evaluated the utility of 
legal means to enhance enjoyment of socio-economic rights in different jurisdictions and 
found that, in countries which constitutionally protected socio-economic rights and had 
strong institutions for judicial review, the state devoted a more significant amount of financial 
resources to the realisation of socio-economic rights and increased the priority of social 
programs, which benefited vulnerable and marginalised citizens.
1
 Country-specific studies 
have also evaluated the role of the courts in advancing pro-poor struggles.
2
 With a particular 
focus on actualising enjoyment of a right to water in a developing country context, this study 
supports the findings of previous research.  
This dissertation sought to advance the claim that, where a right to water is explicitly 
recognised within the constitutional text as an enforceable right, it is better translated through 
legislation and policy and ultimately more effectively enforced by the courts. In the end, this 
translates into better enjoyment of the right to water by citizens. In each of the countries 
studied, I examined the manner in which the constitutional framework pertaining to 
recognition and enforcement of socio-economic rights impacts on how the right to water is 
constructed within the domestic context. Drawing from the constitutional text, I explored the 
effects of the specific and implied constitutional construction of the right to water on its 
eventual translation through legislation and executive policy. I also considered how, if at all, 
adjudication had enhanced enjoyment of a right to water for citizens. A significant proportion 
of the study was dedicated to examining the outcomes of adjudication and considering 
whether court decisions made a difference in substantive enjoyment of the right to water. In 
doing so, I studied the judicial approaches followed by courts in adjudicating socio-economic 
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rights claims, with a view to establishing the benefits and shortcomings of direct and indirect 
adjudication of the human right to water. 
The study was premised on the notion that constitutional protection of socio-economic 
rights has increasingly been accepted as a means to enhance enjoyment of these rights. In 
turn, commentators who have examined the utility of adjudicating socio-economic rights as a 
means to enhance enjoyment of these rights have argued that while adjudication alone cannot 
guarantee enjoyment of these rights, it tends to enhance their actualisation. This manifests 
mainly in three ways. The first is by legitimizing basic needs as socio-economic rights. 
Where the nature and content of a specific right are articulated by the courts, citizens have a 
basis upon which their needs are recognised, and citizens are ultimately afforded a legitimate 
basis upon which to claim for the right. Secondly, adjudication can counter the negative 
impact of liberalist views of rights, which seek to use rights to protect the privileged and 
perpetuate the desolate conditions of the poor through maintaining the status quo. Where the 
State uses resource re-distribution to enhance progressive realisation of socio-economic 
rights, it is likely to be met with resistance from those already privileged. However, a rights 
based paradigm enables government to argue that, in order to realise its obligations, it is 
necessary to apply human rights-based approaches to resource distribution in order to realise 
socio-economic rights.
3
 Finally, because the adjudicative process facilitates the participation 
of citizens in determining issues of concern to them, it can counter judicial overreach 
concerns typically raised against judicial involvement in enforcement of socio-economic 
rights.
4
 
Of course arguments for adjudication of socio-economic rights may be countered by 
concerns that a rights framework can set off negative consequences for vulnerable citizens. 
Commentators critical of rights discourse have argued that rights are indeterminate and, as a 
result, do not offer any substantive solutions to the real needs of vulnerable citizens. Given 
the varying and opposing interests that may be implicated by enjoyment or violation of a 
right, commentators argue that liberal interests are more likely to be preserved through rights 
discourses.
5
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In addition, the advancement of socio-economic rights in the courts operates within a 
broader institutional framework in which courts have institutional limits. The courts cannot 
be left to fashion the manner in which water rights are actualised and to overshadow 
legislative and executive roles in actualising a right to water. Accordingly, the argument that 
is advanced in this dissertation emphasises an interaction between all these branches of 
government. 
6.2 A SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS OF THIS DISSERTATION 
This dissertation set out to explore the broader question of the effectiveness of a rights-based 
approach to water in ameliorating water needs and in enhancing meaningful and equitable 
access to water by the poor and vulnerable. I explored this question through three main 
themes within three country studies of Uganda, India and South Africa. The three main 
themes interrogated the utility of a constitutional protection of a human right to water, the 
effectiveness of legislative and executive translation of a human right to water, and the utility 
of adjudication of rights as a means to enhance enjoyment of a human right to water. 
In the countries studied, there were three main means through which socio-economic 
rights, from which the right to water is read, are constitutionally protected. In Uganda, it was 
within the non-justiciable directive principles of state policy. In India, the constitutional 
protection emerged indirectly from the judicial enforcement of the right to life and an 
expansive application of rights to a clean and healthy environment; while in South Africa, the 
right to water was constitutionally protected through direct entrenchment.  
Where socio-economic rights are protected as directive principles, they were not 
directly justiciable but remain to be translated mostly within legislative and executive 
strategies. On the other hand, where socio-economic rights are protected as substantive and 
enforceable rights, even though legislative and executive translation is envisaged, they tend 
also to be directly enforceable. Some enjoyment of the right to water therefore appears to be 
present whether or not the rights were directly justiciable. Given that, in the end, the three 
paradigms provided means through which socio-economic rights were being enjoyed by 
citizens, this dissertation examined which of these paradigms provided better relief for 
vulnerable citizens. 
Commencing with unpacking the international law understanding of the right to water, 
chapter 2 showed that the right is inferred within most international law Conventions. I 
identified the various rights through which a right to water can be read into several of the 
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international human rights Covenants, particularly the rights to life, health and to an adequate 
standard of living given the UNCESCR General Comment 15’s elaboration of the content of 
the right to water, which is highly persuasive, although not binding upon States. Even then, a 
conjunctive reading of international law covenants and declarations affirms a universal right 
to sufficient, safe, acceptable, accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic use. 
I demonstrated that, on a conjunctive reading of the Covenants and UNCESCR’s General 
Comment, there is sufficient evidence from which to infer specific entitlements for citizens 
and specific obligations attaching to states which flow directly from implicit and explicit 
recognition of the right to water, even though there remains some uncertainty about the full 
scope of the right. 
On account of this understanding of a right to water, I began by examining the extent to 
which international law finds expression in Uganda’s domestic legal system, in chapter 3. I 
demonstrated that the 1995 Constitution impliedly envisages the application of international 
law within the domestic setting. The 1995 Constitution is also structured in a way which 
allows for a generous interpretation and enforcement of the Bill of Rights. Given that the 
human right to water is recognised as a directive principle of state policy, it cannot be directly 
enforced, as is the case with other constitutional rights. At most, it operates as a directive 
principle to the legislature, executive and judiciary. Even then, its exact internal content is 
limited to three components - a right for everyone to enjoy clean and safe water. In addition, 
its external reach remains abstract. Therefore, not all elements of the right to water enjoy 
constitutional protection in Uganda. I then showed that this lack of constitutional 
entrenchment led to weak legislative translation of the right to water. While it appears that the 
most elaborate translation of the right to water for Uganda had been through executive policy, 
I showed that such translation did not embody the international law understanding of the right 
to water and particularly weakened possibilities for its enforcement. 
Chapter 3 showed that the Ugandan Constitutional court was willing to apply a 
generous interpretive approach and apply international law to the interpretation of the 1995 
Constitution which goes a long way to advancing international human rights standards 
domestically. Yet, the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence has illustrated that the courts are 
unwilling to determine claims arising from socio-economic directives of state policy. I argued 
that the courts’ potential to creatively enforce socio-economic rights is impeded by concerns 
regarding their institutional legitimacy. Accordingly, it appears that judges may be more 
concerned about protecting their legitimate institutional space and are generally reluctant to 
read rights into the constitutional text, beyond those which are explicitly recognised as 
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justiciable in the Bill of Rights. Given that courts are likely to adjudicate claims on the basis 
of precedent, it seems that the underlying problem of a vague constitutional right to water 
may endure and remain an impediment to successful adjudication of the right in Uganda. 
Therefore, I concluded that enjoyment of the right through non-justiciable directive principles 
of state policy was an ineffective means towards universal enjoyment of the right to water.  
 Chapter 4 examined the constitutional framework for translating and vindicating a right 
to water in India. I found that the 1950 Constitution of India neither explicitly mandated the 
application of international law nor recognised a right to water. Unlike Uganda’s directive 
principles which explicitly refer to a human right to water, the Indian Constitution’s directive 
principles do not even include an explicit reference to the right to water. In sum, there is at 
most an implied constitutional protection accorded to water within the context of 
international human rights law. I showed that, consequently, India’s national and municipal 
legislation did not thoroughly elaborate on the right. The study showed that it was mainly 
through executive policy that the right to water had most recently been elaborated.  
 The study then found that the Indian Supreme Court’s flexible approach to interpreting 
directive principles as underscoring the fundamental rights provisions, its generous 
interpretation of a right to a clean and healthy environment, and specifically, its elaboration 
of the socio-economic dimensions of a right to life have informed the content and scope of 
the right to water in India. As a result, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence established a 
universal right to clean and safe water for drinking purposes. I concluded that, while judicial 
interpretation had facilitated protection and enjoyment of the right to water, it did not allow 
for the full expression of the right to water as understood in international law. Even though 
judicial review in India has not been impeded by typical concerns about the enforcement of 
socio-economic rights, it has taken a long time for the outcomes of adjudication to stimulate 
legislative and water policy reforms.  I argued that the Indian experience showed that the 
manner in which the right to water is constitutionally framed, may be critical to the extent to 
which it is translated and realised. From the Indian case study, I concluded that indirect 
vindication through reading the right to water into other rights will only partially vindicate 
the right and then only in the long term. 
 Chapter 5 focused on the understanding and translation of the right to water within 
South African constitutional law. It showed that the 1996 Constitution explicitly allowed for 
international law applications of the right to water to influence interpretations of the 
constitutional right to water. It then showed that all elements of the right to water enjoyed 
explicit constitutional protection in the South African Constitution. Subsequently, I explored 
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the extent to which the legislative and executive translations of the right to water elaborated 
on the constitutional right to water. I argued that the constitutional entrenchment of a right to 
water had facilitated strong translations of the right, both within the legislative and executive 
spheres of government, running through to municipal level. In addition, unlike in India, the 
translation of a right to water has happened at a relatively fast pace, which may be explained 
by its constitutional entrenchment. 
 I then examined the outcomes of a range of decisions of the South African 
Constitutional Court, in which socio-economic rights were interpreted and vindicated. I 
argued that the manner in which the Constitutional Court had approached claims for water 
can be attributed to the constitutional mandate and explicit recognition of the justiciable 
nature of the right. However, I showed that, unlike the Indian Supreme Court, the 
Constitutional Court has been unwilling to read socio-economic rights into the right to life, 
which disregards the legitimacy of some dimensions of the right to water. In addition, the 
Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the right to water does not vest citizens with 
immediately claimable entitlements to water. However, a closer look at the outcome of 
adjudication in terms of substantive enjoyment of water, shows better enjoyment of the right 
to water in South Africa, given the time it has taken to implement the 1996 constitutional 
ideals. This may be attributed to the constitutional entrenchment of a justiciable right to 
water. 
6.2.1 The impact of constitutional entrenchment to conceptualising a right to water 
To summarise, this study showed that the manner in which the Constitution expresses a right 
to water impacts on the extent to which the various elements of the right are being enjoyed by 
citizens. Given that the right to water is considered as a determinant of the rights to life, 
health and enjoyment of a decent standard of living within international law, I examined how 
it has been conceptualised within the domestic context of Uganda, India and South Africa and 
evaluated the extent to which such conceptualisation enhanced enjoyment of the right. The 
manner in which the right to life is conceptualised as a fundamental right whose actualisation 
is tied to the enjoyment of other rights such as water is at the core of India’s contextualisation 
of a right to water. While Uganda and South Africa have also entrenched a right to life, it 
does not appear to have influenced conceptualisations of a right to water. For Uganda and 
South Africa, the manner in which the right to water is conceptualised appears to be hinged to 
improvement of social services for citizens although in South Africa the Constitution goes 
further to entrench these social services as enforceable rights. As a result, I conclude that 
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unlike India and South Africa, a Ugandan understanding of the right to water is an aspiration 
rather than an entitlement for citizens.    
 Accordingly, after examining the manner in which the right to water was elaborated 
through legislation in the countries studied, I concluded that the constitutional entrenchment 
of the right to water in South Africa had facilitated a more thorough translation in legislation 
than the Indian model, which conceptualised a right to water indirectly, through a reading 
into of a right to life and elaborations of directive principles of state policy. At the same time, 
the South African legislative translation of a right to water was more comprehensive than the 
Ugandan translation which relied only on directive principles of state policy. Indeed I found 
that the national and municipal legislations in India and Uganda regulating water supply and 
delivery did not espouse rights conscious language. In these instances I argued that a weak 
legislative framework was attributable to the manner in which the right to water had 
originally been conceptualised in the respective Constitutions. 
 Even then, it appears that in all three countries studied, the executive translation of a 
right to water offered an elaborate interpretation of the right within policy documents. This is 
to be expected, considering that the executive’s legitimacy is often dependent on improving 
service delivery for citizens. Yet, in all three countries studied, it appeared that inequity in 
enjoyment of the right to water remained and there were still millions for whom impediments 
to enjoyment of the right remain. In Uganda, I demonstrated that the directive principles 
could have influenced the conceptualisation of a right to water within national water policies 
adopted by the executive, although this did not result in full translation of the right. While in 
India, an understanding of enjoyment of a right to life as dependent on consuming clean and 
safe water has influenced Indian conceptualisation of water as a right, thereby, delivering 
partial translation of the right. In South Africa’s case, it seems that national policies relating 
to water were more elaborate in establishing a minimum standard of norms in adherence to 
the constitutional ideals for universal enjoyment of a human right to water. This shows that 
explicit constitutional protection goes even further to shape executive translation of the right 
to water. Therefore I conclude that, even though the Ugandan understanding of a right to 
water ensconces some of the elements of the right to water at international law, it remains to 
be fully conceptualised.  
 The study found that domestic understanding of the right to water was enhanced by 
adjudication in India and South Africa. In India, the expansive interpretations of the right to 
life and the right to a clean and healthy environment by the Supreme Court yielded a limited 
interpretation of a human right to water for drinking purposes. I argue that although this 
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understanding of the right to water goes some way to enhance enjoyment of the right and to 
minimise the negative outcomes of consuming unsafe water, it does not fully accommodate 
the international law understanding of the right to water. At the same time, the South African 
Constitutional Court’s reluctance to read a right to water into the right to life has inhibited 
better understanding of some dimensions of the right to water. The study found that although 
the South African Constitutional Court had directly adjudicated upon the right to water, its 
jurisprudence has not established immediately claimable entitlements to water and has mainly 
expanded understanding of the state obligations to citizens by imposing substantive standards 
on the state at national and municipal levels of government. Given that the right to water has 
not been adjudicated upon in Uganda, and as my study lamented, that this was not likely to 
happen soon, I would argue that the extent to which courts have been able to use the manner 
in which the right to water is constitutionally protected to interpret the right is also 
determined by their own internal approaches to adjudication. 
6.2.2 The impact of constitutional protection on water struggles 
All three countries studied were faced with complex challenges to improving water delivery. 
This study found that struggles for better delivery of water for domestic use, although 
complex, have benefitted significantly from invoking human rights law as a means to frame 
demands for equitable water access.
6
 At the same time, the struggles for water rights appear 
to be more vocal where water is perceived as a human right, as was the case in India and 
South Africa. Uganda appeared to have muted claims for water delivery with little attention 
being given to the articulation of claims for water both by the legislature and executive. At 
most, concerns relating to water appear to have been voiced where a value added tax on water 
delivery for those accessing piped water was proposed by government. Yet in both rural and 
urban areas, water delivery remains a significant challenge for many citizens. 
It appears that, in India and South Africa, the need to ameliorate the water crises borne 
by citizens has been articulated as a legitimate claim for which the State must be held to 
account. Yet, the cases decided in courts reflect an implicit difference in the form which 
water struggles have taken. In India, because claims for water are drawn from claims of a 
right to life, the legitimacy of such claims appears to be driven by a threat to life. In South 
Africa on the other hand, claims for water are directly linked to demands for fulfilment of 
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standard norms and the expectation that municipal councils have an obligation to provide 
basic services. This tells us that, in South Africa, where the right to water is constitutionally 
entrenched, struggles for water have been better shaped and inspired by the constitutional 
promise to establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental 
rights.  
It appears that constitutional protection of a right to water has enhanced State 
accountability towards citizens by requiring the executive to transparently explain its policies 
and engage with citizens in a forum which allows for such state policies to be subjected to 
rigorous evaluation. Particularly for South Africa, the study found that citizen engagement in 
policy making is more rigorously demanded. I argue that the explicit constitutional protection 
of a right to water accounts for the extent to which the executive has engaged with citizens 
prior to reviewing and improving its water policies. Therefore I conclude that democratic 
accountability for water delivery appears to be better facilitated in South Africa than is the 
case in India and Uganda. 
6.2.3 The social impact of vindicating a right to water 
Efficient mechanisms for water delivery, or a lack thereof, have a direct impact on 
communities in the countries studied. Commentators have argued that socio-economic rights 
adjudication provide a means through which the social conditions underpinning the lived 
realities of citizens can be improved.
7
 Given that the claimants for a right to water are in 
many instances poor and vulnerable, it is to be expected that there would be direct benefits in 
the form of remedies such as improved water delivery frameworks, as well as indirect 
benefits through empowering rights beneficiaries. The study of India found that beneficiaries 
had directly benefited in some instances, where municipal authorities had been ordered to 
ensure that steps were taken to provide or improve the quality of drinking water. Although 
the initial wave of judge-led vindication of a right to water appeared to have improved the 
lived realities of citizens, given that concerns over the courts’ increasingly neo-liberal 
leanings cannot be overlooked, it would appear that there has not been a substantive shift in 
the balance of power in favour of vulnerable citizens. I argued that this may be as a result of 
the absence of an explicit constitutional right to water, upon which objective and principled 
judicial interpretations of the right can be founded. In South Africa, by contrast, 
commentators showed that there was both a direct benefit in terms of improved water 
delivery services as well as a shift in the existing structures of power arising from direct 
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vindication of a right to water in favour of poor and vulnerable citizens.
8
 I therefore conclude 
that the South African model, which ensconces constitutional protection and direct 
adjudication, is more likely to deliver direct and indirect benefits of enjoying water services. 
6.2.4 The extent to which constitutional entrenchment counters neo-liberal ideology 
This study interrogated the extent to which a constitutional entrenchment of a human right to 
water facilitated branches of government to rely on the human rights based approach in 
developing and implementing executive policy, legislation and judicial decisions. In all three 
countries studied there appear to be intentional measures to ensure that the price of water for 
basic needs remains affordable. Nonetheless, for those most poor and vulnerable, the 
existence of ability to pay as a pre-condition to enjoyment of the right to water negates the 
ideal of a universal right to enjoy access to water. The negative impact of this pre-condition is 
particularly felt in Uganda and India. In South Africa’s case, the adoption of a free basic 
water entitlement and broader social policies designed to cater for the needs of marginalised 
citizens’ points to a more rights-based approach to water delivery. 
 In all three countries studied, I showed that water related legislation, policies and 
decisions were significantly influenced by neo-liberal ideology. In Uganda, where the right to 
water is read into other rights and the directive principles of state policy, a strong neo-liberal 
water delivery system was established through legislation and policy, which used a weak 
rights language and focused on the delivery of water as a service to consumers. The study of 
India found that the existing legislation and proposed legislative framework facilitating a 
water delivery system was mostly neo-liberally inspired. At the same time it found that, while 
the Supreme Court had initially set down pro-poor decisions, in more recent years there were 
concerns that its decisions had been increasingly neo-liberally inspired. The study of South 
Africa found that, while executive policy and legislation had neo-liberal leanings, they were 
curtailed by the presence of explicit constitutional protection of the human right to water. 
Even though commentators remain concerned that the Constitutional court and High court 
adopted a neo-liberal stance which perceived water users as consumers, it appears that the 
extent to which a market based approach to water delivery was furthered by executive policy 
was countered by the constitutional protection to a right to water. The South African 
adjudication of the right to water exemplifies the possibility of challenging the neo-liberalism 
underpinning a State’s water policies. To conclude, I find that where the right to water is 
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given constitutional protection, such a rights-based conceptualisation of water needs may 
offer an effective counter weight to neoliberal discourse. 
6.2.5 The impact of constitutional protection on institutional dialogue 
This study found that the constitutional protection of a right to water could enhance and 
sustain institutional dialogue between the branches of government and social dialogue 
between government agencies and citizens. Such dialogue was also found to be a useful 
means through which translation and actualisation of socio-economic rights can be enhanced. 
In all three countries studied, water delivery was effected through local governments 
responsible for the delivery of municipal services. It is to be expected that this institutional 
dialogue inevitably involves the local governments, which are directly responsible for 
ensuring delivery of services in a manner which upholds constitutional ideals.  In Uganda, 
where a non-justiciable right to water exists, some dialogue appeared to exist between the 
legislative and executive institutions over formulation of law and policy which would affect 
the prices of water. But it would appear that executive positions prevail over the form and 
outcome of water delivery. This may be explained by the fact that the executive is better 
supported by technocrats and is therefore in a better position to adopt and implement policies 
for effective water delivery. Even then,  I conclude that for Uganda the institutional dialogue 
has not been sustained and has mostly remained weak on account of the vague understanding 
of the ambit and scope of a right to water. 
For India, where an indirectly justiciable right to water is recognised, the study found 
that the dialogue seemed to have been sparked by judicial interpretations of a right to life, as 
including drinking water. I argued that subsequent national and federal state policies which 
clarified a right to potable drinking water were a result of a dialogue between the judiciary 
and executive arms of government. Even then, I showed that it had taken a long time for the 
executive and lately the legislative arms of government to act upon the judicial interpretations 
of a right to water. I therefore conclude that, while the indirect vindication model may 
facilitate interpretations of a right to water, it does not stimulate the much desired 
institutional dialogue necessary to enhance entitlement and enjoyment of a right to water for 
beneficiaries.  
Perhaps the South African experience provides the best evidence of the ability to 
sustain institutional conversations between the branches of government and rights 
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beneficiaries.
9
  This study argued that because of the possibility of direct vindication of a 
right to water, South African policies, programs and legislation have been enriched within a 
shorter period of time than India. The changes in the national and municipal water policies 
which have occurred since the coming into force of the 1996 Constitution (which entrenched 
a justiciable right to water) may manifest an attempt to maintain dialogue between the 
institutions of government, about better ways of enhancing access to water and fulfilling the 
aim of progressively removing impediments to enjoyment of the right. Even though it would 
appear that the institutional contribution of the executive to translating the right to water has 
stimulated much of the changes to water policies and legislation, I would argue that like the 
study of India showed, national and provincial water policies are more likely to benefit from 
the outcomes of judicial review of executive policy. This was particularly shown by the 
manner in which the City of Johannesburg responded to the Mazibuko litigation by 
consistently altering its policies to accommodate the applicants’ concerns, which led to the 
City’s water policy being more pro-poor. I therefore conclude that the dialogical benefits 
promised by socio-economic rights adjudication, have benefited South Africa more 
substantially as a result of the simultaneous constitutional protection and adjudicating the 
right to water. 
6.3 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The dissertation showed that there were various entitlements flowing from recognition of the 
human right to water and the application of a rights-based approach to water delivery. In 
arriving at the desirable point where these entitlements can be both enjoyed and claimed, 
international law envisages that the State and its agencies have several obligations to realise. 
Most of these obligations may well be realised through the involvement of private water 
suppliers. Inevitably, this brings into play the question of the extent to which a horizontal 
application of the right to water may enhance enjoyment of the right for beneficiaries. 
However, this dissertation did not elaborate on the manner in which a horizontal application 
to the right to water may play out for citizens and third parties. Research on this aspect may 
engage with and clarify the full extent of a State’s obligations in realising the rights of 
citizens. 
 The research showed that Uganda’s water policies and its water delivery paradigms 
appeared to be heavily influenced by neo-liberal underpinnings. Yet, this research did not 
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fully explore the ways in which a neo-liberal policy environment can effectively co-exist 
within the rights based approach to water delivery advocated for in this thesis. At the same 
time, given that the neo-liberal influences were present in all three countries studied, it is 
unlikely that states may completely abandon a consumer and market based paradigm in 
improving water delivery services. I therefore propose that further research on the co-
existence of the two paradigms would be necessary to minimise the harsh effects of neo-
liberal ideology on poor and vulnerable citizens. 
 This dissertation showed that domestic understandings of judicial power appear to 
impact on the extent to which courts are willing to enforce socio-economic rights and the 
right to water. But the research did not fully explore or propose ways in which the enjoyment 
of these rights can be enhanced by engaging with the judicial function and domestic 
conceptualisations of the limits of judicial power in Uganda. I propose that further research in 
this area may enhance an understanding of the role of the courts in vindicating socio-
economic rights.   
6.4 CONCLUSION 
Water has several dimensions, which mainly revolve around its resource capabilities, 
economic utility as well as a basic necessity of life. It is possible to utilise a rights based 
approach to water in order to meaningfully improve access to the resource. At the same time, 
the tension between all these dimensions may be reduced when water is perceived within a 
reconceptualised human right for citizens. This dissertation concludes that there appear to be 
three necessary pre-conditions to effective enjoyment of the right to water: an explicitly 
articulated right within the domestic constitutional framework; explicit justiciability of the 
human right to water and an open, approachable and creative court, in whose arena poor and 
vulnerable citizens can voice claims.  
In addition, the cost and other resource implications of enhancing enjoyment of a right 
to water through improved water delivery mechanisms cannot be ignored. Where these three 
pre-conditions are in place, water delivery ceases to be confined within the legislative and 
executive spheres and is extended to the judicial sphere. This facilitates the institutional 
interaction required to remove the impediments to the enjoyment of the right to water, 
because these impediments are more likely to be given adequate attention by state agencies. 
In this way, effective translation of the human right to water in a manner that postulates water 
for basic needs through the lens of a rights based approach would most likely have tangible 
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results for the most desperate citizens. It is therefore hoped that, once the Ugandan courts re-
conceptualise their interpretive function, they will be well placed to offer claimants relief by 
affirming the enforceability of a human right to water and crafting appropriate remedies for 
its violation.  
 Finally, much progress has been made in increasing access to water for most of the 
poor and vulnerable citizens, particularly in urban areas, but these efforts still fall short of the 
constitutional ideal which rests on an equitable society. This study has shown that, if Uganda 
is committed to enhancing enjoyment of the right to water, it ought to expressly articulate a 
justiciable right to water in the Constitution and empower Courts to evaluate policies aimed 
at giving effect to the right for constitutional compliance. Considering that the idea of a 
review of the 1995 Constitution is being mooted these additional efforts may realise the 
commitment ‘to building a better future by establishing a socioeconomic and political order 
through a popular and durable national Constitution based on the principles of unity, peace, 
equality, democracy, freedom, social justice and progress.’10  
                                                          
10
 Preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995.  
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